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ABSTRACT

THE WORD: JACQUES ELLUL’S DIALOGIC RESPONSE TO LA TECHNIQUE

By
Jeffrey S. Bogaczyk
May 2018

Dissertation supervised by Dr. Calvin L. Troup
The focus of this interpretive work is primarily to bring two Ellulian metaphors
into conversation with one another: la technique, and “the word.” Jacques Ellul (19121994), a prominent French philosopher, sociologist, and theologian, is predominantly
known for his critique of what he calls la technique, an underlying system which acts as
an all-encompassing feature of necessity, which privileges the values of efficiency, speed,
and progress in all societal endeavors, and which serves as the predominant interpretive
lens by which we can examine and understand our current historical and cultural moment.
Technique had its origination in the value system of the machine, but its tentacles have
now reached into every aspect of human lived experience, turning humanity into a means,
limiting human freedom, and reconstructing truth in terms of fact. In response to what
Ellul calls the Technological Society, he presents the idea of “the word,” a dialogic

iv

metaphor which illuminates the intersubjective intentionality in human relation by
recognizing the value of authentic “encounter” in a phenomenological space which
Martin Buber described as “the between.” Ellul prioritizes dialogue over and against the
totality of a world given over to Technique. This dissertation seeks to understand the
dialectic between these two oppositions, to bring them into conversation with one another
in an effort to understand how Ellul’s dialogic hermeneutic can serve as a response to
Technique, and to present some possible solutions which can serve to guide human
beings seeking liberation within the tyranny of the Technological Society.
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Chapter One: The Problem of Technique
Introduction
Humanity has always found itself in a unique relationship to technology. The astounding
achievements and advancements that have come as a result of technological development have
served to contribute to the betterment of the human condition in virtually every arena of human
life. Science, business, communication, medicine and other fields all provide multiple examples
of how technological advancements have contributed to more efficiency, greater production,
newer discoveries and an overall progress in the advance of human society. Francis Bacon wrote
in 1620 that the “real and legitimate goal of the sciences is the endowment of human life with
new inventions and riches” (F. Bacon & Devey, 2010, p. 58). Bacon’s observation seems
obvious.
On a less conspicuous note, however, there is an aspect to technology that has been
considered problematic - a lingering question about some of the consequences of technological
progress. As mentioned, the examples of the benefits of technological progress appear endless,
but in the euphoria of new invention, the potential negative aspects of these technologies remain
hidden from view and even shrink into the shadow they themselves create. The shining light of
newness, speed, efficiency, and progress sometimes prevents us from realizing that in each new
technological advancement, we might be losing something. Neil Postman referred to technology
as a Faustian bargain – technology giveth and technology taketh away – and in his work
Technopoly (1993) makes the argument that while technology produces multiple benefits to
humanity, there are other less positive consequences. He states:
“[T]he accusation can be made that the uncontrolled growth of technology destroys the
vital sources of our humanity. It creates a culture without a moral foundation. It
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undermines certain mental processes and social relations that make human life worth
living.” (1993, p. xii)
Postman’s critique of technology is not alone. Others have echoed and shared his sentiment and
while some see technology as neutral – an instrumental view that recognizes technology as a tool
subject to the way in which it is used - scholars have suggested that technology is itself “a human
process that is value-laden throughout” (Christians, 2002, pp. 38–40). Today, we find ourselves
in a historical moment characterized by technicalization in all areas, and particularly in the realm
of our communication media. Van der Laan states, “Technology determines now, as never
before, the modalities of our existence” (Laan, 2012, p. 242). Postman, with an attention to our
communication media, reconsiders Ellul’s la technique as “the technical thesis” and points out
how, in a technically dominated culture, we can come to the point where procedure supersedes
and even becomes more real than purpose. This situation across the totality of a culture is what
Postman calls Technopoly (Postman, 1993). Whether it is called the technical thesis (Postman,
1979a, pp. 90–91), la technique (Ellul, 1964), Technopoly (Postman, 1993), technics (Mumford,
2010), mechanology (Stiegler, 1998), or scientism (Lewis, 2015), the problem of technology
affects a culture in its totality. This problem, especially in regard to communication, defines the
scope of a discipline within communication studies that investigates the mediated environment.
“Media Ecology,” formally developed into a meta-discipline through Postman and draws its
theoretical foundations from a multitude of scholars, the most notable including Lewis Mumford,
Harold Innis, Walter Ong, Marshall McLuhan, Elizabeth Eisenstein, Eric Havelock, Jacques
Ellul, Alfred Korzybski, Neil Postman, and Lance Strate. Media ecology directs its focus toward
understanding our symbolic environments - our communication environments. Postman states:
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“Every society is held together by certain modes and patterns of communication which
control the kind of society it is. One may call them information systems, codes, message
networks, or media of communication. Taken together they set and maintain the
parameters of thought and learning within a culture” (Postman, 1979a, p. 29).
Media ecologists are interested in how these media of communication influence us and how they
impact and relate to one another. As our communication environments change due to
technological advancements in communication media, our thinking and behavior change as well
(Forsberg, 2009, p. 138).
A main tenet of the media ecology discipline is the ecological metaphor. As with any
ecological system, the system itself is predicated upon balance. A change in one component of a
system changes the entirety of the system itself. This balance-centered theory of media is what
media ecology addresses. Gencarelli states “If balance is the key principle underlying the
ecology of natural environs, then media ecology is about striking a balance in the ecosystem that
is the information or media environment” (Gencarelli, 2000, p. 94). The attention to ecology
points to an environmental concern that the means by which people communicate comprise an
environment referenced by Marshall McLuhan in his famous aphorism, “the medium is the
message.” The medium is the message precisely because the medium structures our modes of
thought (For greater understanding of this concept, see McLuhan, 1994).
Defining the Problem
As previously mentioned, the argument has been made that the uncontrolled growth of
technology is having an adverse effect on what it has traditionally meant to be human – in our
moral foundations, our mental processes and social relations. While technology promises to
connect us in greater ways through newer electronic communication technologies (i.e. the
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internet, mobile phones, chat apps, social media platforms, etc.), the reality is that our human
social interactions are growing apart. Sherry Turkle exposes this dichotomy, how today,
“insecure in our relationships and anxious about intimacy, we look to technology for ways to be
in relationships and protect ourselves at the same time… We bend to the inanimate with new
solicitude. We fear the risks and disappointments of relationships with our fellow humans. We
expect more from technology and less from each other” (Turkle, 2012, p. xii). Ellul noticed the
same predicament, albeit years earlier:
“Men become accustomed to listening to machines and talking to machines, as, for
example, with telephones and dictaphones. No more face-to-face encounters, no more
dialogue. In a perpetual monologue by means of which he escapes the anguish of silence
and the inconvenience of neighbors, man finds refuge in the lap of technique, which
envelops him in solitude and at the same time reassures him with all its hoaxes” (Ellul,
1964, pp. 379–380).
Turkle and Ellul call our attention to a societal crisis: a shift in the nature of human
communication. Within such a cultural context, the ecological metaphor draws our attention to
the importance and the need for something to restore balance. This project interrogates Jacques
Ellul’s work to examine the dialectical tension between the technological society and human
relation – to explore if and how his dialogic metaphor of “the word” can serve as a balancing
response to dominating aspect of la technique.
Ellul’s Project
Ellul’s work primarily investigates what he calls “Technique.” He states, “I try to offer a
theoretical explanation for a phenomenon that strikes me as all-encompassing, a phenomenon
that covers the whole range of human activities… This all-inclusive view, this framework, is that
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of technique (Ellul, 2004, p. 28). And while one of his intellectual influences, Karl Marx, looked
at Capital as the explanatory element for interpreting society during the nineteenth century, Ellul
looks at Technique as the most decisive factor for explaining the twentieth century (Ellul, 2004,
p. 26). His work cannot be accurately interpreted without an in-depth understanding of his
concept of dialectic. Early in his life, he read Marx and became convinced that understanding
the material forces of our world opened the door to its interpretation. Later in his life, he
converted to Christianity and found that Jesus Christ supplied something for him personally that
he found lacking in Marx. While Marx could explain his material condition, Marx could not
answer the existential questions of life, love, death and the meaning of human existence. Christ,
therefore provided an answer on one account and Marx on the other. These two sources, Marx
and Christ, became the poles of dialectic tension in Ellul’s thought. He states:
I thus remained unable to eliminate Marx, unable to eliminate the biblical revelation, and
unable to merge the two. For me, it was impossible to put them together. So I began to
be torn between the two, and I have remained so all my life. The development of my
thinking can be explained with this contradiction” (Ellul, 1982, p. 16).
Any interpretation of Ellul must recognize this dialectic framework. He explains:
[T]here is a dialectic within my work, and it is entirely central in that I have discovered
progressively that in the world we live in there are no means of thinking and acquiring
knowledge that are not of a dialectical nature…I became conscious, as I worked and
thought, that I needed to interpret all things dialectically.” (Ellul, 1982, pp. 201–202).
The same dialectic exists in relation to communication. Ellul’s work in Propaganda (1973b)
investigates the technique of communication on a mass scale and how the “word” in human
communication becomes subject to la technique in order to accomplish its purposes. Propaganda
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is not something “made by certain people for certain purposes” but is rather a sociological
phenomenon that can only exist in the technological society (Ellul, 1973b, p. v). He juxtaposed
this view of communication with a different perspective in The Humiliation of the Word (1985)
addressing what he considered a modern crisis in language. In HOTW, Ellul explicates how
language, and particularly “the Word,” has been subjugated by the predominance of the image in
the technological society. He describes a humiliation of language which comes from
structuralists with a “pure” view of language who have attacked it as a communicating medium,
as well as post-structuralists who attempt to remove the speaker from the speech act (Ellul, 1985,
p. xi).
Contrasting these perspectives on language, Ellul’s understanding of the “word” is
dialogic and embedded in human relation. It is not something that is merely spoken, but
something which must be heard as well. “All human speech in intrinsically connected to a
person,” he states, and notes that the objective word, left to itself and separate from the person
who speaks it, loses all its weight and even its relationship to truth (Ellul, 1985, p. 33). Though
not well recognized as a dialogic communication theorist, Ellul’s understanding of “word” has
advanced the thinking about dialogue and convincingly situated him in the conversation. The
key to understanding Ellul is best found in chapter three of The Presence of the Kingdom, where
he frames what he considers the key problem of our time – the problem of the end and the
means. Technique has woven its value system into the fabric of our culture in such a way to
upend traditional societal ends by turning them into means. The technological society, directed
by a totalitarian technical system turns humanity into a means serving Technique and creates a
dilemma for human beings: we do not know where we are going (Ellul, 1989, p. 51). The fact
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that the human is no longer an end and society is solely concerned with “means” concerns Ellul
and his work addresses this issue phenomenologically – as it presents itself to consciousness.
The Dialogic Landscape
Dialogue as an emerging concept in communication research can be said to originate in
Johannesen’s founding article Communication as Dialogue, (1971) where the author explores the
groundwork for an investigation into communication as dialogue in three general areas: the
components of the concept of dialogue, the nature of monologue as viewed by dialogic
advocates, and questions regarding dialogue for ongoing communication research (Johannesen,
1971, p. 373). Dialogic theory within the literature, is recognized through a variety of lenses.
Anderson, Baxter and Cissna (2004b) look at foundational philosophers who include dialogue as
a major focus of inquiry: Martin Buber, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jurgen Habermas and Mikhail
Bakhtin. Additionally, Stewart, Zediker & Black (2004) denote Buber, Bakhtin, Bohm, Freire,
and Gadamer as "philosophers of dialogue." Regardless of the designation "philosopher of
dialogue," each of these theorists has a unique understanding of dialogue that highlights it as an
area of focus for communication scholars.
Dialogic theory in a postmodern historical moment must recognize and understand
difference. Theorists approach the issue of dialogue recognizing a specific standpoint or
perspective and Cissna and Anderson (1994, pp. 10–13) detail four conceptions on dialogue that
co-exist within the literature. The first comes out of the work of Martin Buber and looks at
dialogue as a form of human meeting and a relationship with the other. The second conception
deals with dialogue as an analysis of the intricacies of human conversation and is found in the
research of Markova and Foppa (1990) and Deborah Tannen (1989). Third, there is a conception
derived primarily from the work of Mikhail Bakhtin (1986; 1981) that sees dialogue as a cultural
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form of human knowing. And fourth, dialogue has been examined as a philosophy of textual
understanding and interpretation derived mainly from the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer (1960).
Other prominent theorists have examined dialogue in multiple communication contexts, and
Anderson, Baxter and Cissna give a detailed account of the literature on dialogue from 19902004 (see Stewart et al., 2004, pp. 3–15 as well as) (2004, p. 3-15).
The foundations of dialogic communication have also been articulated from philosophical
ground and the scholars who adopt this perspective toward communication research typically
address four main focal points. First, they recognize in their research the priority of the
“transaction,” “relationship”, or “the between” in dialogue as opposed to the communication
message or communication effect. Second, they recognize experientialism as a constitutive
element in the accumulation of factual knowledge. Citing Williams, Johannsen recognizes that
important elements of dialogic communication “present themselves only through the experience
of transactional partners” (Johannesen, 1971, p. 378 citing Kenneth R. Williams, “Speech
Communication Research: One World or Two?” Central States Speech Journal, 21 (1970), 178.).
Third, these scholars recognize a focus on self and subjectivity, emphasizing self-awareness,
sensitivity, role taking, authenticity and the self as becoming. The fourth characterization is an
understanding of holism in dialogic communication. Holism recognizes the “multitude of
interdependent cognitive, affective, behavioral, and contextual variables” in dialogue (See
Stewart, 1978). The philosophical ground from which these foci develop comes out of
hermeneutic and existential phenomenology. “[T]he concept of relationship [is grounded in] the
phenomenological notion of relational reality, experientialism in the phenomenological notion of
intuition, self-focus in the subjectivity of existentialism, and holism in philosophical
anthropology (Stewart, 1978, p. 185). The philosophical grounding of dialogic communication
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in phenomenology implies a particular phenomenological understanding of language. Deetz
advocates for this phenomenological view as opposed to a representational and an ordinary view
of language where both the ordinary and representational views are understood as derivative
views that objectify language and tend toward abstraction (Deetz, 1973, pp. 40, 41). Deetz’s
phenomenological view of language sees (1) knowledge as, by necessity, conscious knowledge
(intentional and directed), (2) conscious experience as preceded by a pre-reflective constitution,
and (3) conscious knowledge as already housed in language (In Deetz, 1973 Deetz details the
phenomenological aspects of his view of language and grounds it in the work of Heidegger and
Gadamer).
Dialogue as a phenomenological concept is also addressed by Arnett. In his article
Toward a Phenomenological Dialogue (Arnett, 1981), Arnett discusses and bridges the
relationship between two approaches to communication theory, the dialogic and the
phenomenological. It is his intent to distinguish a phenomenological dialogic communication
theory from a dialogic theory grounded in “third force” psychology as presented in the work of
Carl Rogers and Abraham Maslow (Maslow, 1943, 1959; C. Rogers, 1961; C. R. Rogers, 1951;
C. R. Rogers & Stevens, 1967). Arnett’s understanding of phenomenological dialogue is one
which recognizes the principle of intentionality. As Husserl (2012) noted, consciousness is
always consciousness of, or intentional and therefore implies “the acceptance of a nonsubject/object world view in which the meaning of a communication happening emerges
“between” persons, not in each person’s internal perceptions or through environmental control”
(Arnett, 1981, pp. 206–207). The phenomenological concept of the “between” comes out of with
work of Martin Buber and recognizes that meaning in dialogue occurs “between” two individuals
rather than inside them. This locus of meaning in dialogue is the basic difference between
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psychologism’s possessive nature and dialogue’s interdependence. Arnett’s work (Arnett, 1982,
1986, 1994; Arnett & Arneson, 1999) discusses the implications of Buber’s contribution to
dialogic communication and reveals dialogue in its phenomenological nature.
The literature on Ellul is vast and addresses multiple aspects in Ellul’s thought. Scholars
have addressed his sociological work (Kuhns, 1971 see particularly chapter 5; Lovekin, 1982;
Matos Alves, 2014; Omachonu & Healey, 2009), his theology (Christians, 2006a; Stout, 2006),
his critique of technique and technology (Lockhart, 1996; Moore, 1998; Petroşel, 2012; Strate,
2006), and his understanding of communications and communication theory (Christians, 1979,
2009; Gladney, 1991; Karim, 2001; Lyle, 2008; Schick & Posner, 1985; Soukup, 1988; St. John,
2010). More importantly for this project is the research on Ellul as a dialogic communication
theorist. Christians (Christians, 1988) places Ellul alongside Martin Buber, Paulo Freire, and
Jurgen Habermas as a dialogic theorist noting that Ellul’s la technique describes the I-Itness in
the mass media and that the only safeguard against this is a “steadfast, radical, unrelenting
commitment to I-Thou relationships ”(Christians, 1988, p. 22). In claiming Ellul as a dialogist,
Christians notes Ellul’s prioritization in POK of the human being. Christians (1988, p. 22) sees
in Ellul’s work that two modalities (I-Thou and I-It) of dialogue and propaganda are dialectically
connected where the ebb and flow of one occurs at the expense of the other. The research on
Ellul as a dialogic theorist seems to indicate a need for greater investigation and this project
endeavors to examine how his work prioritizes dialogue as a response to the I-Itness of
Technique.
Ellul is also considered a seminal thinker within the Media Ecology tradition, having
influenced Neil Postman, one of the founders of the discipline. Geraldine Forsberg (2014)
outlines Ellul’s influence on Postman and notes how Ellul’s texts provided a foundation for the
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understanding of technology and media in the media ecology program at New York University
during the late 1980’s. Postman (1979b, p. 244) himself references Ellul as a scholar who
illuminates the mediated environment and provides a greater understanding on how technology
effects how our thoughts, understandings, and actions occur. Postman (1993, p. xii) positions
Ellul as a scholar who had described the sociological context created by technology, as one who
has opposed uncontrolled technological development (Postman, 1995, p. 139), as one who
recognizes how our technologies affect who we ultimately become (Postman, 1979a, pp. 100–
101, 1995, p. 190), as one who understands how our politics are shaped by it (Postman, 1979a, p.
96), and one who has tried to document the psychological and social changes that technology
brings to a culture (Postman, 1979a, p. 188). Strate also references Ellul’s perspective on the
technological society and its relation to identity – that “powerful technologies made possible the
creation of the mass society, a society in which a mass of individuals are identical in their
anonymity and apathy, equal in their alienation and impotence, and all the same in their
indifference” (2007, p. 225). Strate sees Ellul as a seminal thinker within media ecology
scholarship having a perspective on media and technology that situates him firmly within the
field of inquiry and additionally recognizes Ellul’s influence on Postman particularly concerning
verbal discourse juxtaposed with image (Strate, 1994, pp. 160, 167). Forsberg (2014) values
Ellul, not only for his sociological contributions to a greater understanding of technology, but
also for his contributions to a greater understanding of the English language with his emphasis
on “the word.” Garrison (2012) argues that Ellul’s concept of la technique has been subsumed in
our contemporary culture by a trend not for rationalized efficiency – as Ellul talks about in TS
(Ellul, 1964) - but for an evolved efficiency which has resulted in a fourth milieu of virtuality,
which he believes could revitalize Ellulian scholarship. Within the media ecology tradition, Ellul
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is a scholar who has had a profound impact on thought and scholarship, furthering the
conversation on the relationship between humanity, human communication and technology.
Methodology of Inquiry
It also serves a purpose here to detail the method in which I approach this research. In
seeking how Ellul can help us to navigate Technique through his metaphor of “the word,” I will
be working from a Hermeneutic/Interpretive framework. The Interpretive perspective in
communication research is primarily concerned with finding meaning in communication
(Cheney, 2000, p. 18). Within this perspective are several loci of interpretation. First is the
social actor. The interpreter orients himself toward research and recognizes himself as a subject
with theories on the social world and a desire to understand the processes by which meaning is
constructed in that world. Within this framework, the interpreter works as a researcher in the
active process of finding meaning and considers both the historical moment as well as the
context of life experiences that constitute the research. The linguistic turn in philosophy serves
as an important moment for interpretivism because it recognized language as a constructor of
meaning where the "text" can become the focus of research. Interpretivism analyzes ideas of
exposition, explanation, commentary, and representation along with an impressionistic stress on
creativity, all with the understanding that human beings hold a capacity to make sense of the
world as it is experienced through language and symbolism.
The hermeneutic method for interpretive research has been recommended and used by
scholars as a method of research (Butler, 1998) and is defined as the theory or philosophy of the
interpretation of meaning (Bleicher, 1980). The need for methodological principles in
interpretive research has been indicated by Walsham who notes that “interpretive researchers are
attempting the difficult task of accessing other people’s interpretations, filtering them through
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their own conceptual apparatus, and feeding a version of events back to others, including in some
cases, both interviewees and other audiences. In carrying out this work, it is important that
interpretive researchers have a view of their own role in this complex process” (Walsham, 1995,
p. 77). There is a need for an interpretive researcher to recognize his/her own bias at the
beginning so that researchers can question their own interpretations and recognize how their
subjective perspective informs the research.
Paul Ricoeur’s phenomenological hermeneutics (Ricœur, 1973) presents a methodology
for interpreting texts that will guide this project. He defines hermeneutics as a theory of
understanding in relation to the interpretation of a text (Ricoeur & Thompson, 1981, p. 43) and
his interpretation theory is founded on the dialectics between explanation and understanding.
Ricouer’s phenomenological hermeneutics will direct my interpretive work in order to gain a
greater understanding of Ellul’s project and his contribution to a dialogical response to
Technique. Additionally, this project works within the framework of a constructive hermeneutic.
Deconstruction, as a form of philosophical and literary analysis derived mainly from Derrida,
questions the fundamental concepts and meanings within a text and seeks not to build upon what
is given in text, but rather to “deconstruct it” and find meaning in the opposition and difference
between the signs and symbols outside of the author’s intent. A constructive hermeneutic
recognizes an author and seeks to find meaning based upon the intentionality of the author found
within the text and the particular historical moment – understanding theory and offering
constructive suggestions for implementation. Standing on the ground of a constructive
hermeneutic and beginning with an understanding of coherence, comprehensiveness, penetration,
thoroughness, appropriateness, contextuality, agreement, suggestiveness and potential, I believe
that an interpretive project into Ellul and dialogue can be fruitful and advance the research into
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Ellul and provide a greater understanding of Ellul’s thought regarding communication,
technology and humanity.
Charting the Course
In chapter two, I frame the context for the project by investigating Technique in the sense
that Ellul understands it – as an underlying system within society. I explicate the idea of
Technique in relation to science and explain their codependent relationship with one another. I
then turn to a historical examination in order to uncover the evolution of a technical way of
thinking or a “technical mindset.” I begin this historical investigation by seeking traces of its
development from the time of the Ancient Greeks and Romans, through the medieval dark ages,
the Renaissance and into the modern era. I additionally give consideration to Enlightenment
philosophy that grew out of the scientific and Newtonian revolutions. Enlightenment
philosophy, represented in the debate between the Continental Rationalists and the British
Empiricists, privileged a technical scientific epistemology which then allowed the world of value
and meaning to start shriveling away (Christians, 1988, p. 7). Cassirer’s understanding of the
eighteenth century as a time “imbued with a belief in the unity and immutability of reason”
(Cassirer, 1972, p. 6) allowed Sir Isaac Newton to describe the world in his Principia (2013) as a
lifeless machine composed of mathematical laws and built on uniform natural causes in a closed
system (Newton as quoted in Christians, 1988, p. 7).
Chapter three seeks to gain greater perspective on the problem of Technique by
examining the contribution of a meta-disciplinary field of inquiry: media ecology. As
mentioned previously, media ecology recognizes our media as an environment and inquires
about the effects of our media and technology. Media ecology can help illuminate our current
technological society by providing scholarship which helps to understand and explain our
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ongoing relationship with media. I examine several metaphors which guide media ecology
scholarship and give insight to our understanding. I look at media as extensions – that each
technology extends one or more of our senses. I turn to media as environment – that we live,
breathe, and act within media. I explicate media as species – that within an ecology, each media
exists in relationship with other media. I investigate media as epistemology – that every media
reconstructs and reorganizes our thought processes and perceptions of our world. And finally, I
explore media as information – seeking to understand the relationship between the digital
environment and information as commodity. Though Ellul primarily worked as a sociologist,
media ecology has claimed him as a scholar who understands and examines technology as “a key
phenomenon… that is modifying the structure of our entire society” (Arendt, 1967, p. 47).
Chapter four of this project looks at phenomenological dialogue as a fundamental aspect of
human relation and a point of resistance to the problem of la technique. In order to understand
the phenomenological aspect of dialogue, we examine its evolution through the work of the
father of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl and then to Heidegger who established an intentional
quality in Dasein, a human being’s mode of Being, and extended it to the intersubjective
relationship. Schrag then furthered the concept recognizing intersubjective intentionality as one
of the constituent qualities of the structure of moral consciousness. The tradition of dialogic
theory, however, includes the work of Martin Buber (1947, 2010) – the preeminent dialogist.
Buber’s understanding of dialogue in the primary I-Thou subjective relationship forms the
foundation for authentic human communication and is rooted in a phenomenological stance that
happens “between” people, and which emerges in ephemeral moments of human meeting. For
Buber, dialogue manifests itself as a stance or an orientation in communication rather than a
method or technique - the fundamental fact of human existence is “man with man” – a
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perspective that constructs meaning and the sense of self in the “between” space in relationships.
This chapter investigates phenomenological dialogue and situates the research in order to provide
a background for Ellul’s concept of the “word.”
Chapter five details Ellul’s dialogic metaphor of the word as a response to la technique. In
HOTW, (1985) Ellul provides an explication of “the word” as a communicative practice and
theoretical concept that grounds humanity in meaning. Though he does not address Buber
specifically or develop a dialogic theory of communication, he is considered as a dialogic scholar
by Clifford Christians who states that Ellul “follows in the spirit of Socrates and Vico who insist
that the human prospect remain the central issue.”(Christians, 1988, p. 22) Christians goes on to
note the anthropological priority of Ellul which privileges human freedom, humanitarian ends,
and flesh and blood reality. Buber’s two modalities (I-It and I-Thou) are seen through a dialectic
lens where one occurs at the expense of the other in an ebb and flow of interaction. This chapter
will examine Ellul’s “word” as a phenomenological dialogic principle that refuses to integrate
one into a massified, dehumanized, unfree society.
The final chapter of the project looks at some of the implications of Ellul’s
phenomenological word for communication scholars and those living in the technological
society. This chapter shows how Ellul leads us back to a concern for ethics. It reveals how a
dialectic/dialogic hermeneutic can provide necessary balance in a technological society and then
offers three metaphors for living within Technique. The “craftsperson” calls us to a life welllived and cognizant of the importance of process and journey instead of mere destination. The
“mutant” refers to someone who can use technologies and at the same time not be used by,
assimilated by or subordinated to them. And finally, the “student” helps us to understand the
importance of learning. Not simply “technical” skills, but by learning from those who have gone
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before us, who have given us insight into the human condition, and provided a foundation by
which we can reflectively understand our historical moment and ultimately live authentically
within it.
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Chapter Two: The Evolution of Technique
Introduction
Since about the advent of the 19th century, scholars have increasingly put the issues of
technology and technological progress under a critical inspection (Ellul, 1964; Harold Adams
Innis, 2007; McLuhan, 1994; Mumford, 2010; W. Ong, 1982). Of those scholars, few have been
more vocal and critical than Jacques Ellul. His textured and focused interrogation of what he
calls la Technique eschews a more naive understanding of technique as simply an application of
science, and suggests the contrary: that technique not only preceded science, but has also
superseded it as a defining characteristic of society. The relationship between Technique and
science has resulted in a cultural shift biased in the presuppositions of Technique which now
effect every aspect of culture. Ellul’s perspective of Technique in relation to science rests upon
two understandings: (1) in order to progress, technique had to wait for science and (2) without
technical means, science does not advance (Ellul, 1964). The relationship of Technique to
progress puts society in a position where Technique not only orders the structures of society, but
where the technical phenomenon has become the only phenomenon of interest:
"In the first place, there is modern man's collective worship of the power of fact, which is
displayed in every technique and which is manifested in his total devotion to its
overwhelming progress [and] ... In the second place, there is the deep conviction that
technical problems are the only serious ones." (Ellul, 1964, p. 303)
While Ellul addresses the relationship between technique and science, his critique more
importantly concerns humanity’s attitude and relation to technology. He observes a society
which completely welcomes the invasion of technology into human life without any question of
its socio-political effects or its future unforeseen consequences. In order to understand the
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phenomenon of Technique and the culture which has adopted it so uncritically, this chapter will
explain Technique itself, how Technique preceded science, why Technique had to wait for
science, and why new scientific advances now depend on Technique. Accomplishing these
objectives necessitates an investigation of the historical development of the technical or
mechanical mindset, in other words, how did we get to such a place where Technique, and more
particularly the technical values and objectives have superseded everything else?
Technique Defined
The current situation of Technique’s cultural dominance and the virtually unhindered
growth of the technological society which now defines our communicative context did not just
recently emerge in the social milieu. Its rise came about through the prolonged development of a
system of thought – a particular bias in thinking which provided the framework for its growth characterized by a mechanistic, methodological, rational and scientific epistemology. Ellul
defines this cultural situation as the technological society where everything is considered in
terms of the machine. He states,
“Technique…is the totality of methods rationally arrived at and having absolute
efficiency (for a given stage of development) in every field of human activity…
Technique is not an isolated fact in society (as the term technology would lead us to
believe) but is related to every factor in the life of modern man; it affects social facts as
well as all others” (Ellul, 1964, pp. xxv–xxvi).
The majority of humanity (excluding the more primitive civilizations which have up until this
point in history escaped modernization) now finds itself in this condition where technology
reaches into every human arena; where the tentacles of Technique produce not only the machines
we use but also dictate how we construct those machines and how those machines by the nature
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of their very existence then govern the rules for our interaction with them. And as Technique
monopolizes more and more of culture, its values – values inherent within its very structure –
become our values and its priorities become our priorities. Perhaps most importantly, the values
and priorities of Technique often counteract and even resist some the values and priorities
necessary for our social interactions and how we communicate and relate to one another.
It must be clarified that in speaking of technology, I refer to not just specific
technological developments such as the assembly line or the combustion engine. Nor do I refer,
since this project concerns communication, to just communication technologies like the printing
press, the telegraph, television, and the internet. In speaking of technology or technics, I refer to
an underlying system of culture or a specific bias within society. Clifford Christians, in
referencing Ellul’s understanding of la Technique, puts it like this, “[L]a technique refers to the
contemporary Geist, the spirit, the characteristic consciousness of industrialized societies. It is a
systemic notion referring to machine-ness more than machines and formally resembles racism as
a defining term.”(Christians, 1988, p. 21) In comparing la Technique to racism, Christians sees
technology as a systemic underlying bias that affects all aspects of a culture. The technological
advancements that produce machines or the systematic processes that benefit the human
condition do not solely define Technique for Technique has become a systemic cultural
metaphor which now colors and gives new meaning to the entirety of human existence.
Ellul’s understanding of Technique, as mentioned, encompasses not simply the technical
arena, but the entirety of society. Technique, as we know it today, had its origination in the
values of the machine, but we can see its ever reaching arms now extending beyond machines
into other areas and processes like science and organization. According to Ellul, the machine
defines and exemplifies pure Technique because it represents the end of a series of rules and
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systems that operate with utmost efficiency in the completion of a task. However, being that the
nature of Technique seems to have become autonomous in the technological society, the values
and priorities inherent in it have become the values and priorities of society and, of utmost
importance, they now direct and influence every field prior to any critical examination of their
effects. The autonomous nature of Technique occurs when “the one best way” to accomplish
something guides whatever that process may be. This develops as the constituent parts of any
process have been examined, measured, and calculated mathematically so that the final method
(or most efficient method) of completing the process comes from the unbiased rational decisions
based upon the calculations and measurements (Ellul, 1964, p. 80). This becomes a selfdirecting and non-personal choice.
Technique has also become independent of the machine to such a point where now the
machine depends on Technique. In such a case, machines can only advance as Technique
progresses. For example, it was once the case that Technique applied scientific formula to the
real world, and as science uncovered new discoveries, Technique then found avenues for the
practical use of this new information in the material world. Ellul believed this assumption to be
false with the exception of one area – the natural sciences. A review of history shows that
Technique in fact preceded science and that ancient cultures were well acquainted with
techniques even prior to the Greeks. But as scientifically directed thought incubated in the
ancient mind, Technique had to wait for science to “catch up” in order for it to progress. Gille
has noted that “Technique, by means of repeated experiments, posed the problems, derived
general notions and the four primary elements; but it had to wait for the solutions” which science
provided (as quoted in Ellul, 1964, p. 7). Look, for example, at the steam engine which
progressed and developed not by scientific theory, but by repeated trial and error
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experimentation. The science to explain the phenomenon of steam power came two centuries
after its discovery, application, and implementation into new inventions. Technique, having
developed as far as it could, had to wait to progress further until science provided new avenues
and new discoveries for its application and systematic process. Though at a certain point in
history Technique had to wait for science, Technique and science have always had an
interdependent relationship that often defies accurate hierarchical attribution.
Today science depends upon Technique to the extent that much of what might be
considered scientific research depends upon funding from commercial business whose interests
guide the technical application of scientific discovery for profit. Because of this, research that
cannot be applied for commercial purposes does not receive funding and dries up. This
condition exists with pharmaceuticals, health care, computers (both hardware and software),
financial markets (note the advance of high frequency trading and robot financial advisors),
politics, business, and even national defense. In each of these cases, Technique has turned
science into a machine and has directed and focused it in such a way that strengthens
Technique’s grip upon each respective field. Technique, by its very nature, systematically turns
everything into a machine. In another domain, the organizing principles in business and in
human resources also reflects Technique’s influence.
In organization, efficiency and procedure for primarily capital ends provide the
guidelines by which systems and people are grouped and how they function within a totality. In
these cases, Technique itself determines the guidelines for organization based in sets of rules that
guide the smooth and efficient operation of business and organizational systems and human
resources. The assembly line as an organizational strategy breaks down labor into individual
parts, examines the procedures (techniques) that result in the greatest speed and efficiency of
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labor, and then institutes those procedures as rules that dictate their operational function. In
cases like these, Technique demands that the procedures, guidelines, systems, and rules be
regularly re-examined and set against the standard of greater efficiency and speed – for the
greater good of “progress.” The operation of Technique in such cases shows how the human
being succumbs to efficiency. In this type of organizing process, human resources become the
means to the technical end – a means to greater speed, greater efficiency, greater profit, and
greater progress.
In contemplating Technique as an underlying cultural bias, its autonomy becomes
apparent as does the fact that it engulfs everything in its path – to ingest, process, and spit back
upon the culture to further its own efficient ends. In human resources Technique devalues the
human and makes him/her another cog in the efficient operational machine - a means to an end,
rather than an end itself. Marx’s concern for the human’s devaluation by the advance of
capitalism in many ways resembles the influence of Technique in the modern and postmodern
world. Technique has employed a similar strategy to that of Marx’s “Capital” in using humanity
to further its own ends. Ironically, “Capital” has been usurped and exploited by Technique.
Technique now employs and integrates “Capital” to expand, to grow, and to further its
dominance upon culture. How did this happen?
Humans as Technical Beings
Tracing history for the development of a technological mindset is quite different than
simply examining and recounting historical technological developments. In undertaking this
effort, we search for the origins of a methodology or a particular way of thinking more so than
simply detailing historical inventions. Though we can readily find instances of technological
development in early ancient history such as the development of stone tools for greater
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productivity and efficiency in hunting and building during the Neolithic period and the Biblical
account of mass labor organization for the building of the great tower of Babel, in general, we
must endeavor to scour the history of thought for instances and examples of the particular
processes and structures of thought sometimes recognized only by their results. Generally, we
can look toward the ancient Greeks for the first documented evidence of a technical type of
thinking, particularly the tale of Prometheus (recounted in Plato, 1992, pp. 320d–322a) which
introduces the idea of the human as a technical being. According to the myth, when the gods
created all the creatures on earth, Prometheus and his brother Epimetheus were tasked with
distributing to the creatures gifts that would enable them to survive on the planet. In his wisdom,
Epimetheus distributed to all of the different creatures gifts like, fur, wings, speed and others.
Having given all these gifts, by the time he got around to man, he found his basket empty. His
brother Prometheus, seeing this difficulty, proceeded to raid the workshop of Hephaistos and
Athena on Mt. Olympus, stealing from them fire – a symbol both of the technical (since fire is
conceived as a technological development) and the power of the gods. Along with the gift of
fire, the Titan also taught humans how to use their gift, helping them to learn the skill of
metalworking – a technical craft associated with science and culture. The Greek myth reveals
the nature of the human being as a technical being, but we might inquire about the origin of this
proclivity.
The Technology of Writing
In making this inquiry, we first look to the technology (if it can be called that) of writing.
It has been said by the ancients that “speech is the difference of man.” In fact, language, and
particularly spoken language, represents the first great leap of intellectual capacity for human
beings. The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, a result of the work of two linguists: Edward Sapir and
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Benjamin Whorf, states that our spoken language constrains our thoughts and actions.
Particularly, as Whorf has stated, “the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impression
which has to be organized by our minds – and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our
minds” (Whorf, 1940). Though the stronger form of the hypothesis which tends toward
linguistic determinism has been criticized by scholars, the weaker version suggests a linguistic
relativism, that our spoken language influences the ways in which we think. Accordingly, in the
same way that speech distinguishes intellectual development, any technology, including the
technology of the alphabet does as well. As Breasted has noted, “The invention of writing and of
a convenient system of records on paper has had a greater influence on uplifting the human race
than any other intellectual achievement in the career of man” (Breasted, 1954, p. 23). In
speaking about writing as a technological development and its effect upon human thinking,
Harold Innis states, “…the art of writing provided man with a transpersonal memory. Men were
given an artificially extended and verifiable memory of objects and events not present to sight or
recollection. Individuals applied their minds to symbols rather than things and went beyond the
world of concrete experience into the world of conceptual relations created within an enlarged
time and space universe… Writing enormously enhanced a capacity for abstract thinking”
(Harold Adams Innis, 2007, pp. 10–11).
The development of the technology of writing through the invention of the alphabet
reconstructed the way human beings think. This can be seen in the distinct differences between
alphabetic languages of the West and the pictorial, imagistic alphabets in the East. There is a
great difference in the way the spoken word is visually coded in eastern cultures as opposed to
western. McLuhan and Logan make this comparison noting how the western alphabet is used
phonetically to visually represent the sounds of words whereas eastern cultures (particularly
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Chinese culture) use characters as pictographs to represent the idea of a word (McLuhan &
Logan, 1977). In this sense, eastern written languages are less abstract than their western
counterparts and consequently, so are the resultant thought patterns in the people who use those
languages. McLuhan and Logan argue that within the time frame from 2000 B.C – 500 B.C and
within the narrow geographic zone between the Tigris-Euphrates river system and the Aegean
Sea, certain innovations developed which constitute the basis of Western thought that did not
develop in the same way in the East. These developments include codified law, monotheism,
abstract science, formal logic, and individualism. The implication being that the presence of the
phonetic alphabet in the West contributed greatly to the thought patterns which then allowed
these concepts to arise and come into being in the cultural milieu. The tendency of the Western
phonetic alphabet to lead toward a greater abstract thought process as opposed to the
pictographically oriented code systems of the East explains, for McLuhan, why science began in
the West rather than the East, despite the greater technological advancements of the Chinese
culture (McLuhan & Logan, 1977).
McLuhan and Logan also give an explanation for why the phonetic alphabet developed in
the West as opposed to the East. They suggest that the spoken languages of the East, being
monosyllabic, produce a large redundancy of sounds in the spoken tongue. As an example, there
are 239 words with the same sound: “shah.” This being the case, the linguistic distinctive in
Eastern languages did not lend themselves to the development of a phonetic alphabet as much as
they did in the fractured languages of the West. The phonetic alphabet of the West laid the
foundation for abstract thinking and even more so since the very environment of writing serves
as a double abstraction. The written word, being a symbolic abstraction of the spoken word
(which itself is an abstraction of experience), “is broken up into its constituents of semantically
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meaningless phonemes which, in turn, are represented by meaningless letters” (McLuhan &
Logan, 1977). The development of unique languages, particularly those who employ a phonetic
alphabet tends to structure the thoughts of the people who use them toward a unique thought
process which favors a technical perspective in thinking. The techniques of science come to us
as a result of the technology of the written word, specifically the phonetic alphabet.
Philosophizing, Rational Thought and the Greeks
With the Greeks, philosophy and reason emerge as major topics of their intellectual
focus. Socrates introduces dialectic – an argumentative method of deliberation between two
participants whereby a teacher engages a student in a back and forth asking and answering of
questions with the intention of coming to greater knowledge and a better understanding of truth.
Socrates dialectic functioned as a unique method for discerning truth based in a mindset primed
for abstract thought. It represents an example of how a particular thinker constructs and
implements a technical method for achieving a particular end. Though probably not intended as
a “technique” per se, Socrates dialectic operated somewhat as a systematic process, serving as a
method which could be replicated and repeated in multiple contexts to achieve a specific end.
The dialectical method employed a rule-governed systematic approach to learning. One
interlocutor would ask a question prompting an answer on behalf of the other. This answer
would then generate another “deeper” question and lead to greater understanding for both
participants. In fact, elenchus or the idea of refutation, served as the primary technique of the
Socratic Method (Vlastos, 1982). The process begins with the assertion of a thesis, the refutation
of that thesis by securing the agreement of a further premise which refutes the original thesis,
and finally the claim that the original thesis must be false do to its negation by the secondary
premise. There is debate about the elenchus on whether it leads to greater knowledge or serves
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as just a negative method used solely for refutation, but the fact remains that it functions as a
method or technique toward a specific end. And though other philosophers prior to Socrates
“philosophize,” his dialectical approach marks the beginning of western philosophy and sets the
stage for philosophizing as a rational enterprise.
Aristotle followed upon the foundation of Plato and Socrates and defined the human
being as a rational animal (animal rationale); recognizing within human beings the rational
principle or the ability to carry out rational thought processes (Aristotle, 1985, p. 77). His
understanding of logos in the Rhetoric (Aristotle, 1954, p. 25), reflects a deliberative tendency in
the human mind and makes logical reasoning necessary for effective persuasion. Aristotle’s
scientific examination of rhetoric reflects a similar sentiment in his teacher Plato who disdained
rhetoric in the sophistic tradition for a more rational deductive search for truth. Plato prioritized
philosophy as the avenue for the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake and though Aristotle
differed with his teacher in many aspects, Plato’s epistemological perspective, in some sense,
gets passed down to his student. Aristotle’s systematic investigation (1954) concludes that the
highest human happiness comes from the pursuit of “theoretical knowledge or contemplation”
and he notes that “intelligence is the highest possession we have in us” (Aristotle, 1985, pp.
1177a11-1179a33). Thus, even Aristotle’s course in ethics is a progression from ordinary ethical
beliefs to a “systematic, reasoned body of ethical knowledge” (Curren, 2010, p. 545). For
Aristotle, education should cultivate “the power of forming right judgements, and of taking
delight in good dispositions and admirable actions (Aristotle, 1932, p. Book VIII 1340a 15-19)
based on reason.
These Greek philosophers were engaged in a communication debate at the time with
another group of itinerant teachers who claimed to be able to teach their students excellence and
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virtue. The approach of these philosophers directly opposed that of the Sophists who taught
“rhetoric” as the means to acquiring knowledge and that truth depended to an extent upon
arguments and deliberation in the city-state. The Sophists attention to rhetorical techniques was
condemned by Plato in Gorgias (Plato, 1997) and also by Isocrates in Against the Sophists
(Isocrates, 1929). Bruce Kimball (1995) recounts this conflict for ancient thought supremacy
between oratory and philosophy and how it resulted in the development of the idea of a liberal
arts education. The philosophic side, represented by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle was critical of
rhetoric as a means of acquiring knowledge. Socrates and Plato, critiquing the Sophists as mere
propagandists selling their rhetorical techniques out to the highest bidder, claimed that
philosophy by means of the dialectic method provided the pathway to truth and that philosophy’s
greatest end was the pursuit of knowledge. Representing a differing perspective, Isocrates and
other orators also condemned the Sophists but they viewed rhetoric as important for the
development within the citizenry of values for morality and civic virtue. They emphasized the
expression of what is known, “the crucial importance of language, texts, and tradition – linking
to and building up a community of learning and knowledge ” (Kimball, 1995, p. xviii). In this
great debate between the philosophers and orators, the philosophers ultimately triumphed.
Kimball states the victory in terms of its relation to science and the liberal education:
“Philosophia is no longer equated with the seven liberal arts but has risen above them…it
is a philosopher’s curriculum of liberal education, dedicated to scientiae speculativae
inquiring after knowledge. The concern for moral training is de-emphasized, while
rhetoric practically drops from sight.”(Kimball, 1995, p. 73)
The philosophers had accused the Sophists of technicizing the logos as rhetoric –
implementing techniques of communication as instruments of power and persuasion instead of
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tools for the pursuit knowledge and truth. Their critique of rhetoric as sophistic persuasion,
however accurately it addressed technical sophistry and the power of language in human agency,
dismissed the hermeneutic consciousness altogether in favor of a more rational philosophy.
Christians notes how the hermeneutic consciousness in the Greeks, represented though linguistic
expression as a means to understanding and meaning, became subjugated to a Western
philosophical tradition dominated by reason – a tradition traced back to Plato and Aristotle. He
states, “Intellection received the emphasis and survived to antiquity in a way that the interpretive
capacity did not” (Christians, 1988, p. 5). Though the Sophists taught specific rhetorical
techniques as the way to arête (moral virtue), the dismissal of the hermeneutic consciousness
represented by more nuanced rhetorical perspective and the resultant advance of a more rational
philosophy continues the advance of a technical proclivity into the collective consciousness
(Stiegler, 1998, p. 1).
Though the advancements of Greek culture mentioned previously resulted in a more
abstract way of thinking (and thus the progress of philosophy) might seem to suggest a culture on
the cusp of a technological explosion, the Greek culture itself was not a technical culture. Their
development of scientific thought processes does not result in new techniques or technological
progress. Simply put, the Greeks valued contemplation over utility or application. The Greek
citizen placed a high value upon the contemplative life, moderation, and balance; therefore, they
considered any technical or utilitarian study unworthy of the intellect. Moral virtue (arête) for
the Greeks consisted of a scorning of material possessions and practical ends in favor of
philosophy and contemplation. The ancient Greek perspective devalued manual labor and
technical developments to the level of slaves as opposed to the higher virtues of the citizenry – a
virtue system which held societal technical development in check even though thought processes

30

tended toward becoming more scientific and methodical. And though the victory of philosophy
over oratory and the resulting development of Greek thought would eventually change the
trajectory of the liberal arts education and result in an epistemology favoring a quantitative and
efficient method for finding truth, this did not emerge in the actual practice of the Greek
intellectuals. It would still need time to ferment in the social Geist before it would gain purchase
upon the intellectual landscape and find supremacy in actual lived experience. The orators’ loss
to the philosophers during this period created a fertile soil in which the mechanistic,
methodological, and scientific perspective could grow and eventually achieve dominance.
Technical Development with the Romans
While Greek culture avoided a broad technical emergence due to its particular virtue
structure, Roman culture embraced Technique with open arms. In Rome we find social
technique developed, both civil and military, through the multiple public and private forms of
Roman law (much of the historical research in this section comes from Ellul, 1964). First of all,
Roman law based itself in efficiency and progressed from the concept of addressing the concrete
situation with the fewest possible (and therefore most efficient) means. Administrative and
judicial techniques developed to address situations efficiently, as well as to evaluate and refine
those very techniques so they became as perfect and efficient as possible. Secondly, Roman
organization sought to reach a homeostasis between technique and the individual, allowing space
for individual initiative and responsibility but balancing that with the needs of the collective. The
great era of Roman law (prior to the third century A.D.) gave consideration to both the regulation
of law and the freedom of the individual. Roman judicial technique did not regulate the minor
details of human life until the third century A.D. leaving the individual bound more and more by
government regulation. Third, Roman technique had a specific focus directed at the target of
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societal cohesion. In Rome, a variety of techniques developed in multiple arenas – religious,
administrative, military, and financial – in order to accomplish the purpose of organizing society
more efficiently. The Roman military exemplified this aspect of Technique in its organization,
its ability to move effectively through the development of the Roman road system, and via
military mass strategy in conquest. A fourth element of Roman technique was continuity. In
Rome, laws were continually adapted and reorganized for the most effective results. This readaptation of laws and procedures to produce a more perfect system sits at the heart of
Technique. In re-adapting law, regulation, rules, guidelines, and procedures, Technique controls
the outcomes based upon its underlying values: efficiency, speed, and progress. Additionally, in
the later Roman era a technical revival took place which sought technical solutions to practical
problems, problems created by the advance of Roman conquest. Animal-powered machines,
water wheels, the screw press, and other technical developments grew out of an empire burdened
with production limitations and the needs of a growing populace. The applicability and
continuity so prominent in Roman judicial technique found new avenues in addressing some of
these other societal challenges.
Technology in the Dark Ages
The end of the Roman Empire marks what some have seen as a pause in technical
development. Barbarian invasions, the splintering of Rome and the rise of Christianity in the
medieval period led the West into a period commonly referred to as the Dark Ages. While some
have credited the Christian religion with the advancement of the practical soul of the West (See
Weber & Tawney, 2003 for a theory of Christianity’s influence on rational materialism), this
supposition primarily concerns itself with Christianity after the Protestant Reformation and not
during the medieval period from the fourth through the fourteenth centuries. During this period
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of the “Christian era,” history in some ways shows a marked decline of Roman technique in
virtually every area. Roman organization, city development, military advancement, industry, law
and transport all decline and this obliteration of technique gets blamed on Christianity as a moral
proclivity aimed against human progress (Ellul, 1964, pp. 32–39). Yet other investigations show
remarkable technological advances between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries. Linen, towels,
knitting, buttons, improved road building techniques, advances in agricultural productivity, wire,
whiskey, the crossbow, heavy artillery, the chimney, and even paper came about during this
period of time (L. White, 1940, 1974). Even with these advancements, the collapse of Roman
influence in Western Europe did lead to a severe decline in literacy (Graham & Hearn, 2010, p.
147) and while the Christianity that defines the early medieval period is a religion concerned
more with eschatological issues (namely the end of the worldly kingdoms and the eminent
appearance of the heavenly kingdom) than issues of practical activity and the material concerns
of luxury and money, the advance of the religion, though accused for the lack of technological
progress should not bear the full burden of blame. The destruction of the Roman Empire, the
fracturing of communities in the feudal age, and the advance of serfdom as an economic model
also play a part in this decline.
Interestingly, however, in the dark ages, we see a particular process or method of thought
begin to emerge .(I rely here upon the work done by Graham & Hearn, 2010). The development
by Charlemagne of a formalized knowledge monopoly in the University of Paris (recognized as
“the parent of the sciences”) led to not only the university’s preeminence as the center of
scholasticism, but also to the large number and wide distribution of its students and its influence
upon the establishment and constitutions of other universities (Haskins, 1904, p. 1). Through the
institutions of the university and the church, knowledge came to be expressed ritually (sermons,
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liturgies, articles) and generically in rigid forms. The apex of the scholastic method of
knowledge presentation came with Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae (1981) but we must make the
distinction between the “outer, external techniques of presentation,” which were organized into
“parts,” “questions,” and “articles,” and the “inner spirit” of scholasticism, “of which the
technical schema is merely the vehicle” (Makdisi, 1974, pp. 643–645). Law, and not philosophy
or theology, provided the basis for the scholastic genre’s mode of expression that was both a
method of presentation and a way of thought (Makdisi, 1974, p. 642). In other words, in the
Dark Ages, we find the development of the scholastic way of thought, another method which
finds its roots in Technique dominated procedures of law.
The Renaissance and Technique
Historically, Technique advances toward the middle of the fifteenth century with the
prominent technological development of the printing press. The printing press issues in a new
era and begins a major societal shift which affects not only the culture of Europe but also the
patterns of thought in the general populace. The medium of print creates a bias toward linear
thought not present in non-literate cultures (See Eisenstein, 1980 for an explication of the effects
of the printing press on European culture) and sets the stage for thinking patterns more favorable
to large scale technical development. Though the invention of the printing press ushers in a new
literacy for the common person, it would take several centuries before these literate-bias thought
patterns would find their full bloom. As an example of this delay in technical thought, an
investigation into the literature of the Renaissance shows a predominant lack of logical order. In
fact much of the literature on science, medicine, law, history and economics from this time,
shows a lack of cohesion and logical progression of argumentation (Ellul, 1964, p. 39).
Examples like this show how the rise of humanism in the Renaissance placed greater emphasis
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on a broad liberal arts education rather than specialization in particular fields (the marks of a
more scientific and quantitative perspective). These humanistic values showed themselves in the
literature by authors who, in order to show their broad humanist knowledge, composed treatises
that lacked technical specialization and logical order in favor of presenting in their work a broad
general mastery of multiple subjects (Ellul, 1964, pp. 39–40). Additionally, books from this time
lacked the characteristics of intellectual technique such as tables of contents, sections, indices
and references. The lack of the availability of these technical tools reveal a purpose in this
literature which privileged reading and pondering the work in its entirety as well as each part’s
relation to the whole instead of identifying and locating information on specific topics and
quantifying particular categories of information.
Though the Renaissance is not a definitive era when it comes to technics, it does reveal a
rebirth of processes of rational thought and observation. Renaissance art and architecture display
evidence of mathematical precision especially shown in the development of linear perspective
and the precise observations and representations of the natural world. The linear perspective art
style is generally credited to a goldsmith and architect named Filippo Brunelleschi (King, 2013)
who also designed and built the Duomo di Firenze – considered both an architectural and
technical marvel. Brunelleschi’s linear perspective style derived from his early observations of
Roman architecture and his desire to represent the reality and accuracy of that architecture in
two-dimensional space. Linear perspective as a more technical drawing style employs the
“vanishing point” technique into the painting and in doing so, creates a new relationship between
the art and the viewer. In medieval art the images predominantly stood on their own – flat and
where the subject within the piece is presented as the object of the art. In the Renaissance, the
viewer becomes integral to the painting in the sense that the viewer is considered as part of the
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piece along with the object of the artwork. The vanishing point perspective invites the viewer
into the piece as a subject instead of just an observer. In linear perspective, the painting involves
the viewer from a unique perspective – that of an individual within the landscape of the piece.
This artistic technique, which more accurately represents reality, defines a new relationship
between art and viewer and continues a technical/scientific advancement in the arts through
masters like Da Vinci, Raphael, Michelangelo and other prominent Renaissance artists.
The Scientific Turn
The scientific revolution which begins with Copernicus and continues through Galileo
and Newton begins a period that builds on thought processes that emerged out of Renaissance
science. Founded on a dualistic understanding of the human (mind/body), Cartesian philosophy
finds its pre-Descartes roots with Galileo in the sixteenth century. Galileo’s work re-mapped
reality by dividing it between primary (matter, motion, mass, mathematics) and secondary (the
metaphysical, the supernatural, values and meaning) components. In his concern for the primary
components of matter, Galileo had to utilize the tools that gave him the best opportunity to
investigate those components. This forced him to prioritize quantitative data in favor of
qualitative and in doing so he suggested two basic essences: value and meaning on one hand and
matter and quantity on the other (Christians, 1988, p. 6). This separatist perspective and his
emphasis on matter and objective reality led to his heliocentric perspective of the cosmos which
ultimately revealed a truth about not only the cosmos but the nature of reality and ultimately the
nature of the human being. Anything non-material was considered unimportant and outside the
realm of science and observation. A world defined by matter and quantity, devoid of the more
subjective essences of value and meaning, called into question the medieval structure of reality.
For this tectonic change in perspective the Roman Catholic Church deemed Galileo a heretic.
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Soon afterward, the Newtonian perspective of the world as a lifeless machine composed
of mathematical laws would continue to advance this changing perspective of reality. For
Newton, as it was with Galileo, quantification and numeration reigned supreme and their
prominence devalued and dispensed with any other perspectives in their path: the
mechanistic\technical\quantified worldview began to take its reign. What Galileo and Newton
did with the cosmos, Descartes (1993) introduced in the very nature and being of humanity. The
human being became a simple Cartesian dualism - mind and body. Descartes famous statement,
“Cogito, ergo sum” (I think, therefore I am) concluded in the supremacy of human reason. This
recognition of rationality called into question subjective knowledge and since the realms of
mystery and spirituality could not be objectively measured or analyzed, they were considered
unreliable epistemological determinants. Descartes project concerned itself with the
investigation of things of precision, mechanism, and measurability in order to better understand
and master the mystery of the natural world (Christians, 1988, p. 8). His influence in philosophy
and science created in the Western mind the separation of hard facts and subjective values.
Rationality and empirical knowledge gained the edge and bias of Western thought.
The Influence of Nominalism
Though a case can be made for the rise of technique out of the advance of the quantitative
perspective and the scientific revolution in Galileo, Newton, and Descartes, a word must be said
about the realization of an earlier philosophical movement. In the fourteenth century, William of
Ockham (1974) proposed the philosophical doctrine of Nominalism, which denied the existence
of universals and abstract objects. Weaver says of this “The practical result of nominalist
philosophy is to banish the reality which is perceived by the intellect and to posit as reality that
which is perceived by the senses. In this affirmation of what is real the whole orientation of
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culture takes a turn and humanity now joins the road to modern empiricism” (Weaver, 1984, p.
3). Weaver recognized in nominalism the advance of empiricism and a tendency toward a
quantitative, observable value system. In denying universals, Nominalist philosophy denies
subjective experience in favor of a sense-oriented reality based on empirical observation and
physical evidence. The objectivity in nominalism turned science toward the study of the natural
environment. Where nature had once been considered as the imitation of a transcendent model,
an imperfect constitution of an ideal form in Platonic philosophy, it was now looked upon as
having the principles of its own constitution within itself. The change in perspective allowed for
empirical scientific investigation to now reveal the intricacies of the natural world effectively
putting an end to Plato’s theory of forms. Scientific discoveries by Galileo and Newton began to
remove the mysteries of the natural world, thus showing nature working according to rules and
principles governed by a mechanistic process operating without prejudice. Weaver connects this
rational mechanistic understanding of nature with a new perspective on the human being:
“If physical nature is the totality and if man is of nature, it is impossible to think of him
as suffering from constitutional evil…One comes thus by clear deduction to the corollary
of the natural goodness of man.” (Weaver, 1984, p. 4)
This then placed the highest priority upon rationalism as a first philosophy. In removing
humanity from any transcendent experience and all of the religious baggage that went along with
it, rationalist philosophy no longer considered the question of purpose or value in the world.
This question had become meaningless. Instead the question now concerned the working of the
world and the understanding of its governing laws and rules - the basis for modern science whose
systemization of phenomena became a means not just to an understanding of the natural world
but to its conquest (see S. F. Bacon, 2010).
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The obvious resultant effect would be the fall of the institution of religion. The world of
rationalism and science disregarded religious experience by definition. Religion was something
transcendent and outside the constraints of reality, therefore beyond observation, measurement,
or quantification. The rationalist assault on religion took its toll and in this vacuum arose
materialism and naturalism. If religion could no longer explain the human condition, the
responsibility would now fall upon the only reality that was truly knowable – the natural
environment. Darwin’s Origin of Species (2003) provided this opening to the naturalistic
explanation for human existence which was not simply constrained to origins but also addressed
human motivation by recognizing the biological necessity of the survival of the fittest.
Humanity’s freedom now reduced to natural laws operating without prejudice also challenged
the purpose and development of every human institution. Marx took Darwin’s explanations and
developed a powerful theory of capital and the human being, noting that humans always act in
relation to economic incentive. Freud did the same thing, but regarded human sexuality as the
prime human motivation. These theories took responsibility away from the individual and laid it
at the feet of naturalistic causations, further removing human freedom and ensconcing
Technique.
In such a climate, it was only a matter of time before the materialist/naturalist perspective
would progress toward its teleological end – the machine. Rationalist philosophy’s disregard for
human subjectivity and concurrent privileging of the world of senses changed the traditional
understanding about humanity. The human being became nothing more than a biological
machine governed by the unrelenting laws of nature, and though different theories attempt to
account for how these laws work and which laws have priority, the more important issue
concerns the underlying philosophy. A religious\metaphysical explanation cannot make sense in

39

a naturalist/materialist universe. Science, empirical observation, and quantification become the
only tools and models able to explain the universe and humanity, and if humanity is relegated to
a law-governed biological system (or machine) then its explanation must be systematic (and
mechanistic) as well. The process for the explanation of the machine begins by breaking it down
to its component parts – by taking it apart piece by piece and observing it in order to understand
it and how it works, and the only method suitable for this type of cataloguing and theorizing is
modern science. This shift eliminated all explanations but science because in this universe,
science alone can provide the solutions to break the machine down, to observe the machine, to
quantify the machine, and to then give explanations for its operation and motivations. A
materialistic world must favor and value technical methods.
Technique in the French and Industrial Revolutions
The end of the French Revolution and the rise of Napoleon Bonaparte marks another
signpost in the development of Technique as an example of a state given over to it and a state
autonomous in things that did not serve its own interest (Ellul, 1964, p. 43). In the Napoleonic
period we see the creation of precise military techniques in strategy, organization, logistics, and
recruitment; the beginning of economic technique; the rationalized system of hierarchies in
administration; the regrouping of national workforces based upon efficiency; and a
systematization of law. As Ellul notes, “this systematization, unification, and clarification was
applied to everything – it resulted not only in the establishment of budgetary rules and in fiscal
organization, but in the systematization of weights and measures and the planning of roads”
(Ellul, 1964, p. 43). These examples all demonstrate an adaptation of governance and commerce
to a system based upon Technique where reason and quantification preside over other more
subjective value systems. The cultural application of Technique after the French Revolution
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precedes the greater explosion of Technique in the later Industrial Revolution. Why did an
eruption of technical progress take place over a century and a half when prior history showed
such slow progress? Mumford states that it had to do with the development of science (Ellul,
1964, p. 44) and how scientists now turned their attention to the practical application of their
discoveries and resulted in the enslavement of science to technique (as has already been
discussed).
Ellul notes the philosophy of the eighteenth century as a potential element in this radical
explosion of invention. Eighteenth century philosophy favored technical progress and sought to
exploit nature for the betterment of the human condition. The utilitarian and pragmatic aspects
of eighteenth century philosophical thought (Examples can be found in Bentham, 2007; James,
1995, 2003; Mill, 2002; Peirce, 2011) provided an avenue for the application of science to
human advancement and connected scientific discovery to material results. This philosophical
perspective announces a change in the collective philosophical and intellectual thought. Though
this occurred initially among the intellectual elite, it slowly trickled its way down through
education into the general populace. These philosophies cannot take credit for the entirety of the
technical explosion of this era, however. Credit should also be attributed to the general
optimistic atmosphere and state of mind in the eighteenth century as potentially an even greater
reason for this advancement – an optimism based on the improvement of the general living
conditions for much of the populace due to the exploitation of natural resources and the
application of scientific discoveries (Ellul, 1964, p. 47). Regardless of which of these conditions
had the greater influence, the combination of both of them together provides an explanation for
the technical advancements we find in the Industrial Revolution. Though the philosophies of
utilitarianism and pragmatism which grew out of the Enlightenment account for a change in the
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way people began to think about the natural world, the benefits of prior technological
developments experienced by the general populace created the climate for the application of the
technical mindset.
Conclusion
This historical overview shows the slow incubation of a technical or mechanistic mindset
(and not simply a history of technological developments and discoveries) which contains a
particular set of values. These values – progress, speed, efficiency, rationality – though present
in many instances throughout history generally take a more universal hold on culture at the
Industrial Revolution and increasingly continue from there to the point where we find ourselves
immersed in a culture dominated by Technique. And while we recognize the presence of
Technique in almost every epoch of history, not just in the advancement of technological
inventions or the application of new techniques of organization, investigation, and operation, but
in the general mindset of the culture, Ellul will make the argument that we have reached a point
where Technique has ceased to be a means to an end and has now become an end in itself. If this
is the case and Technique has become its own end, one result is that Technique has ceased to
serve humanity and that humanity now serves Technique. This current autonomous advance in
modern technological development and the increasing adaptation of humanity to technique can
have detrimental effects, not the least of which is the increased limitation of human freedom. If
Ellul’s observations are correct and we find ourselves in a culture given over to Technique, we
must not simply ignore the facts before us but endeavor to find some solutions that can allow
humanity to survive in such a landscape. However, before we can seek these solutions, we might
find some enlightenment in a field of inquiry comprised of scholars that investigate the
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relationships between technologies that we employ and the people that employ them. The field
of Media Ecology can give us insight into the problem of Technique.
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Chapter Three: The Value of Media Ecology Scholarship in Addressing Technique
Introduction
Humanity’s ongoing relationship with technique came as a result of the slow
development of a technical or mechanistic mindset as well as a cultural optimism based upon
prior technological developments which made great contributions to the betterment of the living
conditions for the general populace. Finding success in practical application as well as a greater
purchase upon the prevailing philosophical Geist of the Industrial Revolution, technique began to
command a greater monopoly over the prevailing culture. To this situation, several scholars
have turned their attention in an attempt to understand, explain, and consider the consequences
that will undoubtedly occur in a culture given completely over to Technique, and these scholars
comprise the corpus of the field of Media Ecology. Media Ecology, as a meta-disciplinary field
of study examines media as environments in which we live and investigates the resultant effects
that media have on cultures. It makes explicit the environments of media – television, radio,
print, etc. – which are typically hidden -and seeks to find out what roles media force us to play
and how media structure our thought. Though the field traces its official inception to Marshall
McLuhan and Neil Postman, it has a long history of scholarship drawing its theoretical
foundations from scholars such as Lewis Mumford, Harold Innis, Walter Ong, Marshall
McLuhan, Elizabeth Eisenstein, Eric Havelock, Jacques Ellul, Alfred Korzybski, and others.
We should begin by distinguishing the term “media” as a defining word for the title of the
field. Media in this context does not refer to a content within some communication technology
nor does it merely refer to the communication technology itself. Although the word medium
suggests some object interposed between two subjects, what we usually think of today in terms
of media generally centers around terms such as “the news,” “the networks,” “television
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shows,” “movies,” or “the internet.” We also tend to consider media in terms of the platforms
upon which we view or consume this information – books, newspapers, television, movies,
iPods, computers, smart phones, and even “the internet.” Media Ecology, as we will explore,
defines a medium quite differently.
The Roots of Media Ecology
In tracing the roots of the field of Media Ecology, we can find a basis for the beginning in
the ancient scriptures of the Old Testament. In the very beginning of Genesis, God said “Let
there be light” (Genesis 1:3 NIV). Here, God introduces the first and primary medium of speech,
and through speaking, God reveals the second – light. Speech (an oral medium) precedes light (a
visual medium) for a purpose: language, and not image, is what will characterize humanity’s
experience with God. In the New Testament book of John, the writer notes that “In the
beginning was the Word (logos), and the Word was with God, and the Word was God” (John 1:1
NIV). This comparison again denotes language as the original and ideal form of our mediation
with God. Further evidence of this relationship between humanity and God comes later in the
Ten Commandments. The command that came down to Moses from God on Mount Sinai
specifically states:
“Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of any thing that is in
heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth.”
(Exodus 20:4 KJV)
The command clarifies that God intended his experience with humanity to be characterized not
by images or idols but through the deeper abstractions found in language. In other words, the ear
and the aural senses are given precedence over the eye and the visual senses in humanity’s
relationship to God. Sound takes precedence over light. Orality precedes literacy. The media
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ecological reasoning behind this preference for the oral above the visual is in how the nature of
the media determine the nature of our relationship with God. The media itself is important.
The scriptures continue, with a reference to why the medium is important and how these
“mediums” affect us. In Psalm 115, the psalmist refers back to the making of idols and the
effects those idols have upon those who make and worship them.
Their idols are silver and gold,
The work of man’s hands.
They have mouths, but they cannot speak;
They have eyes, but they cannot see;
They have ears, but they cannot hear;
They have noses, but they cannot smell;
They have hands, but they cannot feel;
They have feet, but they cannot walk;
They cannot make a sound with their throat.
Those who make them will become like them,
Everyone who trusts in them. Psalms 115:4-8 (NASB)
Here, the psalmist reveals the power of a medium to form us into its image, to change the nature
of the way we experience reality, and to conform us to the restrictions, limitations, advantages,
and permissions of the mediums we create and employ.
Other ancient texts reveal similar sentiments regarding human experience with media and
technology. For thousands of years, before the invention of writing, cultures communicated
orally. The ancient Greeks at the time of Plato and Aristotle were experiencing a tectonic shift
from oral communication to the newer technology of writing (see E. A. Havelock, 1963;
McLuhan, 2005; W. Ong, 1982 particularly pp. 17-30). Socrates and Plato categorically
exemplify this change. Historically, we have no record of Socrates writing anything. As far as
we understand, he primarily communicated orally. Interestingly enough, what we do know of
him comes to us from the writings of others, mainly his student Plato. Plato’s writings show us
Socrates priority on orality, his dialectical style which engaged others through oral debate. In
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contrast to Socrates oral communication style, Plato utilized writing and through this medium
captured for later generations the wisdom of his teacher.
In Plato’s Phaedrus (1956), Socrates recounts the story of Thamus, the king of a great
city in Egypt, and Theuth, an inventor god. In the narrative, Theuth comes before Thamus to
present his inventions. As Theuth presents each one, Thamus inquires of the invention and then
expresses his approval or disapproval of it. When Theuth presents the invention of writing, he
defends it to the king by reciting the virtues that writing will bring to the people. Specifically,
that it will improve their wisdom and memory. The king responds to Theuth by telling him that
what he intends the invention to do is exactly the opposite of what actually will occur. Thamus
states that writing will not improve memory but will in fact destroy it by providing an easy
means of recollection, and the easy recollection of information in writing will contribute to a
collective loss of memory, for writing allows access to information by external reference without
actually exercising a person’s internal mnemonic resources. As for wisdom, Thamus states:
“[Y]our pupils will have the reputation for it without the reality: they will receive a
quantity of information without proper instruction, and in consequence be thought very
knowledgeable when they are for the most part quite ignorant. And because they are
filled with the conceit of wisdom instead of real wisdom they will be a burden to
society.” (Plato, 1956, p. 96)
The parable of Thamus and Theuth reflects Socrates’ critique of writing, and this critique, while
correct in some ways, misses the mark in others. The negative effects of writing made plain in
the critique only demonstrates part of the story. Writing has some extremely positive aspects the obvious one being the recording of human histories for later generations. While Thamus
recognized the negative effects of the technology of writing, his mistake was in assuming that the
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invention would only have a negative effect. As Neil Postman puts it, every technology is both a
burden and a blessing (Postman, 1993, p. 5). The greater point beyond the ramifications of any
particular medium is the fact that technologies or media force us to play specific roles, to play by
their rules – rules contained within the structural levels of the media themselves. Media form us
into their image and in so doing, they reform our world and ultimately the world. Media ecology
points us to an epistemological revelation – that our knowledge is, in some sense, determined by
the media we use to acquire it, that knowledge reforms our own understandings of the world, and
ultimately reforms the world itself. There are several basic metaphors in media ecology
scholarship that help to clarify some of the basic tenets of understanding.
Media as Extensions
One of the very first metaphors given for understanding media is the metaphor of media
as extensions. The idea of media as extension comes out of the work of Marshall McLuhan, who
claimed that a medium or technology is any extension of ourselves or any extension of our
senses (McLuhan, 1994, p. 7). For certain media, we can easily understand and recognize how
this description applies. The technology of the wheel acts as an extension of the foot, the rifle is
an extension of the hands and teeth, and the book extends our speech. Each technology functions
to extend some aspect of our being further into the world. In fact, in many instances, this
provides the basis for the development of the technology. Megaphones, microphones, loud
speakers, and sound systems, for instance, were developed to extend and amplify speech so that
more people could hear. Cars, trains, and airplanes were invented to make travel easier – to
extend the reach of our feet faster, further, and more efficiently. The shovel and then the
backhoe extended the limits of our hands to dig, hold, and move dirt. The metaphor of media as
extension is plain for some media. However, for other media, this perspective of extension can
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remain hidden or difficult to observe and understand. McLuhan notes that electronic media
extend not our bodies, but our minds – our central nervous systems. The electronic technologies
– the telegraph, radio, telephone, and television – all represent an extension of our minds – our
thoughts extended out into the world via electronic pulse over wires and cables.
Additionally, each medium as an extension of our senses, when employed, also affects
the ratio between our senses. McLuhan calls this a change in the ratio of our sensorium and
states “What I am saying is that media as extensions of our sense institute new ratios, not only
among our private senses, but among themselves, when they interact among themselves”
(McLuhan, 1994, p. 53). Television, for example, affects our senses differently than radio does
and therefore reprioritizes sight above sound- affecting a change in the ration of sight and sound
in our sensorium. In effect, media not only engage our senses in particular ways, but they
rearrange and reprioritize our sensorium – the totality of our sensory engagement with the world.
Each medium hierarchically restructures the way we experience its content based upon its own
inherent structure and design, and therefore forces our sensorium to operate in accordance and,
we might say in subservience, with its design by prioritizing certain senses above others.
McLuhan’s work revealed a revolutionary perspective on how human beings relate to technology
and how technologies (or media), in turn, effect and change humans and their symbolic
environment.
Media as Environment
In addition to media as extension, Media Ecology scholarship looks at media as an
environment – via the ecological metaphor. Any ecology considers balance an essential aspect
of a system’s survival and continuity because the complexity and interdependency of systems
and their component parts place them upon a delicate fulcrum where even a minor change in one
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component can change the entirety of the system itself. Media ecology addresses a balancecentered theory of media as Gencarelli states: “If balance is the key principle underlying the
ecology of natural environs, then media ecology is about striking a balance in the ecosystem that
is the information or media environment” (Gencarelli, 2000, p. 94). The ecological metaphor
allows us to recognize an environmental perspective of media – that we live, work, socialize, and
relax in media. Media have come to dominate every area of our lives, and in much the same way
that a fish lives within a particular environment primarily defined by water, today we live in an
environment primarily defined by media. In the same way a fish is unaware of its water
environment, we often find ourselves unaware of our media environment as well. Through
continual incorporation into our lived experience, these media not only recede from our
conscious awareness of their existence, but even more importantly they “are moments that
refigure and reconstitute the whole” of our lived body (Anton, 2016).
The environmental metaphor also helps us to recognize a basic principle of any ecology.
Changes in any ecological system are not simply additive, they are transformational. Or as
Postman put it, “Changes in the symbolic environment are like changes in the natural
environment; they are both gradual and additive at first, and then, all at once, a critical mass is
achieved” (Postman & Postman, 2005, p. 27). We can look to medieval Europe as an example.
Prior to the invention of the printing press, the “media ecology” of Europe had reached a sort of
stasis. The social relationships had been brokered through the feudal system and the advance of
the Christian religion defined both the authority structure for the society as well as gave insight
to the way a person should live. Priests and religious figures had authority simply because they
had the power to read, translate, interpret, and communicate the words of God. Harold Innis
(2008) refers to this as a monopoly of knowledge.
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Monopolies of knowledge occur when one particular class maintains its power through
the knowledge and dominance of particular communication technologies. These monopolies
derive their power from specific knowledge and tend to polarize societies into two classes, those
who possess the knowledge and those who are ignorant of it. Of course those in possession of the
power have an interest in preserving their monopoly by any means necessary because the
specialized knowledge both gives them power and allows them to keep it. Technological
advances in communication media can shift the balance of power because new knowledge
produces different experts and results in a disruption of the monopoly. In this instance, priests
educated in the ancient languages in which the Holy Scriptures and texts were written possessed
a monopoly of knowledge over and against the rest of the population of Europe. Their
knowledge of language and their literacy placed them in the hierarchical position as the only
medium between God and man—a position of great power. The invention of moveable type and
the Gutenberg printing press in the 15th Century challenged the authority of the priests by
removing the monopoly of knowledge. No longer did the priest solely possess the knowledge of
literacy. No longer could only the priest read and understand the words of God. The printing
press placed the Holy Scriptures on the kitchen table of every person and in doing so, gave each
person the ability to read and interpret the words of God for himself/herself. The need for the
specialized knowledge of a priest as mediator disappeared. Though Johannes Gutenberg was a
good Catholic, had he understood that his invention would contribute to the Protestant
Reformation and the resultant loss of the authority of the Catholic Church, he might have
reconsidered. This change in media resulted in a disruption and transformation of the cultural
and spiritual environment of Europe.
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Another example is found in Ancient Greece. As a primarily oral culture, the ancient
Greeks at the time of Socrates and Plato placed the poet or rhapsode in a high societal position.
This group of people who, through their specialized knowledge of the form and content of
poetry, possessed a unique power - the appearance of knowledge and expertise. Homeric epic
poetry, as Havelock (1963) notes, constituted the entirety of Greek society through oral
communication. The Greeks’ values, history, and culture were presented and reflected in the
public oral recitation of these epic poems which continually reconstituted the societal structure
and functioned as a communal encyclopedia through which the citizens of the polis understood
what it meant to be Greek, what it meant to be a citizen, and what it meant to be virtuous.
Because of the common recitation of the Homeric narratives by the poets, the virtue structures in
Greek society were “in the air,” so to speak. People’s lives found meaning in the narratives of
the poems and because of this, they understood what it meant to be a “good” Greek citizen.
This poetry also presented a religious perspective and an epistemology that included and
affirmed the gods of Greek mythology and their interaction with humanity. In Ion (Plato, 1925),
Plato has his protagonist Socrates address this epistemology as it concerns the medium of poetry
and its public recitation. Socrates encounters Ion, a rhapsode fluent in Homer, who believed that
he possessed certain knowledge as a result of his ability to recite Homer—a concept that can
only be understood in the context of an oral culture. Ion’s belief that all knowledge comes
through the memory and recitation of poetry reflects the epistemology of Greek society in its
orality and the nature of poetry as a medium of learning and knowing. Socrates critiques this
very notion and later in The Republic, (Plato, 1991) Plato expands upon the critique and calls
poetry a crippling of the mind. His dismissal of poetry sets the stage for a different epistemology
found in philosophical dialectic. Of course Socrates’ critique had religious implications as well.
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In challenging the monopoly of knowledge held by the rhapsodes, and proposing a new
epistemology based upon philosophical dialectic, Socrates ultimately challenged the authority of
the gods themselves and in privileging philosophical dialectic against the mouthpieces of the
gods (the poets), Socrates was accused of atheism and ultimately lost his life.
These monopolies of knowledge contribute to the socio-cultural environment and they
are defined by the unique types of media employed by a culture. In more recent times, we have
seen similar transformations in our symbolic environment with the advent of digital technologies
and new media. Since about the 18th Century, western culture has been dominated by what we
might classify “the supremacy of print.” Literacy has characterized civilized culture in the West
since the printing press made texts widely available to the public. This resulted not only in the
Protestant Reformation, but also in creating new class structures and new monopolies of
knowledge. For example, Neil Postman argues (1994) that the very concept of childhood came
about with the wide growth of literacy. In primarily oral cultures, children were subject to adult
conversation and adult topics as soon as they developed the capacity and ability to speak. The
development of print (and with it a greater emphasis on literacy) created a new obstacle for
children entering into the adult world – reading. With the growth of print, children now required
a specific type of education based in literacy before they could enter into the adult world and
engage adult topics. In the world of print culture, adult topics were generally considered off
limits to children until such a time when they had completed the necessary requirements,
education, and maturity to be considered able to handle those topics. Children were protected
from mature topics until they “came of age,” a coming of age that depended upon completing
certain educational requirements and attaining literacy.
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Additionally, the growth of literacy in the greater populace then created another
hierarchical structure based on a monopoly of knowledge. The value of literacy within a culture
gave academics a monopoly of knowledge similar to the priests of the Middle Ages. Academics,
by nature of their profession, possessed a wide range of knowledge in their particular field and
had an authoritative status which gave them a certain power especially, due to their expertise, in
the development of public policy and educational curriculum. However, as was the case with the
invention of the printing press, the academic monopoly of knowledge is similarly being
challenged by the development of a new technology – the internet. The ability to access
authoritative information on any topic at virtually instantaneous speeds has had an effect on the
expertise of the intellectual elite. The Ivory Tower’s monopoly of knowledge has not been
completely destroyed because access to information does not necessarily equal knowledge and
any information needs to be interpreted, but some cracks in the foundation of the power structure
may be appearing.
Media as Species
As McLuhan noted, media not only affect and alter our sense ratios, they affect and alter
other media as well. Another hermeneutic entrance into the study of media in the field of Media
Ecology addresses this - the understanding of media as species. The metaphor of a media
environment suggests the fact that media do not operate in isolation. In other words, different
media live within the mediated environment and interact among themselves and concurrently
affect and change each other. This metaphor gives perspective and insight to how different
media relate to one another and, in some cases, cause other media to become extinct or to gain
greater prominence within the environment. For example, the invention of the telephone made
the telegraph virtually obsolete – a media extinction caused by the introduction of a new
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technology. What need was there for Morse code communication when messages could simply
be spoken. Even though the telegraph eliminated space as an obstacle for communication by
allowing information transfer over vast geographical distance, the telephone was simply easier,
more user friendly, and more efficient. In Amusing Ourselves to Death (Postman & Postman,
2005), Postman reveals how television has similarly affected print. The importance of the
relationships between media cannot be overstated because the effects of one medium upon
another can have drastic consequences, not only for the media which is being made obsolete, but
for the overall culture in general. Part of what Postman argues has to do with what he considers
a battle for supremacy between print and television in our educational system. For hundreds of
years, the education system has been founded upon literacy as the primary means of attaining
knowledge. TV has upset that foundation. The invasion of television into the mediated
environment made entertainment a higher priority than education because television captivated
the attention of users more easily and for longer periods of time than books could. A generation
growing up under the influence of television had difficulty adjusting to a more traditional
educational system that used books because they had been conditioned by the television medium
to be entertained. And as anyone who has gone to school knows, many times educational
reading is anything but entertaining. TV survives based upon its ability to entertain audiences.
If a program does not captivate an audience and generate ratings, it is discontinued in favor of
one that will. The relation of telegraph to telephone and television to print are only two
examples of the media as species metaphor.
Our current media environment now includes multiple new media platforms vying for a
greater piece of the proverbial pie when it comes to audience attention and the all-important area
of advertising dollars. To extend the media as species metaphor, like species within an
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ecological environment, media need sustenance for survival, and in a content media context, that
sustenance comes in the form of money and attention. If media do not command attention, they
do not generate income and inevitably starve to death. This necessitates that media and media
content providers find greater ways to capture and hold the attention of their audiences in order
to increase their ratings and command greater percentages of the advertising money. The
introduction of new media platforms affects this intermedia dimension within the environment
where more players now compete for the same resources. And there are consequences.
Statistics show that over the last five years while media ad spending has increased by an average
of 5% per year, print advertising has lost almost 6% of its share of the market. In the same span,
the market share of digital media has increased almost 12% with television showing a small loss
of 3% (“Total US Ad Spending to See Largest Increase Since 2004 - eMarketer,” n.d.). In
understanding media as species, this type of trend should not be surprising, especially when we
extend the metaphor to the idea of survival of the fittest. A media as species metaphor can give
valuable insight to how media interact with one another. Additionally, a greater aspect of media
interaction depends upon user engagement and another focus of Media Ecology inquiry – media
as epistemology.
Media as Epistemology
McLuhan understood that a medium communicates a meaning beyond the content or
message it contains. In his words, “The medium is the message.” In stating this McLuhan calls
us to focus on the medium, to recognize its underlying bias and to realize the message
communicated within the medium itself as opposed to the content of the message. As a message
in itself, each medium has social consequences. Lynn White, in his book Medieval Technology
and Social Change (1962), details an example of this in how the feudal system became a social
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consequence of the technological invention of the stirrup. The stirrup introduced mounted shock
combat into the arsenal of military strategy and called into existence an entire new social class –
the knight. The introduction of the knight into society had far reaching effects. To mount a
knight in full armor demanded extensive resources to cover the costs of multiple horses, plate
and armor, and the weaponry needed to supply the knight for battle. In a peasant society, one
individual could hardly afford these costs so multiple peasant holdings were later merged
together to cover the expenses. This situation created a unique social relationship based in the
economics of this new warfare technology. The lord employed knights to protect the serfs who
in turn served the lord by working his fields, mines, roads or forests. The relationships provided
protection and basic sustenance for the serfs in exchange for their labor; payment and support for
the knights in exchange for their military might; and labor and protection for the lord in
exchange for his provision and protection. This example shows the social implications of
adopting a new medium and reinforces a principle of any ecology, namely that any change in a
system does not merely add something to the system but changes it entirely. In this case, the
addition of the stirrup changed entire social and economic dynamics of Medieval Europe.
Postman also recognized this aspect of media and summarizes the theoretical base for
Media Ecology as it concerned the symbolic communicative environment and culture:
“Every society is held together by certain modes and patterns of communication which
control the kind of society it is. One may call them information systems, codes, message
networks, or media of communication. Taken together they set and maintain the
parameters of thought and learning within a culture.” (Postman, 1979a, p. 29)
Postman attends to how our media – the communication technologies and information systems
we utilize – affect our culture by altering the ways in which we think. Each medium has its own
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particular definition of reality whether it be speech, print, image, photograph, or video, and in
defining reality in their particular ways, each medium also organizes and controls the ways in
which we think. In altering our sensory ratios, media change our patterns and ways of thinking.
This fact often escapes our notice because we usually concern ourselves with the content
presented to us through the medium and not with how the medium itself works to force us to
think in its own particular ways and according to its own biases. Postman’s focus on media as
epistemology provides insight to how technologies affect our thought processes and define our
perceptions and understandings of knowledge and truth.
Walter Ong’s (1982) research explores not only the cultural effects of the transition
between orality and literacy in societies, but more importantly the effects of literacy as a medium
to reconstruct and configure consciousness and thought. Additionally, Eric Havelock’s (1971;
1963, 1982) work interrogates the mindset and thought structure of ancient Grecians during the
period from Homer through Hesiod, the pre-Socratics, Socrates, and Plato; moving from a
conception of thought as concrete, situational and personified toward more abstract thought
patterns as the transition from an oral to a literate culture takes place (Strate summarizes
Havelock’s scholarship particularly concerning thought structures regarding the concept of
Justice in Strate, 2004, pp. 13–14). Postman addresses this connection between a medium and
modes of thought in Technopoly when he states:
“Embedded in every tool is an ideological bias, a predisposition to construct the world as
one thing rather than another, to value one thing over another, to amplify one sense or
skill or attitude more loudly than another.”(Postman, 1993, p. 13)
Lewis Mumford (2010) also alludes to the influence of technology on the thought (and action)
patterns of humanity. In referencing the technological development of the mechanical clock by
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the Benedictine monasteries of the 12th and 13th Centuries, Mumford states that the invention of
the clock “"helped to give human enterprise the regular collective beat and rhythm of the
machine; for the clock is not merely a means of keeping track of the hours, but of synchronizing
the actions of men" (Mumford, 2010, pp. 13–14). The point being that media do not simply
carry content – they are a content in themselves with certain biases, predispositions and values
that effect the user. The medium is the message precisely because the medium structures our
modes of thought in its own unique way (For more on how this happens see McLuhan, 1994).
Recent research in neurology has posited a new model of brain function which features
certain principles of neural ensemble (Nicolelis & Cicurel, 2015). Two of these principles—the
plasticity principle and the context principle—relate to environmental influence on thought. The
plasticity principle of the brain states: “The internal brain representation of the world, and even
our own sense of self, remains in constant flux throughout our lives” (Nicolelis & Cicurel, 2015,
p. 21). Neuroplasticity is what allows our thoughts to develop and change. It is what enables us
to learn. It shows that what we know is not fixed and recognizes that our thoughts and
perceptions can and do change as a result of external influences. The context principle states:
“the global internal state of a brain at a given moment in time determines how the brain is
going to respond to a sensory stimulus or the need to produce a motor outcome… the
context principle postulates that the brain has its ‘own point of view’ and it applies it to
make any decision regarding a novel event.” (Nicolelis & Cicurel, 2015, p. 19)
The brain’s “point of view” always comes out of a particular context from which it regards the
world and in turn makes decisions and choices. The choices a person makes come from a
context, and that context is constantly changing as a result of external stimuli. The symbolic
environment dominated by technological media will change a person’s thoughts and perceptions
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based upon the principle of neuroplasticity. This in turn will affect the choices a person makes –
choices from a context formed by the symbolic environment. This neurological research
substantiates the idea that the medium is truly the message, that media are an epistemology.
Medium Bias
Within any epistemology, there are inherent biases. Harold Innis describes media and
their inherent biases in his work The Bias of Communication (2008). His theory states that each
communication medium contains its own particular bias in terms of the organization and control
of information the medium allows. His examples show how media contain either a time-bias or
a space-bias based upon the nature and structure of the particular medium. The characteristics of
durability and constancy inherent in time-biased media (e.g. stone and clay tablets) lend to a
greater longevity for the empires who employed them in their communications. However, these
same properties prevent easy and quick transportation over large geographic areas. A stone
tablet cannot be easily transported and shared. Space-biased media (paper, papyrus), on the
other hand, lend themselves to easy and efficient transportation. The portability of a scroll or
papyrus facilitates faster communications for easier transmission and sharing of information.
However, these media do not endure over time as long as stone or clay tablets. Innis shows that
each communication medium possesses some type of inherent bias that allows it to accomplish
its own unique purposes while at the same time preventing it from accomplishing others.
Postman gave the example of how American Indians used smoke signals to communicate
messages and humorously suggested that we can safely assume these types of messages had little
to do with philosophical argument and debate simply because puffs of smoke do not contain
within them an ability to express complex and abstract ideas about metaphysics and ethics. The
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obvious conclusion being that the medium itself (stone tablet, papyrus, smoke signal) allows
certain types of messages to be communicated while also limiting other types.
Images and words also have their particular biases. Visual media (pictures and images)
directly represent the real world and only call our attention to the object pictured. Words,
however, do not represent a distinct reality per se, but the nature of abstraction contained in the
meaning of words engages our thought processes in a completely different way than images do.
Spoken languages and particularly native languages constitute a context framed by history,
tradition, and grammatical structure that places certain limitations on individuals as well as
provides possibilities for how and about what that individual can think. In a recent talk (Tran,
2012), a natural born Vietnamese man who grew up from childhood in America details how the
lack of a subjunctive mood in his parents’ native language of Vietnamese prevented them from
thinking in certain ways that the presence of the subjunctive mood in English allowed him, a
native English speaker, to think. In his recognition of how the imperative and subjunctive moods
forced him and his parents to think differently, he reveals some of the inherent biases in language
and how they can differ depending upon the grammatical structures and rules within particular
languages. Ludwig Wittgenstein surmised this in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus by stating
that the limits of our language are the limits of our world (Wittgenstein & Russell, 1998, p. 68).
The bias of language means that first, we can only know or think about that for which we have
words, and second, the grammatical structures of a language can allow and even force our
thoughts to be directed in particular ways.
In the same way that stone tablets, papyrus, print, television and language have biases,
Douglas Rushkoff argues for a bias of distinction within digital media which trickles up into
society from the digital platforms and apps that our cultures uses regularly; a bias based upon a
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foundation of digital logic. He states, “digital networks break up our messages into tiny packets,
and reassemble them on the other end. Computer programs all boil down to a series of 1’s and
0’s, on or off” (Rushkoff, 2016). This distinction in the digital medium – a polar opposite bias –
creates a milieu defined by a greater tribalism, a more pronounced nationalism (or what he calls
in a separate interview “anti-globalism” (Timberg, 2016)), and I would add, a more contentious
partisanship. He describes the contemporary digital environment where our choices are noticed
and acted upon by the algorithms which personalize our news feeds, isolating each of us in our
own ideological filter bubble. Rushkoff recognizes in digital media what Wittgenstein, Innis,
and others have described in other media, namely that each medium forces its user to think in
particular ways and, at the same time, prevents them from thinking in other ways.
The Information Mythology
We have examined some of the effects of new technologies on an environment and how
information monopolies (or monopolies of knowledge) rise and fall with each new technological
development. Media Ecology scholarship not only investigates the information environment as
an ecology but also studies its historical development and its socio-cultural ramifications.
Approximately sixty years or so ago, George Bernard Shaw noted that the average person was as
credulous as the average person living in the middle ages. An average person living in the
middle ages usually lacked a formal education and for the most part trusted and believed in the
authority of religion and the church. Shaw’s comment referred not to the lack of a formal
education, but rather to the tendency of people to form and hold beliefs based upon tradition and
assumption even when those beliefs sometimes defied rational understanding. People need to
make sense of their world and they form beliefs based upon the information at their disposal. In
the middle ages, the lack of scientific information available to the average person contributed to
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the common acceptance of superstition and myth as truth. When information is not available to
give some structure or meaning to the world, other narratives fill the void. Unfortunately today
we find ourselves in a similar situation. Not that we do not have valid information and
knowledge upon which to make sound judgments as was the case in the Middle Ages, but rather
that the massive amount of information available to us today results in a similar dilemma. In the
midst of such vast quantities of information, people can find it difficult, if not impossible, to
make any sense of it, find any meaning in it, or determine any truth of it. Additionally, in the
same way ancient cultures viewed the gods and their ways as mysterious and beyond our
capacity as humans to understand, we view technique and technology similarly. For the majority
of tech users, the mysteries of our technologies defy our ability to understand or explain them.
We do not understand how computers work and any average person would be hard pressed to
explain the coding within the operating systems and the algorithms that give us our information,
news feeds, computers, and smart phones. Nevertheless we know that they work and we accept
their operation with a somewhat simplistic and blind trust in the science behind the technology.
We can also notice a similar blind trust in the mysteries of ancient religions. Ancient
people living in a world of presumed chaos made sense of their world by attributing the unknown
mysteries of the universe to the gods. Their ancient religions provided a set of metaphysical
assumptions that gave a more or less comprehensive order to the world in which they lived. And
while the regular people living in these cultures had difficulty grasping how the tragedies and
realities of life fit into the grand scheme of the universe, they still believed in a grand scheme
and their priests and shamans were there to make sense of it for them through religious rites,
myths, and narratives. Religion as a metanarrative provided a ground for people to stand upon
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that made some sense of the world. It gave meaning and coherence to a universe that appeared
chaotic and without order. It gave them an assurance of a higher purpose.
Today, technology has become our religion. Society’s blind worship of Technique and
technology - a mysterious force that can give meaning to the world and make life better – eerily
resembles the ancient magical religions. To compensate for the void of meaning in ancient
times, magic in religious rites developed as a technique to obtain certain results within a spiritual
order. In the ancient spiritual realm, magic acted as a mediator between god and humanity, and
functioned to give people a sense of control over the mysterious ways of the ancient gods. If
subjects performed the rites correctly or made the appropriate sacrifices, they could obtain the
outcomes from the gods that they desired. Thus, human sacrifice can calm the volcano, prevent
destruction and devastation, and even bring rain for the dying crops. Of course, when the desired
outcome did not occur, the blame went back to wrong technique – the ritual was not performed
correctly, the shaman messed up, or the girl was not a virgin. Magic, in this sense, shows how
Technique acts as a “cosmic vestment” for humanity; where Technique becomes the
intermediary between humanity and its environment. Technique fills the void of the displaced
old gods and becomes the means of protection and defense from the unknown and harsh realities
of the world (Ellul, 1964, p. 25). It gives us control, provides equilibrium, and give us a sense of
order in the world when that order appears to be lacking. Magic, Ellul notes, is the first
expression of technique.
Information and “fact” function today in a similar role that magic did for ancient cultures.
Information grounds our feet on a supposed stable foundation of truth and gives us a means of
comfort that things actually make sense in this world. The modern human worships “facts” and
accepts them as the ultimate reality, believing that facts, in themselves, provide evidence and

64

proof of something (Ellul, 1973b, p. xv). Though empiricism and modern science has convinced
humanity of the almost deistic status of facts and information, the cultural problems we have –
political, social, and personal – do not typically arise from the lack of sufficient information and,
unfortunately, we have not found their solutions even in the abundance of information available
to us today. The problems of global terrorism, international conflict, war, hunger and many
others did not occur because we did not have enough information. These problems typically
come out of ideological disagreements rather than a lack of information. In the same way, these
problems will not be solved by acquiring more information despite the chant of the modern
technophiles. Information, facts, analytics, and other mechanistic methods of parsing data
cannot provide solutions to these types of problems. Postman noted how the metanarrative of
religion, especially the church, provided order for the populace of pre-modern Europe and he
recognized the void left behind as that narrative was dismantled by science (Postman, 1993, pp.
59–60). In its dissolution, the metanarrative of Progress emerged accompanied by the dazzling
inventions of science and technology. And Progress fulfilled its promise and provided an easier
way of life and vast improvements in virtually every arena of human society. Yet it brought with
it a misplaced trust – the concept of information as savior. Postman states:
“What is the problem in the Middle East or South Africa, or Northern Ireland? Is it lack
of information about how to grow food that keeps millions at starvation levels? Is it lack
of information that brings soaring crime rates and physical decay to our cities? Is it lack
of information that leads to high divorce rates and keeps the beds of mental institutions
filled to overflowing?” (Postman, 1993, p. 60)
The situation resembles a similar communication problem writ large – understanding the
difference between miscommunication and disagreement. In interpersonal conflict situations,
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assuming the problem consists of a simple misunderstanding instead of a more ideological
disagreement results in an attempt to provide more information as the solution. However, in
ideological disagreements more information does not usually provide resolution and will more
than likely result in a greater divide. Even this common interpersonal communication problem
reflects the underlying value of Technique prevalent in culture, namely that information is
always the solution to any problem. The modern worship of “fact” shows the technological
priority placed upon information and data. As Postman noted in Amusing Ourselves to Death
(2005), at the beginning of the digital age, the lack of information was not a problem that needed
to be solved. The printing press had already solved that problem by granting more information
than one could ever consume. Now, computer technologies have given us almost instantaneous
access to virtually all the information now available in the world, but they have also created the
additional problem of too much information, what Postman calls information glut (2005, p. 68).
We now have so much information available that we find it difficult to recognize truth and
falsehood and have no viable means of making sense of it all. In our current political climate
characterized by accusations of “fake news,” Postman’s prediction resonates all too well. Who
can know what is fake and what is real when “evidence supported” articles come out on both
sides of an issue? Who can know true and false when academic studies show “proof” for both
sides? A culture that steeped in a tsunami of data must now deal with the questioning of fact
and, most alarmingly, now finds that “alternative facts” can be not only presented and
considered, but given equal credence.
The Information Revolution
The information revolution began with the invention of the printing press. Elizabeth
Eisenstein’s (1980) work demonstrates how the invention of the printing press changed Europe
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by altering the vehicle that provided information to the public. Prior to this technology,
information distribution had many limitations. For information seekers, the rarity of written
texts demanded a journey to the library or university which possessed the text in order to access
the information. The static nature of the text made it valuable - in need of protection and
preservation –and prevented the general populace from gaining access to it. The printing press
changed that allowing greater distribution of information and removing geographic constraints.
More texts available in print gave greater access and availability to the information contained
within them. Books could now be distributed and purchased from almost anywhere marking a
shift in the availability of information. Additionally, the wide availability of books changed
education by making literacy a desired and necessary skill and altered the human being by
reorganizing human thought processes around the linearity of writing. Walter Ong (1982)
details the epistemological differences between oral and literate cultures. Suffice it to say that
though print technologies granted a wider availability of information, geography still constrained
access. Information could only be gained at the speed of horse or train. These limitations forced
newspapers and magazines to focus on local issues - issues of interest to the geographically local
citizen. News of things in Texas generally had no interest to those living in New York, for
example. These cultural information biases of print remained predominant until the invention of
telegraphy.
The invention of the telegraph removed the geographic limitations of information
distribution. For the first time in history, transportation and communication were disengaged
from each other. The telegraph enabled instantaneous access to information across the globe,
providing the conditions for a greater global awareness and also creating an entirely new type of
information, what Postman called “context free” information (Postman, 1993, p. 67). Context
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free information removes information from any ties to the functions that information may serve
within a local, social, or political context. The telegraph gave equal weight and value to
information in Texas as well as information in New York. The telegraph transformed
information from something that functioned to enable people to take actions based upon
reasoned and informed decisions into a commodity that could be purchased. Because of the
availability of the information, it did not matter whether people in New York wanted to know the
happenings of Texas, the fact that they now could know this information immediately resulted in
the idea that they now should know – an almost deterministic consequence. In this sense, the
quality of the information became less important than the quantity and the variety of the
information.
The technology of the camera ushered in the third stage of the information revolution and
transformed the symbolic environment by introducing the photographic image. Though painting
and imagery have been around for millennia, the mid-nineteenth century saw a sudden explosion
of imagery and photographs within the symbolic environment. The development of this
technology and the corresponding barrage of imagery is what Daniel Boorstin (1961) refers to as
the “graphic revolution.” Boorstin explains how the image came to supplant language in popular
culture and in doing so, changed the way we construct our reality. The image forces us to think
in ways differently than language does. Sight acts as a somewhat selfish sense as opposed to
hearing which in its nature must be tuned toward another subject (I rely here on Ellul, 1985, pp.
5–47). For instance, when I look around, I make the space I see my own and I record the images
juxtaposed with myself and in relation to where I am. Sight makes me the center of the world,
because sight allows me to situate myself in space in relation to all I see and sight respectively
situates everything I see in relation to myself. Furthermore, sight objectifies other people.
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“Even one person gazing into another’s eyes does not penetrate to his soul… such looking is
truly relationship, and is genuine understanding of the other person, but only in his reality”
(Ellul, 1985, pp. 113–114). Ellul declares that mere looking transforms what is into an object –
whether that be scientific matter or another human being. Ellul’s critique of sight and the image
exposes how images (pictures in this case) become a substitute for something living, eliminating
the personal and existential relationship with the world and cutting one off from relationships
with other people (Ellul, 1985, p. 123). Photographic images transformed the symbolic
environment, the population and the culture. But the camera served only as a step in an evolving
process which led to broadcasting.
The rise of the television, represents the next iteration in the development of our current
symbolic environment. Postman (2005) argued that television (and broadcasting in general)
created a culture primarily characterized by entertainment. This is not to say that people did not
read for entertainment prior to television but that television created a situation where
entertainment became a more primary end to content and media. As a medium, television
demands entertainment. This has to do with a fact inherent in the system of televised (and
broadcast) media - advertising drives programming. If a program does not draw ratings, the
network cannot sell advertising on the program and it eventually gets cut from the network
schedule. Obviously, more entertaining programs draw larger audiences which then enable
networks to sell more advertising increasing their profit and satisfying the shareholders. The
economic structure of television/broadcasting demands a product that entertains the audience.
Add to this the competition among the networks for viewers and ratings and one can see how a
greater push for ratings would lead to more attention getting programming targeted at prime
financial demographics.
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The introduction and wide acceptance of television and broadcasting, much like the
introduction of any technology, transformed culture. Any media or technology inevitably does
what it is designed to do, though not always what it was intended to do. Television and
broadcasting are no different. The introduction of television into mainstream society eventually
led to the removal of literacy as the obstacle preventing children widespread access into the adult
world. Information previously available only in print, now became available through
broadcasting to everyone with a television. Postman argued (1994) that the medium of
television, in removing literacy as the primary marker for entrance into the adult world,
destroyed the traditional concept of childhood. In the same way the printing press transformed
Europe in the middle ages, the television has created a new socio-cultural environment.
Additionally, the television medium by its nature requires a specific commitment to a
particular space. In order to participate in the content, the user must be in front of a television –
in a dedicated space defined by the presence of the technology. Of course that place could be in
various locations, but a television viewer required a television, and because of size and other
limitations of the hardware (need for electric power, antenna for reception, etc.) that meant being
constrained to a specific place. The television demanded a particular context for anyone who
desired to consume its content resulting in the creation of furniture, meals, times, and spaces
designed around the medium. The television dinner, the TV room, TV dinner trays, surround
sound, recliner chairs, and other amenities reflect a transformation in the living environment
brought about by the introduction of a new medium. Another consequence of television has to
do with the health of large media consumers. Several studies have linked child obesity and other
health issues to the sedentary lifestyle of the typical television viewer (Dietz & Gortmaker, 1985;
Gortmaker et al., 1996). And in another arena, television provided an ideal platform for the
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elevation and growth of the advertising industry. The combination of an attentive, sedentary
audience with their attention engaged in the medium along with a platform suited to subtle
messaging gave advertisers an ideal environment to refine and develop their psychological
advertising techniques. And due to the growing television audience both in number and as well
as time spent in viewing, the growing number of advertisements resulted in the targeting of ads
toward specific demographics as well as the evolution of branding as a means of connecting and
relating consumers with products.
Currently, we find ourselves in another transitional period not dissimilar to what
happened with the telegraph, printing press, and the television. The latest shift of the
information revolution involves digital or computer technology. Like some of its technological
predecessors, the computer has once again transformed culture. We might think of the computer,
the internet, or the smartphone as portable television sets, but that assumption would be naïve
and simplistic. The internet not only connected computers together in a vast, expansive network,
it also connected people. McLuhan’s sixties era metaphor of the global village seemed to be
being fulfilled in the technology of the internet. Through computer and internet communication
technologies, the global community immediately became smaller and more intimate simply due
to the immediacy of communication between people irrespective of geographical location.
Additionally, the computer and internet technologies provide immediate access to just about any
information available on the planet. The availability of information became a selling point for
greater expansion of high speed internet access and provided a justifiable means to invest
millions of dollars in connecting schools and businesses to the World Wide Web. In the span of
a few decades, information culture radically transformed. Data that had been previously only
available in books became immediately available to anyone with an internet connection. While
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the telegraph removed space as a limit on gathering information, the internet removed time and
increased both speed and quantity. As has been mentioned, media are not simply additive parts
of our existence, they change the entirety of who we are as human beings. The smart phone or
computer does not give you the human being plus a smart phone or a computer, it gives you an
entirely different human being altogether. (This statement paraphrases Postman’s reflection upon
the printing press’ effect upon European culture in Postman, 1993)
When Marshall McLuhan designated every technology as an extension of man, he
specifically mentioned electronic technologies as extensions of man's central nervous system.
Though he was an intelligent individual and at the time seen as a Nostradamus of technology, it
is hard to believe that he would have been able to foresee just how apropos his central nervous
system metaphor would become in light of the internet and the World Wide Web. Today, that
metaphor applies on a global level. Mobile phone technologies, text messaging services, the
growth of the internet and social media outlets (Facebook, Google+, Twitter, YouTube, etc.)
throughout the world have made the world a smaller place and have connected individuals to
each other in ways that would not have been dreamed about 20 years ago. The question of the
quality of community and interpersonal relationships in light of these advancements, however, is
one that has been examined by scholars (Putnam, 2000) as well as the effects that these
advancements are having on people's conceptions of themselves (De Zengotita, 2005) and their
physical neurological development (Carr, 2012). These technologies, in transforming culture,
have created a situation unique from any other time in history.
Conclusion
The exponential advancement of computer technology is the practical result of the
continuation of Technique’s value of progress and sits at the heart of every technological
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innovation. Media ecology scholarship seeks to make this more evident by providing different
metaphors through which we can view and better understand media and our symbolic
environment. Media have been recognized as extensions of ourselves – technologies that
extend our senses into the world; as an environment predicated on a delicate ecological balance
in which we live, communicate, and act; as species that affect one another in a complex
intermediated interaction; and as an epistemology by which we reconstitute not only the world
around us but ourselves as well. Media have biases inherent in their structure and design that
both allow and restrict our thoughts and actions. They communicate information and direct
and control that information through their unique design structures and programming. And
they now comprise a newly defined “space” mediated by the digital technologies that make up
our current symbolic environment.
Of course throughout history, technologies have had incredible benefits to humanity
and they have vastly contributed to the improvement of the human condition in almost every
arena but often these contributions and benefits cause us to overlook and miss the hidden
aspect of the toll that technology takes upon the nature of our humanity. This dialectical
tension in technology: an unfettered progress and a better future on one hand and the
mechanization and disintegration of the vital sources of our humanity – the limitation of our
human freedom and the destruction of our moral foundations, mental processes and social
relations that make human life worth living – on the other should hasten our desire to understand
both sides of the dialectic. Unfortunately, it rarely does. If technology, in bringing about
glorious advancements in our quality of life, is at the same time destroying some of the things
that contribute most to our humanity, we should turn our attention to those dark shadows and
shed some light in an effort to seek possible solutions. In that spirit, I now look to explicate one
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area of interpersonal human experience currently being negatively affected by Technique in an
effort to provide greater understanding and explore some possibilities for providing greater
balance in the contemporary technological environment. This area is what I will call
phenomenological dialogue.

74

Chapter Four: Phenomenological Dialogue and Human Relation
Introduction
Human communication through the medium of language is what distinguishes human
beings from every other creature on the planet and some might say it has made possible the
progress and advancement of the human condition throughout history. As Isocrates famously
noted, "We have come together and founded cities and made laws and invented arts; and,
generally speaking, there is no institution devised by man which the power of speech has not
helped us to establish" (Isocrates, 1929). In this same vein, Ellul notes that spoken language the relation of language and word – forms a basis of human specificity. Additionally, in ancient
Greece, Athenians looked at the art of speaking well (eu legein) as a means of selfrepresentation enabling people to present their identities to others within the polis.(Poulakos,
1997, p. 50) And while these examples only highlight speech in a general sense, interpersonal
communication functions as the cornerstone upon which all human relationships stand because
without communication between individuals, relationship does not exist.
Much has been written on the subject of dialogue from a philosophical perspective
(Anderson, Baxter, & Cissna, 2004a; Arneson, 2007; Arnett, 1981, 1986; Arnett & Arneson,
1999; Baxter & Montgomery, 1996; Deetz, 1973; Johannesen, 1971; See, for example, Stewart,
1978) and historically, though communication technologies have changed (D. J. Boorstin, 2012;
Eisenstein, 1980; Harold Adams Innis, 2007; McLuhan, 1994; for an explication of some of
these tectonic shifts in communication technologies see W. Ong, 1982; Postman & Postman,
2005), face to face dialogue has generally been considered the primary medium in human
communication. In our contemporary historical moment, however, this is changing. In her book
Reclaiming Conversation, (Turkle, 2015) Sherry Turkle makes the case that in our current
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technologically mediated society, we are losing a skill which has traditionally allowed us to
connect with other humans at the most basic level – conversation. Turkle details the decline of
face to face conversation due to the greater saturation of electronic technologies within our
culture – technologies that make information transfer between humans faster, more efficient, and
less emotionally involved. Recognizing this shift, this chapter investigates dialogue as a unique
and vitally important form of human communication. I look at some of the foundations of
dialogic communication with particular interest to Martin Buber’s phenomenological dialogic
theory. I then contrast Buber with what we find happening today vis-à-vis our digital
communicative environment. Finally, I give some of the implications of human dialogic
communication in our digital environment which will lead into Ellul’s dialogic perspective on
human communication found through his metaphor – the Word.
Dialogic Communication
The framework for understanding dialogue extends historically at least back to the Greek
polis. The term "dialogue" derives from the Greek word dialogos, comprised of two Greek
words: logos, meaning "word" or "meaning," and dia, meaning through or across. The Greek
word connotes the idea of "meaning through" or "meaning across." The ancient Greek
philosopher Socrates pioneered the dialectic method as a knowledge gaining process wherein an
individual would engage another through a question and answer dialogue aimed at gaining
knowledge and understanding of a particular topic. This Socratic dialectical method functioned
as a carrier of information. Gadamer states, "Plato, in his efforts to disclose the facts of the
matter, recognized in Socratic dialogue itself the means - and the only means - by which to arrive
at a really secure stance toward things" (Gadamer, 1991, p. 20). He points out that through
dialogue we come to knowledge. Socratic dialogue "embodies what fundamentally distinguishes
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the logos of science, which is speech that exhibits the facts of the matter in a logical sequence"
(Gadamer, 1991, p. 20). Plato equates the dialectic with conversation, as Robinson states, "Plato
was so absolutely certain...that the supreme method [dialectic] has its being only in conversation,
that he could name it from this fact; dialectical method means conversation method” (Robinson,
1966, p. 77). Plato’s dialogic written style exemplifies the Socratic dialectical method as a
conversation between individuals with the goal of achieving knowledge and understanding – an
interpersonal communicative event.
Primarily understood as a back and forth conversation, a broader perspective of dialogue
must include the historical moment as well as the perspective and ground of the other person.
One definition of a dialogic approach to communication studies states that dialogue functions as
an exchange between communicative agents embedded within a particular historical moment,
standing on their own ground yet open to the standpoint of the other (Arnett, 2001, p. 323). This
unique definition recognizes the issue of historicality (Gadamer, 1960), a privileged metaphor
where subjects enter an ongoing conversation, attending to the importance of a background
narrative which "gives birth to a given set of social practices, virtues, and understandings of the
'good' that are carried forth in dialogue" (Arnett, Arneson, & Bell, 2006). Dialogue not only
operates as a particular method to achieve greater knowledge for individuals, with historicality, it
becomes foundational in the ethics and the “good” within a culture.
Though a dialogic approach to communication seems to assume some type of concern by
one individual toward another in a communicative event, this assumption might be
misinterpreted. In his article Toward a Phenomenological Dialogue, Arnett (1981) discusses and
bridges the relationship between two approaches to communication theory, the dialogic and the
phenomenological. His intent is to distinguish a humanistic psychological dialogic theory
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grounded in “third force” psychology as presented in the work of Carl Rogers and Abraham
Maslow from a phenomenological dialogic theory represented by the work of Martin Buber and
Maurice Friedman. These two “dialogic” approaches both privilege human dialogue as the
primary metaphor for studying and understanding human communication, however their primary
difference resides in the locus of communicative meaning. For Rogers and Maslow, meaning
lies within the individual which leads to psychologism. Arnett notes, “[Psychologism means]
man always imagines everything as happening through and in him… the important is seen not in
the communication between me and the form to which I strive but in the expression of what
takes place in me” (Arnett, 1981). This psychologistic approach to understanding dialogue is
quite different from Arnett’s phenomenological perspective which gives up the psyche of the
individual as primarily important and recognizes that meaning in communication happens in the
phenomenological stance of the “between.” Friedman clarifies:
“The unfolding of the sphere of ‘the between’ Buber calls the ‘dialogical.’ The
psychological, that which happens within the souls of each, is only the secret
accompaniment to the dialogue. The meaning of this dialogue is found in neither one nor
the other of the partners, nor in both added together, but in their interchange. This
distinction between the ‘dialogical’ and the psychological constitutes a radical attack on
the psychologism of our age.” (Buber, 1965b,166a, p. 17)
A phenomenological perspective distances itself from the more psychological approach attuned
toward the needs of the individual and recognizes the relationship of the individuals involved in
the dialogue – that which takes place in the phenomenological stance of the “between.” This
phenomenological perspective, while somewhat vague, can be clarified by a greater
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understanding of the phenomenological concept of intersubjective intentionality – a directed
consciousness from one subject toward another subject.
Intersubjective Intentionality
Edmund Husserl introduced intentionality as a philosophical concept. Husserl,
considered the father of phenomenology, regarded the concept of intentionality as constitutive of
the basic structure of consciousness. In this sense, consciousness is always a consciousness of
something, what he calls an intentional experience (Husserl, 2012, p. 67). Moran states it like
this: “Husserl took this basic structure of intentionality and …presented it as the basic thesis that
all conscious experiences (Erlebnisse) are characterized by ‘aboutness’” (Moran, 2002, p. 16).
Husserl’s phenomenological investigation considers the intentional structures of acts and their
correlative objects, what he calls the noetic-noematic structure of consciousness. For Husserl,
the idea of intentionality - a directedness or “aboutness” of conscious experience – is an
ontological reality.
Martin Heidegger, who served as Husserl’s assistant, extended Husserl’s
phenomenological project and in his major work Being and Time (Heidegger, 1962), he
specifically addresses the question of Being from a phenomenological ground. In his
examination of the question of being, Heidegger categorizes “being” according to two distinct
natures: the Being of human beings (Dasein) and the being of objects that human beings
encounter in the world (equipment). Both of these categorizations reflect intentionality. For the
being of objects (equipment), the intentionality comes from a person’s directedness toward the
object and how it functions as a tool for utility. Heidegger defines Dasein – the Being of human
beings - as “that entity which in its Being has this very Being as an issue” (Heidegger, 1962, p.
68). For Dasein, its Being is something meaningful for it.
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However, Heidegger defines Dasein not only as Being-in-the-world but Being towards
others who have the same kind of being as Dasein. Dasein is by its very nature in an
intersubjective position. Heidegger says that Dasein’s being is social or relational; its kind of
being is a relationship of Being from Dasein to Dasein (Heidegger, 1962, p. 163). In its Beingin-the-world, Dasein is already in relationship with others. He states:
“Not only is Being toward others an autonomous, irreducible relationship of Being: this
relationship, as “Being-with” is one which, with Dasein’s Being, already is.” (Heidegger,
1962, p. 162)
As with its Being itself, there is an ontological quality between Dasein and Being-with-another
in the sense that Dasein’s being is constituted in its Being-with-one-another: “So far as Dasein is
at all, it has Being-with-one-another as its kind of Being” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 163). The kind of
being that Dasein has in the world is its being with others – a being within intersubjective
relationship. Husserl revealed intentionality as constitutive of the basic structure of
consciousness. Heidegger clarifies the ontological reality of intersubjective intentionality and
places it at the essence of Being (Dasein) itself. Calvin Schrag then advances Heidegger’s
intersubjective position for intentionality as an element which constitutes the structure of moral
consciousness.
The Structure of Moral Consciousness
In 1963, Calvin Schrag attempted to provide a phenomenological and existential analysis
of the structure of moral experience. His project had at its roots “an attempted ‘dialogue’
between the phenomenologist and the existentialist” to examine the region of moral valuation in
order to clarify and understand concrete moral choices that “arise in our immediate experience of
being-in-a-world” (Schrag, 1963, p. 255,256). Schrag begins his examination from the fact of
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moral valuation as it “shows itself” as a phenomenon in the concrete life-world of individuals.
Moral valuation is a given for Schrag. As he states, “to exist in the world is to exist as a valuing
being” (Schrag, 1963, p. 257). The argument recognizes that individuals cannot exist without
acting in the world, and that action presupposes value judgements which form a basis for
choosing one action as opposed to another. Value judgments are seen as decisions which must
be made between multiple alternatives that can be placed on a continuum of good and bad, right
and wrong, desirable and undesirable. In other words, the very existence of an active agent
presupposes some type of moral valuation. Schrag argues that moral valuation can never be
separated from the concrete life-world and functions as a given phenomenon which essentially
constitutes the life-world. We might say that by nature of one’s existence in a concrete lifeworld, one fundamentally functions as a moral agent who acts based on decisions that consider
and prioritize particular values in relation to others. One never makes a decision without some
type of value judgment even if that decision relates to something as simple as a choice between
chocolate and vanilla for even here, the liking of one choice as opposed to the other reflects
valuation.
Having established moral experience as an ontological reality for humans in a concrete
life-world, Schrag goes on to detail several structural elements for moral experience:
intersubjective intentionality, historicity, temporality, purpose, meaning, and freedom. These six
elements account for the possibility of a moral act and define what he calls the “world-horizon of
the moral self in action” (Schrag, 1963, p. 265). These elements compromise a
phenomenological structure for moral consciousness elevating moral consciousness to a
fundamental aspect of human existence. Schrag moves from simple intentionality to
intersubjective intentionality and then to moral consciousness. He also notes that Sartre and
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Heidegger broadened Husserl’s intentional framework to include pre-reflective as well as prepredicative experience. A pre-reflective experience’s dependence upon an intersubjective
relationship establishes the experience within the locus of morality and moral consciousness.
Moral pre-reflective acts consider not only the self but other subjects as well. As an example,
the experience of shame is determined by an intentional structure in which another self is
disclosed as an integral part of one’s concrete life-world (Schrag, 1963, p. 258). These type of
psychological experiences (shame, fear, love, hate) presuppose the presence of another self as
conditional for their possibility. Thus, they presuppose an intersubjective intentionality. Schrag
conceptualizes morality as a psychological phenomenon that must consider, acknowledge, and
respond to other selves in one’s concrete life-world – an intersubjective experience marked by
intentionality.
Schrag clarifies intersubjective intentionality as a fundamental structural element of
moral experience and his argument places the human self’s moral agency within an
intersubjective context. “If the self is wrested from the intersubjective context of concrete moral
action, then it becomes an abstracted and ‘lifeless’ self which is neither moral nor immoral”
(Schrag, 1963, p. 258). The nature of morality itself is such that it demands an intersubjective
context without which it is divested of its meaning and existence. Moral consciousness, as
Schrag notes, is “indelibly communal” (Schrag, 1963, p. 258).
Martin Buber’s Dialogic Theory
Where Schrag explicates intersubjective intentionality as a foundational aspect for the
structure of moral consciousness, Martin Buber attends to the same concept but through a more
textured dialogic perspective represented in three distinct metaphors: the concept of the
between, the two primary words – I-It and I-Thou, and the narrow ridge. Buber reveals a more
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complex understanding of dialogue as a central aspect of his philosophy of communication. His
"dialogic voice" (Arnett & Arneson, 1999) is apparent in his writings - most notably in two
works: I and Thou (2010) and Between Man and Man (1947), and in his work he specifies a
common center of dialogue: the relation of the interhuman. For Buber, human life is not simply
an individual “trying to find his way,” but rather an ontological reality found in relationships
between people. Buber’s “horizon of the between” is situated in the historical moment and refers
to an understanding that “human existence is … rooted in one being turning to another as
another, as this particular other being, in order to communicate with it in a sphere which is
common to them but which reaches out beyond the special sphere of each”(Buber, 1947, pp.
202–203). Buber’s philosophy of communication shows the intersubjective and interconnected
nature of human existence and roots dialogue in the common center of conversation between
people and not the psyches of each individual (Arnett & Arneson, 1999, p. 128).
The Between and Intersubjective Intentionality
Buber’s concept of the between represents a distinct perspective on intersubjective
intentionality both as a conditional foundation for dialogue and more particularly as a moral
foundation. The between arose as an alternative to two polarizing landscapes – that of
collectivism and that of psychologism. These extreme positions he considered the base for the
demonic and the destruction of society because they both hinder the idea of the “human” in
individuals. He states:
“The name Satan means in Hebrew the hinderer. That is the correct designation for the
anti-human in individuals and in the human race. Let us not allow the Satanic element in
men [/women] to hinder us from realizing man [/woman]. Let us dare, despite all, to
trust.” (Buber, 1957, p. 239)

83

Both the collectivism of his historical moment seen in a nationalistic Nazism and the
individualism reflected in a greater emphasis on the psychological devalued the authentic human
being which Buber believed could only be realized in relation between people. For Buber, the
fundamental fact of human existence is neither the individual nor the aggregate which,
considered by themselves, he sees as abstraction. In noting the non-psychological nature of the
interhuman, Buber states:
“It is basically erroneous to try to understand the interhuman phenomena as
psychological. When two men/women converse together, the psychological is certainly
an important part of the situation, as each listens and each prepares to speak. Yet this is
only the hidden event fraught with meaning, whose meaning is to be found neither in one
of the two partners nor in both together, but only in their dialogue itself, in the ‘between’
which they live together.” (Buber, 1965b,166a, p. 75)
In refusing to ground meaning in the psyche of the individual or in the collective, he deliberately
turns away from the two extremes of individual “me-ism” and the collectivism of group tyranny
and recognizes that the “good” in life is found in the between.
The intersubjective relationship forms a basis in Buber’s understanding of the between.
First, this relationship is intentional in that it is only available through invitation - an invitation
which presupposes intentionality. In other words, the invitation to participate in dialogue comes
via a particular focus of attention – an intentionality - directed toward the other person. Even
though with invitation the focus of attention rests upon the other, in Buber’s understanding of
dialogue, the focus of meaning comes between individuals. In speaking about the focus of
attention, Buber relates a story from his youth of stroking the head of his pet horse (see Buber,
n.d.) When he would go in to feed his horse and stroke the horse’s massive head, the horse
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would respond with a gentle signal back – the slight raising of its head as if in acknowledgement
of the connection between itself and the young boy. On one day, however, young Martin
became conscious of how much he enjoyed stroking the horse and his focus of attention shifted
from the horse to his own hand. He noticed that things went on as before, yet something about
their relationship had changed. He notes that the next day, when he stroked the horse’s head, the
horse did not respond by raising its head in acknowledgement. Buber recognizes how focus of
attention affects our relationships and that something changes qualitatively when that focus
moves off of the other person and onto ourselves. In intersubjective intentionality, the focus of
attention is directed to the other person and we mostly forget about ourselves as we seek to find
meaning in the relationship, or as Buber would say in the “between.”
Additionally, Arnett and Arneson note six particular connections (Arnett & Arneson,
1999, pp. 133–134) between the phenomenological concept of intentionality and Buber’s notion
of the between. First, both have a nonpsychological emphasis. Intentionality is a directedness
toward a particular noema without a psychological concern for what meaning may be gained
within the act of the individual. For Buber, meaning is found not in one individual or another,
and not in some therapeutic understanding of one’s self in dialogue, but rather in the space
between individuals in discourse. Second, both imply an ontological understanding of relation.
As Heidegger noted, the ontological reality of Dasein is that its being is constituted in its Beingwith-one-another. For Buber, relation is the uniquely definitive characteristic of the human – an
ontological aspect of humanity. Third, each points to a reality beyond the common everyday
understanding of the empirical. Husserl’s phenomenology moved beyond simple Cartesian
dualism to a more textured approach of the understanding of being and called into question
approaches from both psychology and empiricism. Buber deliberately wrote in a poetic,
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ambiguous and non-systematic way in order to move beyond a technical positivistic perspective
which would concretize relation rather than provide the necessary space for its authentic reality.
Fourth, each approach shows the importance of the intersubjectivity of phenomenological
otherness and the subject. Intentionality recognizes both a noema and a noesis – not distinct in
themselves as in a subject or object, but rather two sides of the same coin. Similarly, the
between is a phenomenological space not defined by one person or the other but by a space
between them both where meaning emerges. It takes both – two sides of a coin – for meaning to
come about. Fifth, each reveals an alternative focus of attention beyond self and object. In
interpreting Husserl, Buber notes how Husserl specifies a focus of attention beyond the
individual:
“Humanity in general is existentially the existence of man/woman in entities of
mankind/womankind which are bound together in generations and in society.”… In these
words Husserl says that man’s/woman’s essence is not to be found in isolated individuals,
for a human being’s bonds with his/her generation and his/her society are of his/her
essence.” (Buber, 1947, pp. 159–161)
The focus of attention in the between additionally provides a focus beyond self and object – a
phenomenological space that arises between the two. It is not simply both subject and object,
though it is part of both, but it becomes a space entirely different – a third alternative. Finally,
both intentionality and the between announce the ontological nature of the interdependence of
the seer and the seen, the knower and the known, the listener and the heard (Arnett, 1986).
Intentionality connotes a particular interdependence between the individual and the focus of that
person’s attention – they are related in a specific way with one another and necessarily defined
by one another. In the same way, the between reflects the connection that arises when two

86

people come together in relationship with one another. Each of these six points shows the
phenomenological character of Buber’s between and its connection to the concept of
intentionality.
In the same way, the between forms a moral base for consciousness because it is defined
by relationship between two persons. Though the metaphor of the between can be recognized
outside of the interhuman context, such as in the relationship between the historical moment of a
person and event, the primary context for the emergence of the phenomenological space of the
between arises between persons. In this sense, it focuses on a concern for the other which
naturally evolves out of an intersubjective relationship. Additionally Buber’s understanding of
the “sphere of the between” has four main characteristics and implications: (1) it is an
ontological reality and part of being human, (2) it is a metaphor for communicative life pointing
to a relational rather than individualistic or collectivistic view, (3) it is within a
phenomenological space available in dialogue only by invitation, and (4) it is a reminder of the
human story – together life is to be lived well for us (Arnett & Arneson, 1999). It is important to
note here the moral implication. The “good” of lived life is found within the sphere of the
between in a relational view which is constituted in an intersubjective relationship.
Buber’s Two Primary Words and Human Relation
The between provides one avenue into Buber’s philosophy of communication.
Additionally, Buber’s two primary words, the I-Thou and the I-It give greater clarity to his
understanding of dialogue especially in revealing how individuals encounter other people in the
world: these two primary words “do not signify things, but they imitate relations” (Buber, 2010,
p. 3). To understand this, he distinguishes between the two primary words. The I-It mode of
existence is engaged in experience, where the “I” acts as an objective, rational, observer toward
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the “It.” The It is an object to the I and it “occupies space and time, and has its nature and
constitution” (Buber, 2010, p. 7). This is a communicative representation of monologue where
an individual speaks not with another subject - a "Thou," but to an object - an "It." Alternatively,
the Thou is encountered by the “I” in relation. When one encounters a human as Thou, he is not
merely a thing nor does he consist of things. It is in relation that we encounter Thou as an active
participant rather than an objective observer. This encounter is dialogical – a conversation where
meaning takes place “between” subjects (Buber, 2010, pp. 27–28). Again, the emphasis is on
intersubjectivity - relationship is encountered in a dialogical space "between" subjects.
The Narrow Ridge
An additional metaphor that enlightens us to Buber’s dialogic voice is the metaphor of
the narrow ridge. According to Friedman, the “narrow ridge” metaphor most aptly describes not
only Buber’s existential philosophy but also his dialogic or “I-Thou” philosophy which he
presents as an alternative to the either-or philosophies of our age (Friedman, 2004, p. 3). For
Buber, the narrow ridge signifies a path not of sure statements about the absolute, but rather one
that moves precariously between the gulfs “where there is no sureness of expressible knowledge
but the certainty of meeting what remains undisclosed” (Buber, 1947, p. 184). His textured
metaphor echoes Ellul’s dialectical perspective of the world, the fact that while logical
conceptions of truth seem to suggest an either-or - that two opposing perspectives cannot be
simultaneously true – reality shows a unity of contraries. We cannot escape the fact that
opposites exist in reality. Thus we walk this path understanding in many instances the abyss on
each side – the tension that resides in the dialectic. The danger from Buber’s perspective resides
in the either-ors. In other words the true danger lies not necessarily in the polarization of
cultures and the intolerance of societies based in divisions of race, gender, nationality, and so on,
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but rather in what Buber would see as the falsification of truth. A demand that every person fit
their thinking and way of life into the extreme camps and a refusal to recognize possibilities and
alternatives that do not succumb to the extreme positions. The narrow ridge is an
acknowledgement of the complexity of human existence that cannot be reduced to static
theoretical camps, individual temperament, or objective cultural relativism (Friedman, 2004, p.
5).
Buber provides an entrance into a particular perspective of human being based in
existential phenomenology. He shows through the metaphors of the between, his two primary
words I-Thou and I-It, and the narrow ridge, that life consists of an interdependence between
people. He shows that life is more than mere subjects and objects, that it is more than
individualism or collectivism, that life itself – authentic human life - is best lived in relation
defined by intersubjective intentionality. His work calls us outside of ourselves, beyond our own
perspectives and into a space where meaning occurs between individuals. His work points to a
reality not defined by simple definitions and techniques but one recognized through the
complexity of relationships within a particular historical moment.
Technological Mediation
Considering Buber’s dialogic approach to human relation and the ethical/moral
implications that come out of it, we must attempt to reconcile that with our current
technologically mediated communication context. Before we examine how digital technologies
effect human dialogue, we look at, more generally, the powerful impact a technology can have
upon a culture. In doing so, we refer to both the cultural effects that can be anticipated prior to a
technology’s introduction and those ramifications that cannot always be foreseen. Let us first
look at the introduction of print.
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The technological development of the printing press provided great advancements for
human civilization. Print technology allowed books to be widely distributed among the populace
and led to a greater emphasis in education on literacy. Knowledge spread leading to
advancements in science, economics, business, and much more. Prior to the invention of the
printing press, for the vast majority of the human population, the ability to read was not a great
priority. The skills necessary to scrape together a life depended primarily upon one’s physical
abilities and craftsmanship. That doesn’t mean that people shunned literacy but simply that the
necessary conditions for a literate education were not widely available and the need for
sustenance demanded that lower class, illiterate citizens primarily relied upon physical labor to
provide for their families. Literacy was available to the higher classes of citizens because their
means allowed them access to the materials, tutors, and texts necessary to learn. The distinction
between classes of people who could read and write and those who could not led to certain
monopolies of knowledge (as previously mentioned) and established a hierarchical power
structure in society based upon this knowledge. The invention of the printing press and thus a
wider availability of written texts created a greater demand for literacy beginning the destruction
of literacy’s monopoly of knowledge. Monopolies of knowledge work based upon the principle
of scarcity. As in any economic situation, a scarce resource will command a higher price and
elevate those who possess it to a higher societal and economic level. Prior to the widespread
education system, the ability to read and write represented a scarce, specialized knowledge and
gave those who possessed it great power and influence over the culture. The skills of reading
and writing remained scarce primarily because important texts remained inaccessible to people
without the means to travel to them or to pay to have them copied and brought back for their own
library.
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When the printing press made texts and information more easily accessible to the
population, it created a greater demand for literacy and not simply a greater desire for the
consumption of information. It made literacy a necessity for economic viability. Information is
power because as a commodity it distinguishes the have’s from the have not’s. Those who
possess the information hold advantages over those who do not. One obvious example is in
terms of financial upward mobility. The possession of information allows people to capitalize
upon what they know economically, to leverage information for financial benefit. This has
always been a part of the competitive capitalist system thus the need for trademarks, copyrights,
patents, and laws regarding intellectual property. Literacy became a necessity because,
socioeconomically, without it people were less likely to succeed and even economically survive
in the culture. At a certain point, the lack of the ability to read and write became such an
economic disadvantage that the need for education was obvious to everyone. Governments
began to recognize this and the establishment of an educational system based in literacy grew
and ultimately solved the problem. The introduction of new technologies create these
monopolies of knowledge that people within the monopoly capitalize on for money and power.
In this case, the introduction of the printing press radically transformed first Europe, and later the
entire world, moving the world beyond agricultural societies, into the Industrial Revolution, and
ultimately the information age.
Wide dissemination of information through the invention of the printing press was not the
only effect of this technological innovation. We have already established how the introduction
of any technology additionally changes our cognitive processes. Literacy and advanced
education allows individuals to think in different ways than non-literate individuals. The ability
to think abstractly and in liner, methodical ways are all strengthened and enhanced by the literate
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mind. The growth of literacy among a greater portion of the population during the time of the
Reformation made possible certain thinking processes available to literate minds that in a
previous non-literate times were not possible. This does not mean that people could not think
economically prior to the invention of print, simply that it was not as widespread and did not take
a hold on the culture until literacy became prominent. In this same vein, the introduction of print
also introduced a system of standardization not previously known, and in so doing, began a
transformation in the cognitive processes of both the printers and the readers. The theme of
standardization colored every aspect of typography from the precise measurement of the pieces
of type to the subliminal impact upon the readers who now engaged repeatable type styles,
printer’s devices, and title page ornamentation (Eisenstein, 1968, p. 12). Eisenstein addresses the
impact of standardization on the “brainwork” of the people who both created the standards
(printers) and those subject to those standards (readers):
“Many early capitalist industries required efficient planning, methodical attention to
detail, and rational calculation. The decisions made by early printers, however, directly
affected both toolmaking and symbol making. Their products reshaped powers to
manipulate objects, to perceive and think about varied phenomena. Scholars concerned
with “modernization” or “rationalization” might profitably think more about the new kind
of brainwork fostered by the silent scanning of maps, tables, charts, diagrams,
dictionaries, and grammars.” (Eisenstein, 1968, p. 12)
The standardization of moveable type now contained in the medium of books would transform
how people would think about themselves and the world around them. We should also expect
that if a technology like print could affect the cognitive process of a culture, technologies would
also impact the nature of intersubjective experience as well.
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Digital Technology and Intersubjective Experience
Dialogue in the Buberian sense is defined by intersubjective intentionality – a
directedness toward the other in conversation - and having witnessed some of the other effects of
a technology on a culture, we now turn our focus on the effects of digital technologies on the
interhuman relationship. How does mediation through our electronic communication
technologies affect our relationships with others? While technology promises to connect us in
greater ways through newer electronic communication media the reality tends to contradict that
Pollyanna promise and we actually find that our human social interactions are growing more
distant. Sherry Turkle’s work in Alone Together exposes this distancing in our technological
media. Ellul (Ellul, 1964, pp. 379–380) also noticed the same problem, albeit years earlier. We
see through the prescience of these scholars some of the impact of digital technologies upon
intersubjective experience. Technological mediation, while promising to provide a greater
access and efficiency in human dialogue has more to do with and is better suited for information
transfer than the interpersonal dynamics involved in authentic dialogue. In this sense we might
say that technological mediation, while enhancing what Buber would call technical dialogue
(Buber, 1947, p. 19), may be having a detrimental effect upon the intersubjective experience he
called the between. We can see these effects more clearly as we examine some of the particular
structures of the media themselves.
Distance and the visual medium
Understanding how digital media create greater interpersonal distance requires an
explication of the differences between a visual and an oral medium. Technologically mediated
communication that comes about via texting, email, social media posts, etc. usually comes to us
visually. Texting and email are visual media – characters written in a word processing program
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and electronically transmitted to another individual. There resides a distance in this type of
communication that disconnects us from our relationships with others and releases us from a
basic human obligation to the other. Ellul explains that the more visual the medium, the greater
the distance between subjects. In HOTW he distinguishes sight as a sense relative to the
individual as opposed to hearing which in its nature must be tuned toward another subject. Sight
centers “me” in the world because I see everything in relations to ourselves. As Buber would
note, in a visual medium, the focus of attention rests not upon the other, but rather upon the
medium itself and our own interaction with it. For example, in looking at a piece of art we
typically focus on the medium, on the artwork itself, and then form our interpretation of the piece
– an individualistic endeavor. And though we “engage” the artist in a sort of dialogue through
the piece, the dialogue more accurately represents an internal dialogue with ourselves about the
piece. The visual medium places the focus of attention upon ourselves.
Not only does sight situate an agent as the center of his/her reality, sight communicates
pure information – data. Imagistic communication media codify information in such a way that
points to the reality of what they signify. The image of a person in a picture represents the reality
of the person themselves because the picture refers to that particular person—the image is
analogous to the reality. Postman says that these imagistic forms “have direct correspondences
to the structure of nature itself ” (Postman, 1979a, p. 53). Contrary to these visual codifications,
other symbolic forms of communication, like language, are abstract. They do not necessarily
point to the reality itself and have no intrinsic relationship with the reality for which the symbol
stands. In language, for instance, we cannot know what the word man references without
knowing the particular semantic code, as well as the rules of that particular semantic code. The
grammatical structure of these semantic codes form the basis for how we derive meaning from
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our sentences and we understand that by changing the structure within the code, we can also
change the meaning. Moving words within a grammatical sentence structure will change the
meaning of a sentence. The semantic codes we use in written language contain specific needed
structures that image based forms do not. Different types of media, particularly image based and
symbolic, structure our thinking, our perceptions of reality, and the world around us differently.
Television structures thought and meaning differently than a book, a text, or even an oral
presentation (McLuhan, 1994; Meyrowitz, 1986; Postman & Postman, 2005).
Understanding how particular media uniquely structure our thought patterns also reminds
us of Buber’s delineating of the three different forms of communication. In Between Man and
Man (Buber, 1947), he outlined three basic forms of communication: monologue, technical
dialogue, and dialogue. He states:
“There is genuine dialogue – no matter whether spoken or silent – where each of the
participants really has in mind the other or others in their present and particular being and
turns to them with the intention of establishing a living mutual relations between
himself/herself and them. There is technical dialogue, which is prompted solely by the
need of objective understanding. And there is monologue disguised as dialogue, in which
two or more men/women, meeting in space, speak each with himself/herself in strangely
tortuous and circuitous ways and yet image they have escaped the torment of being
thrown back on their own resources.” (Buber, 1947, p. 19)
We live in a time where technical dialogue is the primary vehicle of communication between
individuals. It focuses on information exchange and is reinforced through the digital media of
communication that hold a bias toward simple information transfer. Today’s digital media, both
in their distancing of relationships and in the way they direct us to think about the world lean
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away from Buberian dialogue by nature of the biases within their very structure. Though
dialogue in the Buberian sense is rare and uncommon in our day, of the three forms of
communication, it offers a moral ground and an entrance into genuine human freedom.
Monologue turns us back to ourselves where we enjoy hearing our own voice instead of attuning
our attention toward the other and technical dialogue privileges the information over the person.
Only dialogue can provide the necessary philosophical base for an ethic based in
intersubjectivity.
Greater Tribalism through the Digital Medium
As mentioned in a previous chapter, the biases inherent in a medium affect the ways in
which we think. I detailed Rushkoff’s perspective on how digital media have biases based upon
digital logic. How digital code (defined predominantly in 1’s and 0’s) is inherently antithetical
to subjectivity and influences a particular way of thinking about the world. What Rushkoff
recognizes as a bias within digital media acts as a self-reinforcing feedback loop exploited by the
algorithms that control the information we receive. McLuhan referenced this phenomena
decades earlier in his explication of the myth of Narcissus. In using a medium - in this case the
technology of a mirror in the pond - Narcissus "became a servomechanism of his own extended
or repeated image” (McLuhan, 1994, p. 41). A servo mechanistic device corrects the
performance of a mechanism by means of an error-sensing feedback. This type of auto-correct
can have benefits for the speedy and efficient operation of machines but can also create a closed
loop system that excludes certain types of feedback which may be of critical importance
especially in an inter-human context. In so readily adapting to our technologies without question
or criticism, we run similar risks of entering into a state where we continually receive the same
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feedback based upon the algorithms of our technologies, leading to a type of sensory paralysis - a
"closed system."
We realize not only how particular types of media (and not simply the content the media
presents) serve to form and direct how we think and what we think about, but also how particular
media can possibly prevent us from seeing perspectives other than our own leading to a more
partisan culture and in so doing, limiting our freedom and autonomy. In digital media, this type
of situation does not happen accidentally though it may not necessarily be deliberate.
Programmers and engineers design technologies to not only present us with aesthetically
pleasing content, but also to examine our content choices and then select other content for us that
fits with what we like. The technology chooses the ads we see when using Google as well as the
stories presented to us in social media news feeds and while we do have choices regarding our
consumption of content regardless of the perspectives or sites from which it originates, we have
already seen how media giants like Facebook have engaged in the suppression of certain political
content from their trending topics feed based upon the programmer’s partisan political bias
(Nunez, 2016). Though in this case human editors intentionally censored and blocked content
opposed to their political leanings, we can easily see how partisan censorship could be written
into the code of the algorithm of a user’s news feed creating a situation where the user simply
would not see a particular story show up in their news feed because the algorithm, acting upon
programming, excluded it. These algorithms now determine what users see, how we learn, and
ultimately affect our choices and decisions in life. Through their total incorporation into our
mediated experience, they limit our understanding and force our decisions based upon their
inherent structure which has been established by Technique.
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The Problem of Empathy
Even in this mediated environment, where we find human beings growing more and more
apart, studies show that people still report a greater preference for spending time with others than
being alone (Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz, & Stone, 2004). This preference is
nothing new and the historical tales of social gatherings from Greek symposia to Renaissance
festivals and contemporary raves and parties are numerous and well-known. And while we
realize the importance and priority of social relationships, people also regularly cheat, lie to,
manipulate, steal from, and intentionally hurt others. Again this is no revelation and any
examination of the historical record will show the devastation and destruction of human
relationships caused by these types of activities by one person against another. But what has
traditionally contributed to the ability of people to relate to others in mutual cooperation and
unity is the characteristic of empathy.
Empathy has been defined as a cognitive mechanism through which people have the
ability to imagine the internal state of someone else (Borke, 1971; Deutsch & Madle, 1975), a
range of emotional responses that people have to what others feel or experience (Maibom, 2014,
p. 1), a manifestation of sympathy toward another person (Hoffman, 1984), the tendency to react
to other people’s observed experiences (M. H. Davis, 1983), and an emotion of “feeling for”
another person (Maibom, 2014, p. 5). The ability to empathize with another has been described
as a key component of a person’s emotional intelligence (Goleman, 1996) and has been
considered an important emotional aspect of morality especially considering how emotions and
feelings toward others contribute to moral values and moral behavior. We can say, as Schrag
and others have noted, that moral concepts are value judgments that deal with issues of right and
wrong, good and bad, justice and injustice (Harman, 1977, p. 5; Schrag, 1963, p. 257). While the
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purpose of this project is not to comprehensively define morality and ethics, we should establish
the connection between morality and empathy since it plays at the very center of the idea of
intersubjective intentionality and phenomenological dialogue. Batson and Powell make the
connection between altruistic (moral) motivation and empathy stating that empathy has been the
most frequently proposed source of altruistic motivation – an “other-oriented emotional response
congruent with the perceived welfare of another person” (Batson & Powell, 2003, p. 474). The
empathy-altruism hypothesis, espoused in various forms by Thomas Aquinas, David Hume,
Adam Smith and others claims that empathetic emotions “evoke motivation with an ultimate
goal of benefiting the person for whom the empathy is felt – that is, altruistic motivation”
(Batson & Powell, 2003, p. 474). Scholars have shown that feeling empathy for someone in
need leads to an increased helping of that person – a connection between empathy and moral
(altruistic) behavior (See Batson et al., 1991; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987 for further review).
Empathetic behavior and feelings toward another individual is a cornerstone of morality
in a civilized culture and finds its basis in the concept of intersubjective intentionality. To have
empathy for someone first demands an intersubjective relationship - that one sees another as
“subject” and not “object.” That one sees another, in the words of Buber as Thou rather than It.
And empathy must be directed – it must be intentional. Empathy is, in the words of Husserl, a
particular type of consciousness of another. It is directed and about the other. As previously
mentioned, mediation in its very structure distances our intersubjective relationships. In doing
so, mediation contributes to the objectification of the other such that in mediation, a person is
objectified – a person becomes an “It” rather than a “Thou.” A common phenomenon in the
social media era is the trolling that takes place on social media platforms and often society
vocalizes the horror at some of the vitriol that occurs at the expense of other people, in some
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cases for no apparent reason. We also recognize that people who say those things are less likely
to say them when engaged in face to face communication. Digital mediation constructs an
environment fertile for online disinhibition, otherwise known as the Gyges effect (see “Internet
trolls and the Gyges effect,” 2013; Iverson, 2011; Lapidot-Lefler & Barak, 2012; Suler, 2004),
which is directly linked with anonymity and the facelessness of the other (Marche, 2015).
In light of this, I refer to Emmanuel Levinas’ concept regarding the face of the other not
only as a characteristic of identity, but also one of obligation. “Responsibility is elicited, brought
about by the face of the other person” (Levinas, 1994, p. 43). Levinas concept of face realizes an
intentional directedness towards another individual and establishes a relationship between ethics
and intersubjective intentionality. In morality, we are called to responsibility, an obligation to
the other, through intersubjective relationship – through a call from the face of the Other. For
Levinas, the face of the other is the call to morality. The distance in digital communication
fostered by mediation contributes to the objectification of the other and it is this distantiality that
disconnects us and releases us from a basic human obligation to others.
Conclusion
Levinas reinforces Buber’s notion of the interhuman. That each of us has a responsibility
to the other – to see them as a “Thou” rather than an “It.” To recognize the “between” as the
phenomenological space where meaning exists instead of within our own individual psyche. The
obstacle, as I have noted through this explication, concerns our digital communication media,
and more specifically Ellul’s concept of Technique. In Technique, we lose the interhuman. We
lose our connection with others, we lose a part of the structure of moral consciousness, and we
lose human freedom.
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It is too easy to simply state that digital media is degrading our culture. However, an
introspective examination of Technique and its resulting digital culture presents a compelling
case for the argument Postman made in Technopoly (1993, p. xii) when he stated that the
uncontrolled growth of technology was creating a culture without moral foundation that
undermines our mental processes and social relations. In light of this current cultural context and
the resultant effects on dialogue and human communication, I now turn Ellul’s philosophy of
communication as a dialogic response to Technique. His metaphor of the “word” opens up a
new perspective on our relationship to Technique allowing for a moral and interhuman
communicative experience and the possibility for greater human freedom.
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Chapter Five: The Word as a Response to Technique
Introduction
Having defined Ellul’s understanding of Technique and its historical development as a
cultural system; having explicated media ecology as a meta-disciplinary field of study which
examines technique and both its foreseen and unforeseen consequences on humanity; having
explicated dialogue particularly as communication grounded in the phenomenological concept of
intersubjective intentionality and referenced some of the affects Technique has had upon the
interhuman relationship, I now turn to Ellul for a response. Ellul’s critique of Technique has
been detailed in a subset of his works dubbed “The Technological Trilogy” (See C. Troup, 2016
for a more in depth explication) which consists of The Technological Society (1964), The
Technological System (1980), and The Technological Bluff (1990). Though much of his work
has focused on the examination of Technique as an underlying system in society - a lens through
which contemporary culture must be interpreted, he has rarely provided definitive solutions to
the problem he addresses. His course of action must be extrapolated from fragments (Christians,
2006b, p. 157) that sound a resonant chord throughout his corpus and can be found in various
iterations of a similar theme. In order to consolidate and organize these similar echoes, I look
first to his work The Presence of the Kingdom where he establishes his understanding of the
primary issue with a world given over to Technique – means and ends. From Ellul’s vantage
point, this primary issue results in a problem of communication reflected in the preeminence in
our technological society of image over and above word. This communication problem leads to
an interhuman response which cannot be separated from his Christian faith – one of being before
doing. His response prioritizes the Word - a dialogic metaphor that refuses to integrate humanity

102

into one massified, dehumanized, unfree society and stands as a beacon of hope against the
oppression of a world subject to Technique.
Means and Ends
As mentioned, Ellul sees the biggest problem with Technique’s cultural domination as an
inability to distinguish ends from means, and in the third chapter of POK, he details what he
considers the major tragedy of our day. In order to understand Technique, we must see more
clearly the problem of ends and means. Though this problem has ancient roots and has been
examined for centuries, in our current technological society the problem has changed and must
be considered not from philosophical or abstract perspectives but from a perspective which
understands technics and technical facts. What is this problem? For Ellul, in a culture so
completely dominated by Technique, everything has become a means and there is no longer an
“end” (Ellul, 1989, p. 51). In reconsidering this problem from a perspective which has been
informed by the pervasive influence of Technique, Ellul intends to show us that what has
traditionally and historically functioned as the end of civilization, namely the human being, has
now been turned into a means by Technique. The Technological society has remade humanity in
its own image. With its predisposition to machine-ness and its values of efficiency, progress,
and speed, Technique has upended a cultural hierarchy, turning human beings into
servomechanisms of itself - a means toward more means. Once, techniques were constructed
and established to provide faster and more efficient ways to greater human progress and the
improvement of the human condition; achievements which would hopefully result in better lives
for human beings. But when Technique reigns unchecked and supreme within a culture, it
transforms everything based upon its own set of values, tyrannizing everything to serve itself to
the point that humanity – once the end of techniques – has now become a means.
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For example, techniques have always been a part of economic systems but historically
more so since Taylor (1911) showed the great economic loss due to inefficiency and proposed
the remedy through a science based on clear laws, rules, and principles for the most efficient
means of accomplishing every task. Because of their incredible success in growing profit, over
time, techniques morphed into Technique, transforming economics by directing all policies,
procedures, and actions so that every aspect came under Technique’s dictatorial rule. Every
stock tick, company purchase, and advertisement is now guided and directed by analytics – data
applied to technical examination. The products a store features, the hours an employee works,
and even the amount of profit that can be expected all submit to Technique’s strict gaze and
become subject to the dictates of its algorithms. Technical analysis now determines every
decision because who can argue with the data? The numbers do not lie. In light of big data, the
limited capacity of human beings when it comes to sheer processing power prevents the
complicated analysis necessary to guide decisions at such a scale. The overwhelming tsunami of
supporting data analysis forces most of these monumental business and economic decisions. As
a result, the human being is removed from the decision process, has becomes paralyzed to the
data, and now functions only to implement the guidelines the machine analysis has directed.
Within a parallel arena, humans also serve economic technique by doing their part within the
system - spending, laboring, and consuming. The traditional understanding of the economic
ideal – a system meant to serve humanity – has been upended. Human beings become both
producer and consumer in order to satisfy an economic system transformed by Technique.
What happens in a culture when this seismic shift from ends to means takes place? First,
since the end no longer inspires, means mutually reproduce themselves, suggesting a form of
technical determinism. Once Technique entwines its tentacles into the fabric of society and the
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culture reaches a certain state of technical domination, ends are no longer necessary to demand
means. When ends become obsolete, means beget means and the next discovery or invention
follows automatically, if not inevitably, with no concern for the concept of “should.” The idea of
“should” can only occur in response to a legitimate end. “Should we develop this technology?”
can only be asked when the question points to a valid end. In other words, having an end gives
input and directs the answer to the question. But without an end, moral valuation does not exist.
Ethics and moral valuation become compromised in Technique because Technique is its own
end. Progress becomes the standard for any action while at the same time satisfying any ethical
dilemma or question of morality. After all who can dispute the astounding discoveries and
accomplishments brought about through technological development? Who can disagree with a
jet that goes 600 miles an hour? Who can refute penicillin? (Ellul, 1989, p. 60) And these
magnificent technologies now justify themselves because the inherent values that undergird
Technique have come to direct our understanding of “the good.” If it is faster and bigger, if we
can apply the adjective “more,” if it is efficient, than it is good. In its sovereignty over culture,
Technique defines ethics according to its own values and forces traditionally held understandings
of the “good” to submit to the values of means rather than be measured against an end.
Second, without a legitimate end, humans can no longer master their means. Since the
end typically governs the means, the removal of humanity as end deposes humanity from
choosing their means and subjects the choice to Technique. In choosing between means without
any particular end, Technique chooses for us and with its values embedded in the culture, how
can anyone choose a path against progress, efficiency, or speed? And after all, why would they?
Why would anyone choose the less efficient direction when all of the metrics and analytics point
in the direction of speed? Why choose a slower route when Technique displays the final
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evidence of the best method achievable? In the technological society, this extends to all aspects
of life. Technique has revealed incontrovertible evidence of the best and most efficient way to
go about anything. From medical procedures, to economic policies, to the kind and amount of
food we should eat, and even to the best techniques applied to our most intimate relationships.
The application of Technique to communication has resulted in the development of digital
platforms that do a better, more efficient job of transferring information. Why visit someone in
person when an email or text is quicker and accomplishes the same objective?
Third, the continually automatic reproduction of means and the loss of humanity’s
mastery over them results in a total repression of humanity. A culture governed by the technical
system no longer has freedom to choose its own way since the way is chosen for it by Technique.
This type of society finds itself confined within narrow limits where the social machine controls
everything and in so doing, represses humanity (Ellul, 1989, pp. 63–64). The unfortunate result
of this type of condition is that it goes unseen and so never produces a protest or any attempt at
revolution.
“It is as though we were confronted by an enormous machine, equipped to prevent man
from becoming aware, to drive him into a corner to an unconscious refusal or to a flight
into the unreal.” (Ellul, 1989, p. 82)
And if we cannot even comprehend our own repression by the technical machine, we then
unconsciously become subject to it. Instead of realizing our condition, we fail to see it and find
ourselves captivated by the new inventions and technologies presented to us as the answers to
our deepest questions. Huxley’s (2014) premonition has now become reality as Technique
narcotizes us from the reality of our condition.
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Consider as an example the implementation of computers and algorithms in the area of
stock trading. In the past, stock traders would buy and sell stocks based upon their speculation
of the direction of the markets in the short term or long term future. Day traders traded upon
speculative news and technical analysis – using particular analytic tools like moving averages,
stochastics, and trend lines – to locate buy or sell signals which would determine an action by the
trader. If the stock broke below the fifty day moving average, it would generate a sell signal on
that particular stock. Technical analysis attempted to remove human emotion from the
speculative and risky venture of stock trading by relying upon techniques and data signals which
would determine the course of action in lieu of someone having to make a speculative, and many
times emotional decision. Another type of stock investment strategy based decisions upon a
fundamental analysis of the particular company. Analyzing corporate balance sheets and taking
a deep dive into the fundamentals of a company along with its potential for future profit and
expansion determined the course of action when it came to buying or selling a particular stock.
Both of these strategies rely upon data analysis. Technical analysis applies techniques to
investigate and draw conclusions based upon the stock chart – an attempt to quantify and analyze
the human psychology of the market for that particular stock in order to predict its future
direction. Fundamental analysis applies techniques of analysis to some of the more fundamental
aspects of a company, but the technique remains the same. In the era of computers, however, the
analysis once done by human beings has been taken over by machines. Computers have data
analysis to be completed through a faster and more efficient process. Algorithms make the
trading decisions and buy and sell signals all result in an action – a trade made by computers
without human interference. The speed of computers allows for high frequency trading (HFT) –
high speed trades which outperform human decisions, enabling computers to make decisions
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faster, to make trades faster, and to take advantage of speed in order to make staggering profits
from traders limited by their human faculties. High frequency trading is just a faster means to a
means, hidden from our awareness and removing human freedom in the process.
The Lack of Awareness
Humanity’s inability to see its current condition as a means subject to the means of
Technique does not prevent the condition from having its psychological effects. Subconsciously,
humanity recognizes a dissonance, something amiss in the world, and searches for a way to make
sense of it. In our search to find meaning and explain the feelings of unrest, in our attempt to
make sense of our world, we oscillate between one of two explanations, the phenomenon and the
explanatory myth (Ellul, 1989, p. 83). What Ellul means by the phenomenon is the external
presentation of the fact – the interpretation of our condition given to us as propaganda through
various media. When an event occurs, because of the underlying conditions set by Technique,
the population needs an explanation of the event – a “media” interpretation to give the meaning.
This external presentation along with the power of “the media” (here I refer to media as the
instruments of propaganda) has so framed our current life experience that it supersedes our own
interpretations and we cannot believe our own judgment. So in any action – political, economic,
or informative – we wait for the “interpreters” to tell us what it means. The power of the
microphone dictates our interpretation because, for the most part, our experiences are limited and
we can have no experiential information outside of what we are told.
What comes to us through these media comes as facts of which we will never know the
reality. As an example, consider the war in Iraq under President George W. Bush. Our
government through the media presented indisputable facts to the American public about Iraq’s
possession of weapons of mass destruction. These facts justified the American invasion, only to
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find out later there were no weapons of mass destruction. In the moment of presentation
however, who could have known the validity of the facts given? The public had to trust the
trustworthiness of the reporting, especially in such a tenuous historical moment. Various media
present us with these “facts” and based on the power of the microphone, the media, and
influential propaganda, we are forced to accept them as accurate representations of reality.
However, due to the sheer mass and the flood of information presented to us to, we have extreme
difficulty verifying them – we cannot “master them” (Ellul, 1989, p. 83). This is the
phenomenon. Postman called it – information glut (2005, p. 68). Humanity overwhelmed by a
flood of images and facts, the validity of which it can never know. Images and “facts” which
quickly succeed one another in the Mach speed news cycle as a deluge of information that we
have no possibility of ever completely understanding or comprehending. The phenomenon is
countered by the other “explanation” – the explanatory myth.
If we do not accept the phenomenon – the “facts” presented to us through the
technological system - the other option is the crafting of a myth which gives coherence to what
we experience in life. Narratives serve to provide meaning for individuals and give them an
answer to the question of who - who are they and how they fit into this world (Ricoeur, 1990).
The explanatory myth supports our entire intellectual system by providing an explanation for the
incoherence and confusion created by the phenomenon of the external presentation. The
explanatory myth which functions as an “intellectual key which serves to open all secrets, to
interpret all facts and to understand what is happening in the tempest of phenomena” (Ellul,
1989, p. 85). These myths, known differently in different cultures serve as guiding narratives to
give meaning to people in the midst of information glut. Ellul gives some examples: the
bourgeois myth of the Hand of Moscow; the Socialist myth of the Two Hundred Families; the

109

Fascist myth of the Jews; the Communist myth of the anti-revolutionary saboteur. Today,
explanatory myths such as the American Dream or even Technology as Savior function to
provide meaning, to give direction and order to humanity in the midst of a chaotic world. These
narratives do not necessarily make order out of the glut of information that we strive to
comprehend, but they do provide a path of meaning in the midst of it. The explanatory myth
fulfills this purpose - to give some ground upon which to stand, a sense of stability when we
cannot make sense or find any purchase in the middle of the mass of information.
What accounts for this situation which makes the explanatory myth and the phenomenon
necessary? Why does humanity fail to see the reality of its situation in the world? Ellul gives
four reasons. First, there is an extraordinary complexity to our world. As we advance in
scientific investigations of the world and as technology provides us with the tools that enable a
more thorough examination of natural phenomena, we find that each new discovery creates more
complexity making our explanations of the natural environs even more difficult. As an example,
think of the debate around man-made climate change. The complexity of the multitude of
variables involved with planetary weather systems, not to mention the potential interstellar
factors outside of our own planetary system presents a huge amount of data that must be
analyzed, understood, and interpreted without bias in order to achieve a comprehensive
understanding of potential causalities for the problem of climate change. In fact, considering the
complexity of the relationships between systems and the vast amount of potential variables, some
might say that an accurate understanding of causality will forever be impossible. Of course
scientists and researchers can and should examine the evidence, develop theories, make
assertions, and take preventative actions based upon what we can understand and what we do
know, but we must also realize that no one can never know with absolute certainty the actual
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reasons behind something so complex. In light of the politicization of the debate, we might
consider both explanations, both sides of the debate as explanatory myths which function to give
meaning to the differing cultural factions seeking justification of their perspective on something
they cannot understand. In ancient times, people would simply ascribe these occurrences –
volcanic eruptions, tsunamis, hurricanes, erratic weather, hot temperatures, cold temperatures,
etc. - to the explanatory myth of the gods and offer sacrifices in order to make some sort of sense
of it all. But our naturalist world, having stripped the supernatural of existence, now creates
another explanation that makes more sense and proposes a technical solution. Where the gods
failed, technology will succeed. Society promises that eventually, through greater technical
implementation and discovery, we will finally tame the planet. The complexity of our world
demands an equally complex, yet “realistic” explanation and Technique provides it. Yet
complexity itself does not account for our current situation. A second reason has to do with the
influence of media.
Media influence comes in two forms: social and state sponsored. Regardless of which of
these presents information to us, the underlying technical aspect of knowledge means that its
mechanical character can only be attached to the external aspect of facts (Ellul, 1989, p. 86).
Some things can be represented technically through media and some things cannot. Media
consumers living within the context of Technique can understand only one aspect – that which
can be technically communicated through facts, and facts denote an either/or context. Either
facts are true, or they are not. What this eliminates are any shades of meaning and the idea of
contingency that a more rhetorical understanding of representation allows. The mechanized
communication context negates probabilities and contingencies in favor of certainty,
inevitability, and facts. Additionally, the two forms (private and state) determine which “facts”
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get communicated. Financial obligations of privately owned media companies both contribute
toward and restrict what gets communicated. Ratings, upon which the financial support of the
company rests, guide the content. So the financial interests of the companies function as a
technique to determine what the audience hears. If it does not operate according to the absolute
best method for providing the necessary outcome – in this instance producing ratings which can
be sold to advertisers – it does not get on the air. State sponsored media operate the same way.
Technical objectives (what is best for the state) determine what knowledge gets communicated
which in turn affects what the audience or population at large hears and then understands.
Ellul’s book Propaganda (Ellul, 1973b) explains how this type of communication can only
happen, how propaganda can only work in a technological society.
The third explanatory factor comes from the sheer mass of information communicated.
By nature of the fact that information is communicated at all, it holds legitimacy among the
people. Who can deny information when it has been given to us in such a beautiful and
authoritative package? And in the midst of such a mass, how can we know what to believe?
Neil Postman once shared in a speech an experiment he would test upon his colleagues in
Academe. He would develop a preposterous hypothesis and inform his friends that a “recent
study by MIT” had stated that this ridiculous supposition was true and backed by scientific
research. Inevitably, his colleagues would respond not with a critical inquisition, but rather with
a nod and an acceptance of the ridiculous proposition suggested. With the reputation of MIT
behind the study, the fact that the information existed meant it had legitimacy. Possibly this
experiment shows more about the trust of Postman as reputable individual than the gullibility of
his colleagues but another more recent example (Bohannon, n.d.) is that of Johannes Bohannon,
a Ph.D. in molecular biology. In 2015, he and some of his colleagues conducted a clinical trial
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on bitter chocolate as a dietary supplement setting the research up to deliver false positives on
the results. They then published their research in a pseudo-journal and had a massive press
release stating the results of their study showed that eating chocolate could help people lose
weight. Some of the most popular media picked up the story - including The Huffington Post,
The Daily Star, The Irish Examiner, Prevention, and Shape - and broadcast it out to their
audience without any critical investigation. The technological environment produces two
qualities which allows for this. First, the mass of information works against critical investigation
– media simply cannot “fact-check” everything or they will never publish - and second, the speed
of information and the necessity of audience attention requires that media outlets report it first –
as quickly as possible. The environment of speed creates a value system that devalues accuracy
in favor of primacy, and the nature of the light-speed news cycle prevents retractions because the
world has “moved on” from the story. Essentially, these underlying factors contribute to what
has been termed “fake news.” When news outlets compete for a “scoop” in a ratings driven
environment, checking the accuracy of a story, while still held as a standard of journalistic ethics,
can become a time consuming burden which could result in the loss of precious media share for
not being the first to report. Though “fake news” has been trumpeted as a blight on the industry,
even fake news holds some legitimacy simply because it has been reported and in the mass of
light-speed information, the word of the media cannot be questioned. When media outlets report
something, the legitimacy can come in the fact of the reporting more so than in the accuracy of
the content.
Finally, Ellul talks about “distraction” in the sense in which Pascal (1995) uses it as the
last explanatory aspect of our current cultural situation. Pascal reflected on the human condition
and our inability to deal with the reality of our impending death. Similar to other philosophers
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who recognized the finality of death as an integral aspect of understanding human existence,
Pascal shows how in an effort to defer the unease that accompanies any reflection on mortality,
humanity seeks distraction.
“The only thing which consoles us for our miseries is diversion, and yet this is the
greatest of our miseries. For it is this which principally hinders us from reflecting upon
ourselves, and which makes us insensibly ruin ourselves. Without this we should be in a
state of weariness, and this weariness would spur us to seek a more solid means of
escaping from it. But diversion amuses us, and leads us unconsciously to death.” (Ellul,
1989, p. 118)
In light of this perspective, the immersing of humanity in a mass of information of which men
and women can make no sense or establish any coherence and then providing explanatory myths
to give some type of meaning upon which they can gain some sense of stability contributes to
prevent the only potential remedy to the problem - meditation and reflection. In order to prevent
the remedy, the underlying system of Technique “has arranged everything in order to achieve
distraction” (Ellul, 1989, p. 87). Again, we seemingly encounter the autonomy of Technique
operating as an underlying system within the culture. The reason that we give credence and
authority to the phenomenon and the explanatory myth is because we have already been
distracted by the system of Technique. Throughout history, we have developed distracting
technologies which entertained us and prevented us from thinking deeper about our human
condition. Books served to turn our attention away from our present circumstance and allowed
us to enter into new and foreign worlds. Newer technologies continued the same process – radio,
television, cable television, satellite television, internet – all advancing forward in their
distracting capabilities. Now virtual reality allows almost a full immersion into a world outside
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of reality – an escape from the mundane and troubling world in which we live into a fantasy
filled with attractions that will occupy our thoughts. Accordingly, we find ourselves in an
intellectual paradox: though we know more things and possess knowledge about mechanical
methods, knowledge comes to us via questionable information and this provides the underlying
conditions for a new problem: the absence of communication.
The Problem of Communication
For the intellectual, as well as for the layperson, communication functions as one of the
reasons for life itself. Communication helps us to understand one another and our world, and in
order for this to happen, we must possess common knowledge, ideas, prejudices, and values
which we all share with one another. This does not mean that we all agree on them, but rather
that we are unconsciously aware of them together since we live within the same culture.
Information destroys this commonality in our communication with one another by creating other
prejudices and other common ideas that become new myths which then are pushed into a culture
through propaganda. With such a diversity of new information, we cannot meet another within a
given horizon of meaning, or as Ellul says, within “a given trend of civilization” (Ellul, 1989, p.
94). When we cannot meet another, communication does not exist. Postmodernism has
destroyed these metanarratives which once gave coherence to cultures and in the destruction, has
left nothing behind of substance to fill the void.
The problem or absence of communication arises out of a lack of awareness to our
cultural situation: the enslavement of human intellect to the technical. This condition creates a
culture of information and facts that restricts communication between individuals and subjects it
to the biases of technical communication – namely information transfer. Note the consequence:
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“We can no longer communicate with man, because the only intellectual method of
expression is a technical one. The fact that the intelligence is obligated to use the
technical channel breaks personal relations, because there is not possibility of contact
between two human being along this line. Communication transcends technics because it
can only take place where two human beings are fully engaged in a real conversation.
Now this is precisely what the intellectual technique of the present day both avoids and
prevents.” (Ellul, 1989, p. 95)
To summarize this situation Ellul states, “There never was a time when people have talked so
much about man: there never was a time when so little has been said to man” (Ellul, 1989, p.
94). Ellul’s description of human communication resonates deeply with Martin Buber’s (2010)
dialogic perspective. He sees in Technique a debilitating force that prevents human
communication (or speaking to another person), and as human beings, it should then become our
duty to react against this “will-to-death.” Technique serves as a mediation which prevents
human face to face encounters, a type of “non-communication.” Ellul comments on Technique
and mediation:
“The form of non-communication is particularly pernicious, particularly invisible; for the
men of our day, when they want to meet one another, put their trust in the post office, the
railway, or the newspaper – that is to say, precisely in that which breaks and kills the very
power of finding each other as human beings, in the reality of flesh and blood.” (Ellul,
1989, p. 96)
How do we address the problem of communication brought about through the mediation of
Technique? First, in order to understand oneself and the world (which are inseparably
connected), we must destroy the myths which have come to guide our understanding of reality.
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Second, we must strive to find an objective reality in the midst of our culture immersed in a mass
of information. We must find ways to rediscover the facts – facts led by the people who we live
amongst. Third, we must find ways to grasp reality on the human or interpersonal level.
Technique detaches us from this reality and developing awareness means avoiding this
detachment in all its forms. We must avoid evasion. We avoid thinking of others in the abstract
and endeavor to think of them as neighbor – personally and concretely. Fourth, we must look at
situations to see them as they are, and then to see them as situations we are placed in as human
beings. The common factor in all four of these steps is the human being. Communication has
been broken because we are no longer “neighbor” to anyone (Ellul, 1989, p. 104) and this idea of
being a “neighbor” references a particularly interpersonal and “interhuman” context. The
technical world breaks those personal relations by objectifying and symbolizing people into
abstractions, destroying human freedom, and discounting truth.
Ellul’s Dialogic Metaphor of The Word
The root of the problem of communication boils down to the relationship between
Technique and human relation. Ellul shows us that the concern lies in what Technique
ultimately does to humanity – turning humanity into a means rather than an end, destroying
interpersonal relations, repressing human freedom, and devaluing truth. The remedy to these
symptoms lies in what he calls a new style of life - a revolution which:
“attacks the bases of a civilization…a rediscovery of the meaning of human activity, of
the relation between means and ends, of their true place in a world which is given up to
the love of power, to disorder, to the pride based on a sense of limitless power over the
external world.” (Ellul, 1989, p. 118)
This revolution rests on the foundation of communication:
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“We need a new form of communication between human beings, in order that the
relations between them, distorted by their conditions of life, by class feeling, by
prejudice, may, by a renewal of their intelligence, be recreated upon a personal and living
plane.”
Technique has infected culture by usurping power and taking total control over civilization to the
point that human relations, distorted and destroyed, need to be renewed. But what does this new
form of communication look like and how would it work in practice? Ellul shows us a glimpse
through a dialogic metaphor he calls “the Word.”
The word represents language and speech in a mysterious and organic way which
opposes views of and approaches to language which favor a scientific approach and a method of
investigation defined by the values of Technique. It is a perspective on language which reflects
an ambiguity and mystery that leans away from views of language informed by scientific and
technical analysis. The dialogic metaphor of the word rejects a view of language where each
word would have a mathematically accurate meaning – one that could be known with scientific
precision (Ellul, 1985, p. 18) - and Ellul critiques those who would approach the study of
language like one would study algebra, from a formulaic and quantifiable perspective that gives
each word one, and only one meaning. This type of approach, technical in its method, puts a
straightjacket on language, removing the ambiguity which qualifies the unique character of
human communication. These approaches to understanding language - scientific and structural
approaches - are incapable of describing what actually happens in communication:
“The scientific analysis of language replaces communication. One analyzes in great
detail and with increasing depth the system of signs, for the reason that they no longer
mean anything, and man is going all out to restore value to a dead instrument. All he can
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do is substitute a system for sense. But after he has completely elucidated the sign, that
which signifies, the thing signified, the phonemes, the morphemes, the language, the
speech, the word, the codes, the metalanguage, and the referentials, after he has
demonstrated the possibilities and dismantled the system, nothing is any better
transmitted by the language than before. No communication is established.” (Ellul,
1973a, p. 93)
Ellul’s critique of Saussure’s (1998) structural linguistics and other semiotic approaches to
language analysis reveals the priority he places on the richness of language which comes not
from scientific precision in understanding the meaning of words but in the connection or
“relationship” established by language between people. Structural approaches to language sound
similar to Buber’s understanding (Buber, 1947, p. 19) of the difference between what he called
technical dialogue – that which seeks objective understanding – and dialogue in its
phenomenological understanding – that which references an intersubjective intentionality
reflected in “the between.” Though Buber believes technical dialogue functions as an aspect of
communication, he does not value it in the interhuman relationship as he does dialogue. Arnett
and Arneson note the similarity between Buber and Ellul regarding the technical aspect of
approaches to language:
“Martin Buber would have agreed with Jacques Ellul in his warning about the misuse of
technique that seeks to live life prior to the needs of the concrete moment…Buber’s
dialogue rebuffs answers that appear too neat and clean, but are actually abstract and miss
genuine connections to a given situated moment.” (Arnett & Arneson, 1999, p. 138)
Their critique of the misuse technique makes a distinction of value – one which fails to recognize
the concrete moment values the abstract ambiguity in dialogue. The value of the word comes
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from the ambiguity and mystery of language which inspires human creativity and contributes to
the richness that can be found in the interpersonal relationship. The structuralists “humiliate the
word” – treating it scornfully as an object for the rigors of the scientific discipline and in so
doing, establish a general contempt for it” (Ellul, 1985, pp. 165–166). Ellul’s critique of
structural and semiotic approaches to language, on the contrary, elevates the word to a place of
prominence in the interhuman relationship. Where structuralists want to limit language, Ellul
shows us how language opens the possibilities and provides the opportunities in dialogue for
greater human intimacy. He shows us the value of the human being.
In addition to critiquing scientific and technical approaches to understanding language,
Ellul also sets his sights on postmodern rhetorical theorists who attempt to depersonalize
discourse and make it anonymous. Thinkers such as Barthes, Derrida, Lacan, and Foucault stand
as a canon of postmodern theorists representing a post structural entrance into communication
theory and who primarily focus on the anonymity of language in writing and texts as opposed to
the personalization of speech and discourse (C. L. Troup, 1998). Barthes and Foucault have
famously argued for the anonymity of texts (Barthes, 1989; Foucault, 1989) and, along with the
rest of that canon, share a prioritization of the written text over the spoken word (R. C. Davis &
Finke, 1989, p. 718). This contrasts with a dialogic perspective which presupposes both speaker
and listener as necessary for communication, a philosophy of communication which requires a
relationship between people as a prerequisite for dialogue: “There is a poetics of language and
of relationships also” (emphasis mine) (Ellul, 1985, p. 18). The relational presupposition in
dialogue requires an investigation into approaches which seek to make the speaker anonymous.
This characteristic of depersonalizing subjects in a communicative event reflects more on the
postmodern interpretation of society rather than giving any insight into the nature of language.
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“When language theorists take their analysis to its logical conclusion, they declare that no person
is speaking, nor is there any content to communicate… They are wrong to present this as
something permanent. For our society and our epoch, for our intellectual or bourgeois groups,
they are correct, but this is a sociological observation rather than something linguistic or
psychoanalytic” (Ellul, 1985, p. 157).
Ellul illuminates the very personal aspect of the word which cannot be removed from the
participants in dialogue and he shows how connected the meaning of language is to the speaker.
The word is not anonymous, disconnected, and disassociated from a person, but rather mediates
an interhuman experience – a dialogue of meaning between individuals which values them both.
The word cannot be limited by scientific and technical methodologies, it is not
anonymous and detached from the subjects who employ it, and it is also not image (here, I rely
extensively on Ellul’s work particularly in chapter 1 of Ellul, 1985). The distinction between
image and word becomes a key theme in HOTW (Ellul, 1985) shown not just in the differences
between media types but in the underlying qualities which define each of them and their resultant
effects upon human communication. I have already detailed how the image functions as a selfish
medium, how it creates greater interpersonal distance, contributes to greater tribalism, and
hinders human empathy (see chapter 3). However, in thinking about Technique, sight provides
the underlying conditions for Technique to manifest itself in the world. Vision primarily allows
for the accumulation of information. Through sight, we see the world around us and we get
precise information about reality rather than abstractions, ambiguity or metaphor. Through our
vision we access the dimension of the present without accessing any others. In sight, there is no
past or future, there is only what we see at the present moment when something appears within
our field of vision. Consider the camera which can provide snapshots of the reality before us but
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does nothing to interpret that reality. It only reveals the world it as it exists before us. Our sight
conveys certainties that we can rely on without questioning them; certainties which give us a
sense of security. When our vision is obstructed, clouded and dark, we feel a sense of unease
which can prevent us from acting in the world. The certainty which allows for action has been
taken from us in the removal of our sight. We fear the darkness because without vision, the
world loses its center – the very ground that provides a foundation for our action. Sight gives us
space and without space, there is no room for action.
The image, however contains a contradiction. First, it presents reality as certain and without
ambiguity. When we see something, unless our sight has been altered by some unusual
phenomenon – a drug or a mirage – we see what is the case. Yet again, even in this certainty, the
image has no significance without interpretation. What appears to us in our sight, though
unambiguous, can have multiple meanings depending upon our historical moment, culture,
background, or perspective. So we learn to interpret the images that come into our spectrum and
we then must decide what action to take, if any. We cannot question the images we see – they
are incontrovertible and irreversible. But though we cannot change the image in front of us
because it shows us the reality of the world and situates us as central and within that reality, in
the present moment, we must find meaning in it. We must interpret it in order to act.
The image reveals certainty but also presents us with objects which in turn have an effect
upon us. Unless we accept Solipsism, the objects that we see represent a reality outside of
ourselves that we can turn away from and expect to return to again. The visual image constitutes
the object as something that is thrown before us and exists because we see it. Because of sight
and the relationship between ourselves and the objects of our sight, our vision creates a world
that we possess. Our sight presupposes “a universe-for-me” (Ellul, 1985, p. 10) In this world,
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we cannot separate ourselves from what we see but we are continually refashioned by the images
based on our point of view. We all approach the visual world from a unique perspective, a locus
from which we see the world around us and then must interpret. The interpretation – the
“meaning” - leads us to action which defines to a certain extent who we are. Through this
process, we are refashioned in terms of the image. The process of technique depends upon the
image:
“Sight alone is not enough to accomplish it, but without sight, no technique is
possible…A human being’s sight commits him to technique. The visual image points out
the totality of my possible life in a world where I am both master and subject. All
techniques are based on visualizations and involve visualization. If a phenomenon
cannot be transformed into something visual, it cannot be the object of a technique.”
(Ellul, 1985, p. 11)
So the image presents to us a visual world, one which makes Technique possible thus allowing
for the “imaging” of language itself reflected in scientific and technical explanations of
communication. When we “image” language, it reconstitutes our being, reforming us according
to the values of Technique; we objectify the world and the people in it instead of engaging in an
interhuman experience through the complexity of word.
The critiques of structuralist and post-structuralist approaches to language reflect a
qualitative distinction between technique-driven approaches and Ellul’s dialogic metaphor of the
word. Like Buber (1947), Ellul’s philosophy of communication arises out of a perspective that
recognizes the mystery, ambiguity, and one might even say the spirituality that occurs when two
people engage in dialogue. Postman (Postman, 1984) described Ellul as a “story-teller” and
“moral theologian,” noting that the stories he tells through his exposition of society’s relationship
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with Technique provides us an entrance into understanding the human condition, giving
explanations that attempt to make human life better. “[T]he purpose of social research is to
rediscover the truths of social life; to comment on and criticize the moral behavior of people; and
finally, to put forward metaphors, images, and ideas that can help people live with some measure
of understanding and dignity” (Postman, 1984, p. 32). Ellul shows us through the word that in
moving away from purely “scientific” or technical understandings of communication we enter
into a unique interhuman experience which gives life meaning
In contrast to the visual and the image, speech and hearing are qualitatively different.
Whereas we can close our eyes to the image or even turn away, we cannot easily shut out the
sounds that come to us. Where images fall into a spatial pattern in relation to one another as we
see them, sound comes to us as a cacophony – arriving in our perceptions from a multitude of
locations simultaneously. Sounds assault us all at once but they also contradict one another,
cancel each other out, or distract us from other sounds. Sound does not constitute a “universe for
me” as sight does. Although we hear sounds, they are not as clear and distinct as images.
Sounds do not represent reality the way images do. Sounds bring questions along with them –
where does it come from? What does it say? What is going to happen? Sounds are vague and
abstract creating a world of ambiguity, uncertainty, and mystery. Where sight primarily relates
to space, sound relates to time. Sound “inserts us within a duration rather than an expanse”
(Ellul, 1985, p. 13). In hearing a sound, we ask what will come next. A question of temporality.
Speech locates us within temporality because it comes to us in a linear fashion. As we listen to
someone speak, we must wait for meaning. We must wait for the sentence to end until we can
understand what is being said. And languages differ in the grammatical structures which declare
things like past or present, subject or object, modifier or modified. The temporality of speech
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suggests that we cannot fully know until all has been said. Sight gives us immediate perception
of reality while sound subjects us to ambiguity forcing us to wait in temporality for knowledge.
Additionally, in contrast to the image, the word can never be an object. The word can never be
thrown before us as the image can be. We must wait for it. Before it is spoken, we anticipate it.
And after it has come to us, it exists only as long as we hold onto it. For a word to become
object, it needs to be written or recorded in some way and yet then it has ceased to become
speech.
The Word as Metaphor and Medium
Having distinguished the word from image and explicated the critique of structuralist and
post-structuralist approaches to understanding language, we now turn to understanding the word
as a phenomenological dialogic metaphor and a medium, as necessary for establishing human
freedom, and as critical for providing humanity the opportunity to experience truth. As already
mentioned, Martin Buber distinguished what he called the dialogical as the sphere of “the
between” from the psychological, or that which happens within the soul of each person (Buber,
1965b,166a, p. 17). Additionally, Arnett and Arneson (1999, pp. 133–134) connect the sphere of
“the between” to the phenomenological concept of intentionality (See chapter 3) describing it as
a phenomenological space not defined by one person but by a space between them both from
which meaning in communication emerges. The phenomenological space of the between in
Buber finds a counterpart in Ellul’s understanding of the word. First, language constituted in the
word calls us to construct, exhort, console and enable a person to edify themselves in their
relationship with others. Language acts as the only means of making a connection between two
people. And where different sounds are of different orders, human speech holds rank as the
highest order of all:
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It ushers us into another dimension: relationship with other living beings, with persons.
The Word is the particularly human sound which differentiates us from everything else.
In this connection a fundamental difference between seeing and hearing is immediately
apparent…When I hear speech, however, the human being becomes qualitatively
different from everything else.” (Ellul, 1985, p. 14)
The spoken word brings us into the dimension of the interhuman and into the phenomenological
space – even establishing it – of “the between.” The spoken word forms the very basis for
human relation, it functions as the medium which establishes the conditions for relationship. In
human communication, “a kind of electric current is established between us…There is a poetics
of language and of relationship also. We must not limit this poetics to language, which must be
constantly rewoven, but remember that the relationship is also involved. Language requires that
we recommence this relationship which is always uncertain” (Ellul, 1985, p. 18). The word
provides a hermeneutic entrance into understanding human communication as unique and
important. Ellul reminds us why communication constitutes human relation and he also shows
how this takes place.
The Word functions as a phenomenological dialogic metaphor describing human relation,
but also as a medium or tool used to establish the potentiality for human relation constructed in
the phenomenological space of “the between.” In communication, language acts similarly to how
Heidegger (1962) describes the being of objects in the world. Heidegger classifies the being of
equipment (objects) in two ways. First, equipment is as an object that we experience in the
world. Heidegger describes this type of being as present-at-hand [Vorhandenheit] or “occurrent”
(Dreyfus & Wrathall, 2005, p. 4). The present-at-hand of an object is its being in the world as an
object that we see or experience. It is before us. It is equipment that we recognize and see. This
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is a mode of being for things where things are constituted in properties that they possess in
themselves rather than in their relations to how they are used. In Heidegger’s famous example,
the hammer is there before us and we see it as an object – it is present-at-hand. The being of
equipment changes when a person employs or uses it. In this state of being Heidegger classifies
it as ready-to-hand [Zuhandenheit]. Equipment is “ready-to-hand” when it is put to use. When
we put the object to use in the way that it is intended to be used, our concern with the object
subordinates itself to the “in-order-to” of the purpose in using it. It is in our employing of the
equipment that its being changes; the more we begin to use or employ it, the equipment becomes
veiled to our recognition of it and our concern is not in the awareness of the object, in its being
there, but only in what we are doing – the purpose for which we are employing its use. In
readiness-to-hand, the equipment disappears from the scope of our attention. So in examining
the “being” of the Word, we recognize it in both senses – as present-at-hand in the metaphor
which establishes the potentiality of the co-constructed phenomenological space of “the
between” and as ready-to-hand when employed as a tool which forms the “electric current”
establishing human relation.
The Word as Freedom
Not only does the word function both as metaphor and medium, but it serves as the only
thing which can provide any type of human freedom in a Technique-dominated culture. The
totalizing character of Technique has resulted in the subjugation of humanity, the enslavement of
human beings toward its own technological ends; an enslavement which requires a new freedom
necessary to live humanely. Such a freedom, however, can only be possible transcendently –
through the Word (Christians, 2006b, p. 152). To understand this transcendent quality requires a
prior knowledge of the influence of Ellul’s Christian faith as well as his dialectical thinking. As
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one of his best interpreters put it, “Any attempt to understand his thought that concentrates
excessively on one of the two strands or ignores the relation between them is liable to distort his
thinking” (Andrew Goddard, 2002, pp. 53–54). The two strands include his sociology and his
theology:
“These two levels cannot be combined, nor do they go together naturally and objectively.
For the person who lives on both planes, the two proceedings are mutually consistent. As
a sociologist and as a Christian, I can pursue this twofold quest. I am able to say that man
is doing harm and that he is a sinner, that he is unfortunate and that he is separated from
God. But that correlation is already established in my own thinking, by my own life
experience. It is not something impersonal which can be passed around.”(Ellul, 1973a, p.
158)
Sociology does not provide the totality of an explanation for the condition of society. Ellul
shows us that sociology needed to be “answered by a biblical or theological analysis”
(Christians, 2006b, p. 150), one which provides insight into the relationship between word and
human freedom. These two “poles” of interpretation, though seemingly at odds with one
another, must be considered dialectically, working together and existing at the same time in
unresolvable tension with one another.
Speech and word act together in harmony with one another. Similarly, God expresses
himself, acts, and is only manifested in his word. In fact, humanity cannot grasp God anywhere
except through word because the only channel of revelation is the word – intelligible and
specifically addressed to us containing both meaning and power. God makes himself known
through word and in this, in speaking to us, he shows that he is not a far off and distant stranger,
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but that he is truly with us. Through the Word, God creates, not in abstraction, but by means of a
relationship:
“The Word is the essential relationship. The God who creates through the Word is not
outside his creation, but with it, and especially with Adam, who is made precisely in
order to hear this very word and create this relationship with God. Having received the
Word himself, Adam can respond to God in dialogue.” (Ellul, 1985, p. 51)
Additionally, the Word is not mere language, it is a person: the Word is spoken by God and also
incarnate in Jesus Christ. This does not present a contradiction because in both cases, the word
reveals God. God speaks through the incarnate Christ – the logos or Word made flesh.
Additionally, the word emphasizes freedom because Christianity primarily is a message of
liberation (Christians, 2006b, p. 153) which finds its fulfillment through the word. God is the
Liberator (Ellul, 1976, p. 107), and the word expresses that freedom, it presupposes freedom, and
it invites the listener to express his/her own freedom by speaking (Ellul, 1985, p. 58). God
speaks and therefore manifests his freedom and invites the listener to the freedom involved in
answering. God summons humanity through the word and invites us to speak in dialogue, but
not only with God, with one another.
Freedom through the word allows us to “encounter” our neighbor – to go and meet others
in dialogue (Ellul, 1976, p. 322). The concept of meeting our neighbor, the notion of
“encounter,” echoes Buber’s (2010) understanding of “the between.” In order for “encounter” to
happen, dialogue must begin and this dialogue must move beyond preliminary conversational
remarks which may be predetermined by social conventions or societal norms. For true
relational encounter, “[t]he dialogue has to stop being a mere exchange of words and become the
engagement of the one with the other. This encounter or relationship gives the words we
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exchange irreplaceable value” (Ellul, 1976, p. 324) but the encounter itself requires the freedom
which comes to us through the word. The word liberates us from a mode of technical
communication so that we may enter the phenomenological space of “the between” so that we
can experience “encounter” through dialogue.
Communication technologies have provided greater efficiency in communication as well
as the possibility for greater information transfer but in so doing, they restrict and limit human
relationships. A book, for example, only allows for a limited message, and though we engage
with the author’s argument, this process essentially constitutes an internal dialogue with
ourselves. The opportunity for greater clarification or explanation of the meaning does not exist
because the words on the page are static. Similarly, television and radio present a one-sided
monologue that expresses ideas but provides no opportunity for interhuman communication.
Digital technologies also limit meaning because they provide no outlet for the nonverbal
messages which scholars say constitute anywhere from 60-90% of the meaning in a
communication message (Mehrabian, 1972). Telephones allow for vocal tone, but visual
technologies such as SMS messages, internet posts, and email cannot account for the richness
and depth of meaning which happens via the nonverbal message. These technologies realize the
values of Technique – speed, efficiency, and progress – but they restrict and limit meaning and
encounter. They negate “the between.” And by virtue of their dominance in the culture, they
restrict and limit human communication – preventing a more nuanced and intimate relation. The
word frees us from these limitations of Technique. It allows us to encounter our neighbor, to
enter the phenomenological space of the between, and to meet the other in common horizons of
meaning. The word liberates us to step into the full potentiality of what it means to be human
and what it means to be “neighbor.”
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The Word as Truth
The word functions as a metaphor and a medium, it provides for genuine human freedom
and finally, the word alone allows humanity the only possibility of truth. From at least the time
of Plato, philosophy concerned itself with epistemology – true knowledge. Platonism established
the philosophical sovereignty of sight as the means to true knowledge and for Plato, true
knowledge is the knowledge of ideas - of the form (See particularly Plato, 1956, 1989, 1991).
Even the word idea (eidos in Greek) comes from the verb eido which means “to see.” While
Plato defined perception as the key to knowing the essence of a thing – what we can see –
Descartes (see particularly 1993) continued with this visual motif by using the model of intuition
as the means for discerning truth. But again, the Latin intuiri, the word from which we get
intuition also means “to see.” Kierkegaard recognized the influence of the visual on philosophy
(see Gouwens, 1988; and Soren Kierkegaard, 1992) and broke away from it:
“The speculative individual wants to touch everything he sees…Why doesn’t he respect
the distance imposed by Being? Why doesn’t he deal carefully with the difference
between himself and the other person, in order to understand who he is? In order to
understand, he must give ear: hasten to listen. You must learn to listen.” (Kierkegaard as
quoted in Ellul, 1985, p. 37)
Though the visual nature of philosophy dominates the ancient perspectives, Socrates stands as an
exemplar of one who “speaks truly.” Rather than engage the image, Socrates attuned himself to
the inner voice, his daemon¸ which provided him guidance and wisdom. He listens to that secret
voice we all hear and from that framework, he engaged in a dialogic method of investigating and
discovering truth – one which happens through conversation with another person.
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Ellul sees truth as the absolute or eternal and he shows us how it depends upon language
and the word. In truth, we find a paradox consistent with a dialectical perspective. Truth exists
as an absolute beyond our human limitations. We do not construct it and yet, through language,
we access and transmit it. Through the word, a most uncertain means open to variation, doubt,
and ambiguity; an ephemeral medium which evaporates just as it is uttered; the thing in which
we are the most uncertain has to do with that which is most certain. Our most changeable means
communicates the unchangeable. Truth is distinct and different than the reality we perceive
through our senses. Our senses tell us the reality of the world around us and provide the means
through which we access that world, interpret it and take action, but this is not truth. Our senses
give us the guarantee necessary for living in the world but they cannot give us truth.
Quantifiable knowledge can provide judgments and understandings of reality but it cannot
produce truth because truth and reality exist in different realms altogether. Consider what
happens when we eat something that tastes good. The chemical makeup of the food can be
determined scientifically through a quantitative analysis. It may even be possible in the lab to
reconstruct that food from its constituent parts. But the analysis and reconstitution of that food
has no effect upon the pleasure one may get from eating it. These two aspects – the scientific
makeup and the enjoyment – exist in different arenas.
And just as our sight and perception of reality cannot speak to us of truth, the opposite is
also the case. Truth itself cannot be certain. If truth could be quantified and expressed with
exact perfection and no uncertainty, the situation for humanity would be untenable. We could
not live in a world where everything would have been said, “closed up, and finished: perfect”
(Ellul, 1985, p. 41). In fact, history has shown us the results when persons our groups have
claimed certainty in the expression of truth. Ideologies like Nazism, Communism, and Fascism
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have resulted in some of the most horrific tragedies humanity has ever experienced. Even
Christianity cannot escape this claim to absolute certainty. In its claim to being “The Truth,”
Ellul responds: “this word is conveyed through human language: witnesses who pass it on to
other witnesses” (Ellul, 1985, pp. 41–42). Does this diminish the truth of Christianity? Not in
the least. He continues, “on the contrary, in this way I respect it and recognize its special
dimension and the depth and permanence that make it truth. If I claim to grasp and express it in
its entirety, then it is no longer truth” (Ellul, 1985, p. 42).
Conclusion
Ellul’s work reveals to us a world dominated by the image, one which reduces humanity
to a means in service to Technique. His insight into the consequences of such a world astounds
by its accuracy and prescience. The problems in our world today regarding human freedom, the
domination of Technique and the reduction of truth to the order of reality have consequences of
which Ellul makes us keenly aware - societal ramifications which hit at the heart of the human
condition. While endeavoring to better the state of humanity in the world, Technique creates
unintended consequences which open up the possibility for greater human suffering, individual
psychological feelings of panic and despair, and a reformation of the human being in the image
of the machine. As the ancient psalmist so presciently noted regarding idols:
“Those who make them will be like them, and so will all who trust in them.” (Psalm
115:8 as cited in McLuhan, 1994)
Unfortunately, humanity has been seduced by the rhetoric of technology to the point that we seek
technical solutions for the problems created by Technique. Instead of seeking to understand
Ellul and liberate the word from the restrictions and limitations we have placed upon it, instead
of seeking to engage in “encounter,” entering into the dialogic arena of “the between,” we
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instead look to the gods of technology. The deeper issue that Ellul’s work illuminates concerns
the future of humanity. The underlying societal system of technology, along with its own value
system and moral code reforms the human being. It distances us from one another, redefining
social relation in terms of quantification, efficiency, and speed. Having seen our present
condition from his own historical moment, Ellul seeks a solution couched in the dialogic
metaphor of the word. He calls us back to its reprioritization, but not just for the word to replace
the image, or even to assume a position of superiority over it. Ellul understands Technique, that
we will never be rid of it (nor should we necessarily) because Technique itself is a distinctly
human experience. The human being is a technique-seeking being – a technical animal we might
say. But Ellul recognizes the different arenas of image and word, of technique and human
relation and he then seeks to engage each of them according to their proper place:
“I have not…intended to claim that hearing and the word are superior to sight and
image… [But that] in our present condition, in which we can no longer ‘see’ truth, the
word is the only locus of truth for us, and we cannot dispense with truth.” (Ellul, 1985, p.
41)
From here, we must investigate how to go about this reconciliation of technique and humanity.
How do we “walk the narrow ridge,” as it were? How do we embrace and live within the
dialectical tension between man and machine? How do we seek truth in a world of information
and find ways to free humanity from service to means. Ellul’s work leads us into some potential
solutions.
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Chapter Six: Implications of Ellul’s Dialogic Response to Technique
Introduction
The ubiquity of Technique presents unique challenges for humanity now and in the years
to come, and in light of these challenges, we can look to Ellul for some direction regarding how
we might address them. As we have seen, Ellul’s concept of the word differentiates between two
perspectives or epistemologies. One, based in image sees the world through a lens of actuality
and prioritizes a Technique-driven value system of speed, efficiency, and progress. The other,
based in word, presents the opposition to a world of definitude and allows for abstraction,
ambiguity, and human interpretation. How do we reconcile both realities while recognizing the
greater imposition of image and technology in our world today? How can we find human
freedom under the domination and control of Technique? How can we live authentically as
human beings in the technological society? Ellul gives us guidance by providing insight in
several areas. First, his work calls us back to a recognition and reconsideration of ethics.
Second, the nature and development of his thinking gives us a dialectic/dialogic hermeneutic by
which to engage these oppositions. And finally, he provides three metaphors by which we can
better approach our historical moment – that of craftsperson, mutant, and student. Before
addressing some of the more practical areas, we first turn to scholarship which engages these
questions concerning the relationship between humanity and Technique with a reconsideration of
ethics.
The Ethics of Technique
In discussing the founding of the Media Ecology program at NYU, Neil Postman stated
that ‘from the beginning, we were a group of moralists […] understanding how and if our media
ecology was making us better or worse ’(Postman, 2000, p. 11). Although Postman noted that
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McLuhan believed in a morally neutral perspective, for his part, he thought there was no point in
studying media unless one did it from within a moral or ethical context. Ellul himself, as we
have seen, wrote extensively pointing out the humanistic and/or anti-humanistic consequences of
Technique and in so doing, he calls us to consider the question of ethics within our technologies.
But what do we mean when we talk about a humanistic context? As with all value judgments,
people will disagree on how we might define those judgments. What is humane when it comes
to the study of our media ecology? The question can have multiple answers depending upon the
person asked. Take for example McLuhan and Innis – two major contributors to medial ecology
scholarship. Even though McLuhan personally supported a morally neutral perspective, in
attempting to understand the relationship between media and people he believed it was better for
people if the media they used promoted a balance in the sensorium (McLuhan, 1994; Norden,
1969; Postman, 2000, p. 13). Here, his “neutral” perspective reflects a value-based approach,
one which sees choices on a continuum moving from worse to better. Innis fully embraced an
ethical hermeneutic worrying about how media create imbalances in our perceptions of space
and time and how that imbalance related to military conquest (Harold A. Innis, 2008; Postman,
2000, p. 13). For his part, Postman never shied away from the ethical and moral consequences
of our interaction with media and he even addressed these humanistic issues through a series of
four questions: To what extent does a medium contribute to the uses and development of
rational thought, to what extent does a medium contribute to the development of democratic
processes, to what extent do new media give greater access to meaningful information, and to
what extent to new media enhance or diminish our moral sense, our capacity for goodness
(Postman, 2000, p. 13). Ethical concerns regarding humanity’s relationship with media,
however, find themselves in opposition to the dictates and directives of Technique which
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disregard ethics in favor of the pragmatic values of speed, efficiency, and progress. I do not
want to suggest an intentional conspiracy by an elite cabal of technophiles who desire to see a
technological paradise which elevates the machine as god and relegates humanity to
technological servitude (Ironically, this has already started. See Mailonline, 2017), yet the trend
of civilization seemingly continues to move in direction of a greater technical domination.
Instead of calling it conspiracy or determinism, we might describe technology’s advancement in
terms of “necessity.” A world where means have triumphed is a world of necessity (Christians,
2006b, p. 154) and though Ellul never carefully defined necessity, he gave a general description
in Violence: “Necessity is definable as what man does because he cannot do otherwise” (Ellul,
1969, p. 128). Necessity provides the aim for Technique and functions as the converse of human
freedom in the world, and in our current era of pervasive technology, la technique has become
the all-encompassing feature of necessity (Christians, 2006b, p. 154). Necessity has guided the
development of the technical mind (See chapter 1) resulting in Technique’s dominant stronghold
in society. As a result, Technique creates its own ethic and then subjects humanity to it, forcing
us to adapt by the sheer power of its all-inclusion and the glorification of its apparent success.
And yet, we must question this ethic because, as Ellul (1989) has shown, the ethic of Technique
has resulted from an uncritical examination of the problem of ends and means. The ethic of
Technique is one of utility over morality. It is one of reality over truth (Ellul, 1985, pp. 39–41).
It is one of machine over human being. How might we account for the situation Ellul so clearly
and presciently observed and in which we now find ourselves? If, at this current historical
moment, we find Technique as the standard by which we measure good and bad, we might, in
seeking to understand this dilemma, consider investigating Technique’s role in the evolution of
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ethical thought. After all, no conspiracy exists without a conspirator, and we might wonder
exactly what part Technique itself has played in our arrival at this current destination.
Part of the issue stems from humanity’s proclivity to Technique. Life itself is naturally
mediated for to be human means, to an extent, to be the site of nature open to technological
extensions (I rely in this section on Anton, 2010). “Man is an extension of nature that remakes
the nature that makes the man” (McLuhan & Nevitt, 1972, p. 66). And while some might claim
the independence of Technique as an agent in and of itself (as I seemingly did in calling it a
conspirator), humanity is ultimately complicit in Technique. McLuhan’s observation of media as
“extensions of man” (McLuhan, 1994) made clear the human being as a “technical animal” with
a predisposition for engaging in thoughts and practices which seek its own benefit found through
greater efficiency, faster speed, and more progress. The rational principle (see Aristotle, 1985)
in humanity has led to the development of procedures, processes, tools, and techniques which
have provided great benefits to human civilization while at the same time providing the
necessary conditions for the development and evolution of humanity’s conception of ethics. In
his introductory chapter to the edited work, Valuation and Media Ecology (Anton, 2010), Corey
Anton presents a cogent analysis of the transitions from ethics to morality to legality based upon
the evolution of technological epochs from orality to writing to print.
The idea of ethics developed within an oral culture, where human concepts of morality
existed seemingly without question and where people were pre-reflectively immersed in truthkeeping practices (Thayer, 1997, p. see). In orality, morality existed in the collectively felt
“ought” instead of finding expression in ethical choices based upon individual concerns. These
collective morals were assumed by the group – they were in the air, passed down through oral
tradition, recited in public through the narratives of epic poetry (for more on this see E. A.
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Havelock, 1963) and enforced through familial and cultural tradition and pressure through
ridicule, shame and/or banishment from the community. The conditions of orality – spoken
words which come to people with an air of omnipresence, from a space defined as a “vast
interior in the center of which a listener finds himself along with his interlocutors” (W. J. Ong &
Ong, 2000, p. 164) - prevented people from thinking of themselves as objectifiable and under
self-conscious control (Anton, 2010, p. 9) and thus unable to actualize the individualism
necessary for a personal morality. Ethical standards in early orality were enforced by communal
life – the collective standing watch over right and wrong; norms handed down through oral
tradition. Additionally, the cognitive power necessary for the critical and abstract reflection to
establish a philosophy of personal morality had been usurped in orality by the necessity of
memory. Mnemonic capacity required noetic energy which could not be applied to imagination,
exploration, and critical analytic questioning (E. Havelock, 1978; E. A. Havelock, 1963). In
time, however, the technology of writing freed up the necessary noetic energy by providing a
capacity for easily accessible information storage, thus providing the increased mental power
needed for novelty and originality (Anton, 2010, p. 11).
The technology of writing provided a means of capturing information in a form that could
be readily accessed and opened up the possibility for greater moral reflection resulting in
advanced philosophical and religious doctrine. Havelock (E. A. Havelock, 1963) describes how
writing made the Platonic quest for abstractions such as “the good,” “justice,” and “beauty”
possible, but more importantly, the effects of the technology of writing separated the individual
from the collective. Writing provided opportunity for the extended analysis and reflection of a
text, thought, or idea because the individual, through writing, could enter into an internal
dialogue with the author as well as engage their own thoughts on the subject of inquiry. This

139

interrogation of ideas which written texts allowed, freed up mental capacities previously
committed to memory to ruminate upon and reconsider the ideas, dictates, and doctrines outlined
in a text. As a result, the possibility for individuals to experience guilt increased because writing
made possible the proof of when an individual did not measure up to a standard. Anton notes,
“Most broadly stated, the development of writing signified a major shift toward the existing
individual, to possible self-legislation, which implies movement away from the embedded web
of collective life” (Anton, 2010, p. 11). The move from the ethic of the community to the
morality of an individual comes out of the development of the technology of writing and the
tectonic shift in culture from orality to chirography.
The modern concept of legality results from the context created by the inevitable
advancement of chirography to print which transformed the ancient city-state to a bureaucratic
entity with individual citizens subject to the laws and dictates written down and enforced by the
governmental powers. And while writing ultimately created the environment which fostered
greater self-reflection on subjects like morality and ethics, the printing press exponentially
expanded that capability through the widespread growth of literacy. Print gave society easier
access to knowledge and a greater centralized understanding of what norms would govern civil
life among the citizens. With literacy, laws function as human constructions which separate the
bonds between command and obedience by making commands more arbitrary, anonymous
(Anton, 2010, p. 12), and less personal. Therefore what once may have been thought of as
morally wrong must be reconsidered since under the legal system, the same action may not
technically be considered illegal. Additionally what is legal under the law, depending upon the
circumstances may or may not be morally right. Under legal systems, ethics are reconstituted in
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socially constructed laws which attempt to give guidance but can never completely account for
all of the nuance and ambiguity of human interaction.
A cursory examination of the evolution from ethics to morality to legality shows the
influence of Technique in and throughout the process and as media ecology scholarship makes
plain (E. A. Havelock, 1963 and others; Harold A. Innis, 2008; McLuhan, 1994; W. Ong, 1982;
Postman, 1993), technological advancements change things, not only by introducing new
inventions into the cultural milieu, but by altering our cognitive processes and reframing the way
we think about some of the most important concepts of our existence. How we understand ideas
of ethics, morality, and legality, like everything else, depends upon the framework which guides
our thought processes, and that framework has been, to some extent, molded and directed by
Technique. Ellul reminds us of the dialogic response – we encounter the contraries, oppositions,
ambiguity, and conflict in a dialogic manner with the intent of understanding ethics and morality
in a legal world. The word enables us to explore the mystery of truth without devaluing it into
imagistic ideology. Ellul (1989) exposes Technique’s predisposition to devalue humanity and
makes plain a world guided by the principles the machine. He details Technique’s limitation of
human freedom and implores us to address the ethical question - whether or not our media
ecology is making us better or worse.
A Dialectic Perspective
A second implication of Ellul’s concept of the word as a response to the technological
society is a dialectic/dialogic hermeneutic. Ellul’s work provides a rich and contextual
interrogation of the world that does not seek simplistic answers to complex problems but engages
them with full knowledge of the difficulties and obstacles that a technological society presents to
human freedom. In addition to an ethical hermeneutic, perhaps the most interesting and even
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enlightening aspect of his scholarship is his dialectical/dialogical thinking. Dialectics can be
understood both ontologically and epistemologically. In thinking of dialectics as ontology, we
understand it as a view of reality containing a dynamic interplay of opposing forces, whereas
dialectics as epistemology refers to a method of reasoning by which one seeks knowledge
through the back and forth of opposing arguments (Baxter & Montgomery, 1996, pp. 18–19).
Regarding Ellul’s dialectical thinking, Ellul scholar, David W. Gill, states:
“If there is one characteristic which permeates every thought and every analysis rendered
by Jacques Ellul, it is that his work is thoroughly dialectical. . . . Contradiction,
opposition, and paradox are ever-present in anything Ellul has in view. Axiomaticdeductive, linear logic is rejected. Rationalistic “scientism”–the worship of empirically
demonstrable facts (and nothing else)–is damned. Understanding, whether of Christianity
or society, results from a true perception of the various antithetical factors and forces at
work.” (Gill, 1984, p. 157)
For Ellul, dialectics provides more than an academic entrance into his scholarship and the
problem of Technique, it also grounds a fundamental aspect of his own personal life experience.
In his youth, Ellul lived in Bordeaux, France, the child of parents who grew up wealthy
aristocrats but came upon financial difficulty in the years of their marriage. He recognized early
on the plight of, not only his own parents, but that of the exploited longshoremen and sailors who
worked out of the port of Bordeaux. While studying at the university, Ellul’s study of Marx
opened his eyes and explained for him his father’s unemployment as well as the condition of the
greater world. Marx allowed him to see the unseen systems that undergird societies and
influence the most important aspects of life, namely, how human beings are reformed by those
very systems that they have developed. In Marx, he found an explanation of the human
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condition that resonated with his own experience but he could not reconcile Marx with the
questions that arose out of his own personal experiences. He could not explain “my human
condition, my mortal nature, my capacity to suffer or love or my relationship with others (italics
mine)” (Ellul, 1982, p. 15). In his search to find meaningful answers to these questions, at age
22, he converted to Christianity. What he found in his faith experience provided the answers to
problems which haunted his personal experience. He describes it:
“Through the Bible I was led to receive a word which was not invented or created by my
intelligence and yet which I recognized as being the truth. From that, my conception of the
world and of humanity was totally different.” (cited in A. Goddard, 2002)
Though his conversion to Christianity provided meaning for him personally, he began to
recognize the irreconcilable differences between Marxism and Christianity - the two perspectives
could not be integrated with one another - and this paradox provided a ground from which his
dialectical thinking began to take shape. He explains:
“[I was] unable to eliminate Marx, unable to eliminate the biblical revelation, and unable to
merge the two. It was impossible for me to put them together. My thinking can be explained
by starting with this contradiction.” (Ellul, 1982, p. 16)
Marx’s dialectical thinking influenced Ellul substantially, but more so than Marx, Ellul’s
dialectics primarily came out of his interaction with the work of Soren Kierkegaard. Throughout
his writings, Kierkegaard constantly emphasized the dialectical relationships between the various
aspects of reality: subjective and objective truth, time and eternity, God and humanity, the
crowd and the individual, and many others (Van Vleet, 2014, p. 17). For Kierkegaard, dialectics
served as a hermeneutic entrance into understanding both the nature of reality as well as an
individual’s place within it. He recognized the fact that reality is constituted in opposing
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categories of existence (faith and reason, free will and determinism, etc.) and thus required
individuals to live within this constant existential tension. An example that both Kierkegaard
and Ellul reference is the perspective on the human as a combination of freedom and necessity,
spirit and matter, material and immaterial (Søren Kierkegaard, 1967, p. 4:250). These opposing
elements coexist in a dialectical tension and represent a paradox – an apparent contradiction
containing a truth. Kierkegaard’s idea of paradox makes a distinction between quantitative
knowledge and qualitative knowledge. Quantitative knowledge referred to logic limited to
observable and verifiable results while qualitative logic referenced a reasoning that transcended
the physical reality and embraced mystery, subjectivity, and paradox as elements within human
experience (Søren Kierkegaard, 1985, p. 37). It is easy to see how this perspective influenced
Ellul’s critique of the scientistic values within Technique – values that prioritize the empirical
and devalue the humanistic – as well as his perspective on language and how quantitative
knowledge (facts) based upon reality and “the image” has been valued over the more ambiguous
and mysterious “qualitative” medium of language and word.
Though Ellul’s dialectical thinking shares many similarities with that of Marx and
Kierkegaard, his perspective advances the concept dialogically. For Ellul, the external world
(reality) is something with which humans must enter into a dialogue. Reality exists as knowable
and unknowable at the same time. It is comprehensible and incomprehensible; separate from
humanity and non-separate; logical and illogical; rational and irrational. Thus the opposing
natures of reality are connected and at their basic structure – dialectical. As an example, if one
looks at the world from the perspective of a rationalist twentieth century scientist, the world is
seen as causal, linear, and orderly. On the other hand, if one views the world from the
perspective of an existentialist philosopher, one sees the world as noncausal, nonlinear, and
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disorderly. The world contains both perspectives, as he puts it, the “yes and the no” (Ellul, 1981,
p. 293). One of the ways dialectics can best inform a perspective of reality is by seeing it as
“destructive of neat systems and ordered structures, and compatible with the notion of a social
universe that has neither fixity or solid boundaries” (Murphy, 1971, p. 90). Mikhail Bakhtin’s
idea of dialogism can provide further insight.
Bakhtin’s dialogism represents a dialectical perspective of social interaction directly
associated with language and he sheds greater light on Ellul’s perspective of the word, and the
ambiguity of language and human communication. From a dialectical framework, Bakhtin’s
project was a critique of theories which reduced the “unfinalizable, open, and heterogeneous
nature of social life to determinate, closed, totalizing concepts ” (Baxter & Montgomery, 1996,
p. 24). He additionally critiqued monologic human experience and viewed social relationships
as an open dialogue which brought together multiple perspectives while maintaining the
uniqueness of each. Dialogue is multivocal and in a dialectical sense, exists as a product of “a
contradiction-ridden, tension-filled unity of two embattled tendencies,” the centripetal (i.e. the
forces of unity) and the centrifugal (i.e. the forces of difference) (M.M. Bakhtin, 1981, p. 272).
As Ellul emphasized the word as a hermeneutic entrance into human communication, Bakhtin
also believed that social life happens through the interaction, the “talk” between people. Within
that communicative process, Bakhtin prioritizes the “utterance” as the place where this
multivocal dialectic between centripetal and centrifugal forces takes place. He states:
“Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as
well as centripetal forces are brought to bear. The processes of centralization and
decentralization, of unification and disunification, intersect in the utterance.” (M.M.
Bakhtin, 1981, p. 272)
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Bakhtin’s perspective recognizes the dialogic, multivocal quality of every speech act: the
dialogue of the present utterance with the distant past, the dialogue of the present utterance with
the proximal past, the dialogue of the present utterance with the anticipated response of the
listener, and the dialogue of the present utterance with the anticipated response of the generalized
superaddressee (Baxter & Montgomery, 1996, p. 29). Ellul’s recognition of the complexity in
dialectic echoes the multivocal aspect of Bakhtin’s dialogism, that at any given moment,
multiple dialogues are taking place in an interplay – a back and forth of contradiction and
opposition. Possibility includes both freedom and necessity as the essential components of
reality which prevent deterministic outcomes in the future.
Understanding the evolution of Ellul’s dialectical thinking and his dialectical/dialogical
ontology gives us a different perspective on the reality of our technological society. Essentially,
a dialectic/dialogic hermeneutic sees and reckons with the contradictory and oppositional
elements we find within our culture. On one hand we recognize the benefits that Technique has
brought to humanity. Advanced technologies have provided incredible opportunities, a generally
better quality of life, as well as vast advancements in scientific knowledge. On the other hand,
Technique has opened the doors to some more destructive elements. We might lay at the feet of
Technique the atomic bomb, the gas chambers of Auschwitz, biological and chemical weapons,
propaganda, and the anonymity of bureaucracy. In culture we find people desiring to connect
with one another in meaningful social interactions and communicative events and at the same
time using technological instruments which obstruct and prevent the meaningful and intimate
relationships they seek. We recognize the importance of human freedom – that individuals
possess a freedom to encounter life authentically and yet find an underlying system working in
direct contradiction toward that end – turning humanity into a means which serves Technique. A
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dialectic/dialogic hermeneutic suggests that both aspects are true and exist in a multivocal world
full of oppositions and contradictions that find synthesis and propel humanity to change, and yet
also sometimes cannot be reconciled or brought into a synthesis and must live together in a
contradictory tension. It presents a world of contraries and seeks a unity in the difference. Ellul
calls us to see the reality of the technological society, to recognize the system of Technique
which undergirds it, to understand its complete domination of culture, and that we must live
within this overarching structure. At the same time, there exists an opposition to Technique that
enables us to search for and find freedom from the bondages and limitations which subjugate us.
Ellul shows us the world of the image, of linear logic, of reality and efficiency and progress but
at the same time he gives us the world of the word, of ambiguity, of mystery and interpretation
and human meeting. He shows us a world where humanity has become a means to a means but
also a world where humanity is the end. In TS, Ellul describes the role of Technique in the
modern world, and he argued that it was a phenomenological work which aimed at presenting the
negative effects of Technique as they appeared to him. And though its predominantly negative
perspective can seem one-dimensional, from his dialectical understanding we recognize that
Technique can never be fully understood outside of the forces of its opposition which exist in
tension with it. Technique robs humanity of freedom and sets up a system of efficiency and
necessity but necessity’s opposition is free agency. The problem for humanity is that in a
determined system, humanity’s search for freedom is forced back to Technique for its
fulfillment: human freedom propagates Technique while at the same time limiting itself to the
realm of necessity (Ellul, 1981, pp. 26–42). In his book Hope in Time of Abandonment (Ellul,
1973a). Ellul presents the idea of hope as the dialectical link between the “closed” realm of
Technique and the “open” realm of the transcendent. Hope is not an emotion, but serves as a
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living reality which should be embraced and lived out. A dialectic/dialogic perspective helps us
to see both truths existing in a chain of tension but at the same time recognizing the link of hope
– a lived reality, a “new style of life,” and a new form of communication between human beings
(Ellul, 1989, p. 118). In addition to ethics, a dialectic/dialogic hermeneutic gives new
perspective to the human condition in the technological society. But perspective is not enough.
Freedom requires action and Ellul calls us to this action through three metaphors: the
craftsperson, the mutant, and the student.
The Craftsperson
In looking at Technique with a reconsideration of ethics and through a dialectic/dialogic
lens, we see another side – an opposition to the system of Technique which presents hope as a
lived reality. But we must take the next step and examine what a new style of life looks like and
how we might implement or consider a new form of communication between human beings.
The first entrance into this questions comes through the metaphor of craftsperson or artisan. One
distinctive of Technique is that it subsumes humanity into its machine-ness. As mentioned in
another chapter (4), Technique makes humanity a means to a means and in so doing, transforms
humanity into its own image. Marx (1867) critiqued the capitalist system for its exploitation of
lower class laborers by higher class capitalists who traded capital for labor in order to gain more
capital. Marx recognized within the industrial machine the disparity among classes and believed
that oppression would eventually lead to a revolution, an overthrow of the ruling capitalists
which would result in a new socialist system. The totality of Marx’s critique will not be
addressed here, but what he does reveal is how a technical system transforms humanity into
means. The industrial system functioned as a technical marvel built upon the values inherent in
Technique. In his work The Principles of Scientific Management (Taylor, 1911), Frederick
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Taylor set out to accomplish three purposes: (1) to point out the great loss that the country was
suffering due to inefficiency in daily acts, (2) to convince the reader that the remedy for
inefficiency is in systematic management rather than the search for an extraordinary man, and (3)
to prove that the best management is a true science resting on clear laws, rules and principles as a
foundation. Taylor’s scientific management served as a technical process designed to discover
through observation the most efficient procedure for every task. This included the rules for each
motion completed by a laborer, the perfection and standardization of the tools and working
conditions, the deconstruction of the task into its component parts and even the selection of the
best laborer for each job. Taylor recognized inefficiency as the greatest hindrance to production
and profit and set out to not only create the most efficient process for production but to secure
the maximum prosperity for each employee. Though he believed that improved “technique”
would serve to benefit the employee and improve his/her quality of life, ultimately he developed
a system whereby employees became little more than parts of the machine. Additionally, Max
Weber’s theory of bureaucracy (Weber, 1978; Weber & Henderson, 2012; and Weber &
Tawney, 2003) outlined six characteristics that contributed to the ideal organization: (1) task
specialization, (2) hierarchical authority structure, (3) formal employee selection, (4) rules and
requirements for uniformity, (5) impersonal relationships between employees, and (6) a career
orientation inherent in employees. All of these factors contributed to the depersonalization of the
worker in relationship to the organization. Against this systematic dehumanization which makes
laborers into component parts stands the metaphor of the craftsperson or artisan. Ellul
mentioned the tension between Technique and human freedom and the necessity for human
beings embedded in a technological society to seek freedom by turning to Technique. We
become what we create (see McLuhan, 1994) and the social construction of our mode of being in
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Technique prevents us from escaping the environment to which we have become so accustomed.
However, we can actively oppose this tendency of “becoming like unto them” (See the
explication of Psalm 119 in McLuhan, 1994, p. 45) by thinking and engaging in craftsmanship.
Ellul says, “While crowds of people adopt all the technological developments, we can act
only on individual levels. Hence, this is a true artisan’s work (Ellul, 2004, p. 82). A craftsperson
or artisan functions as an individual instead of a part within a larger collective, and craftsmanship
differs from skilled manual labor by valuing a basic enduring human principle, the desire to do a
job well for its own sake. Craftsmanship exposes Technique as a totalitarian system which
places all value on the collective at the expense of the individual. In the Greek myth of Pandora,
Hesiod describes her in Works and Days (Hesiod, 1993) as the “bitter gift of all the gods,” a
goddess of invention sent to earth by Zeus as punishment for Prometheus’s transgression who,
when she opened her box of new wonders, “scattered pains and evils among men” (See “The
Making of Pandora,” in Warner, 1996, pp. 214–219). Greek culture came to believe that
Pandora stood for elements of their own natures, but culture founded on man-made objects risks
continual self-harm (Sennett, 2009, p. 2). Hesiod reveals the dangers of Technique and the
consequences of opening up a box without a consideration of the potential consequences. But
that box has already been opened and we now seek ways to stand against the seemingly
deterministic forces that Technique employs against us. The craftsperson, as an antithesis to
Technique utilizes dimensions of skill, commitment, and judgment in contrast to the mechanical
technical process and in a way that focuses on the connection between hand and head. “Every
good craftsman conducts a dialogue between concrete practices and thinking; this dialogue
evolves into sustaining habits, and these habits establish a rhythm between problem solving and
problem finding” (Sennett, 2009, p. 9). Technique prevents this type of connection between
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hand and head focusing rather on a thoughtless processes of efficient production. Note the
distinction typical of “work” in the Technological society:
“Never before has the human race as a whole had to exert such efforts in its daily labors
as it does today as a result of its absorption into the monstrous technical
mechanism…The tempo of man’s work is not the traditional, ancestral tempo, nor is its
aim the handiwork which man produced with pride, the handiwork in which he
contemplated and recognized himself…how today’s work is less fatiguing and of shorter
duration, on the one hand, but, on the other, is an aimless, useless, and callous business,
tied to a clock, an absurdity profoundly felt and resented by the worker whose labor no
longer has anything in common with what was once traditionally called work…[Today’s
work] calls for different qualities in man. It implies in him an absence, whereas
previously it implied a presence. This absence is active, critical, efficient; it engages the
whole man and supposes that he is subordinated to its necessity and created for its ends.”
(Ellul, 2004, p. 86)
Craftsmanship, on the other hand, presents a metaphor which brings us back to a consideration of
what we do when we act in this world. It calls us to thoughtful action as opposed to mindless
repetition and begins as a bodily process of skill development and a mental act which includes
imagination. The idea of imagination starts in language which shows creatively how to do
something in an attempt to guide and direct bodily skill (Sennett, 2009, p. 10). The word guides
the imagination and provides the freedom and openness to explore possibility which opposes in
dialectical tension the necessity found in Technique. Ellul’s metaphor of the word and
commitment to the liberation of language forms a ground for craftsmanship as a dialogic
response to the idea of the technician. Indeed, the phenomenological embodiment found in
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craftsmanship, in the head and hand connection, has been lost in Technique. Of course the
technical process often requires physical “hand” processes but the technical process is designed
to take “the head” out of it, standardizing action and eliminating human choice and value
judgment. The craftsperson, on the contrary, presents thoughtful human action – praxis – as an
inoculation against the technological society.
How, then, can we assume the role of craftsperson in the technological society? First, we
must attend to the amount of technological mediation that we allow ourselves. Craftsmanship
engenders the idea of an intentional, thoughtful, directedness not only to the object of our
attention, but to the process of its creation. When we engage in craftsmanship we find value in
the process by which we reach the end rather than simply in the end itself. Technological
mediation replaces the process with a “black box” – something we do not always understand –
which allows us to reach the end faster and easier. The telegraph, telephone, television,
computer all employ technologies we do not fully comprehend to achieve our ends more
efficiently. Mediation always values destination over process, a perspective which discounts the
importance of the work itself. In her work, The Human Condition (Arendt, 1958), Hannah
Arendt makes an important distinction between labor and work. Labor was “enslavement by
necessity” in the inherent conditions of human life, whereas work leaves behind an artifact and is
inherently public – creating an objective and common world which stands between human
beings and unites them together. Work took labor out of the household necessity and made it
into a significant value for humanity. In his/her activity as worker, Arendt names the human
being homo faber – the builder, architect, craftsperson, and artist which creates and constructs
the public world. Arendt’s critique of modernity addresses a world created by homo faber
threatened with extinction due to the rise of animal laborans – those emboldened by technology
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who favor the values of life, productivity, and abundance instead of permanence, stability, and
durability. In technological mediation, we lose sight of the distinction between work and labor
because Technique refuses to make a distinction. Technique addresses each with the same
question – how can it be accomplished faster and more efficiently - and when we choose to
employ mediation, we can easily lose sight of that distinction as well. Choosing when to use
mediation and when to refrain enables us to reconsider in each activity the value of the work
itself. It allows us to find value in the process instead of just seeking to arrive at the destination.
Secondly, we must give more attention to the creative aspects of human life.
Craftsmanship is defined by creativity. As Arendt noted, homo faber is a creative being which
builds walls, both physical and cultural, to divide the distinctly human realm from that of nature
and provide a context in which meaningful human life can unfold (Arendt, 1958, pp. 136–173).
Art, music, design, aesthetics, and creativity all give meaning to life and provide a distinctive
between the instinctual world of animals and the higher order of human activity. The ability to
create involves imagination and abstract thought. The creative process forces us to think outside
of Technique and concern ourselves with something more than utility. When we practice a
musical instrument, paint a landscape, or build a table, we engage life on our own terms and
refuse to be directed by the values of Technique. We can create for no other reason than to
create. We can build for no other reason than to engage in the process. Creativity functions as a
mysterious process below the surface of consciousness and beyond the aspect of utility and when
we engage it in any form, we allow ourselves the opportunity to escape from the busyness and
necessity of the technological world in which we live. The role of craftsperson allows a dialogic
perspective of Technique and enables us to live life outside of its domination and tyranny.
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The Mutant
In addition to the metaphor of craftsperson, Ellul presents the idea of mutant. Typical
ideas conjured up at the mention of that phrase revolve around grotesque creatures ostracized by
society due to genetic mutation which have indisputably established their difference from normal
human existence. Television and movies have expanded upon this caricature to establish
mutants as antiheros who, through their mutation have achieved special powers which set them
above humanity. Marvel’s X-MEN franchise tells stories of individuals who, by nature of their
genetic mutation, have been granted special powers – telekinesis, the ability to fly, the ability to
manipulate and control metal, the ability to teleport, and many others – yet face social pressure
and exclusion from society. These “mutants” are required to keep their powers a secret so as not
to bring upon themselves the rejection and wrath of a society who fears their power and worries
about the potential danger of mutants who hold the power of life and death. In the X-MEN, one
continual narrative theme revolves around the “otherness” of the mutant. The mutant is not like
the rest of us and, therefore, necessarily “other.” It is a commentary both on how society views
the other and the dialectic between inclusion and exclusion. Accordingly, a mutant must accept
its otherness, the authenticity of its being, and find a way to remain true to its own nature, living
within a culture that sees it as different. Naturally, this narrative confronts the idea of racism as
well as addressing the tension between the desire to conform vs. the desire to remain authentic.
In one of the movies, the “normal” humans create a mutant antidote which allows mutants to
cure the X gene responsible for their mutation. The story revolves around the tension between
mutants who want to be “normal” and accepted by society, those who want to remain authentic
and true to their own being, and a power structure who, for reasons of control, want to inoculate
them all. The stories of X-MEN and mutant beings have been around since first appearing in

154

comic books in 1963. It is not clear if Ellul had these narratives and characters in mind when
doing his research though it may not be out of the question to assume his general familiarity with
the stories. Nevertheless, in addressing how one should respond to the technical world, he
chooses to use the metaphor:
“To use big words, confronted with the technological phenomenon and the new milieu
we live in, we must have ‘mutants.’ Not the mutants of science fiction – the
technological human being with a robot’s brain – but quite the opposite. To be a mutant
a person needs to become someone who can use the technologies and at the same time
not be used by, assimilated by, or subordinated to them.” (Ellul, 2004, p. 82)
Similar to the antihero narrative, Ellul suggests becoming “other” to the inclusion of Technique.
He calls for people who will embrace a superpower of sorts - one which stands above the
technical power structure - and know how to use it and operate within it without being used by it.
The mutant as antihero fully understands its power and accepts the responsibility that goes along
with it. In X-MEN, there exists a conflict between “good” and “bad” mutants. The “good”
mutants recognize the power they hold along with its responsibility, and seek to exist in a
dialogic relationship with the rest of humanity. They seek to do good for the human race even
while recognizing their rejection from normative culture. At the same time, “bad” mutants
realize their peril in a culture seeking to eliminate them and attempt to take power over humanity
in their desire to protect their existence. In a sense, there exists two sets of tension – that
between mutants and normative human culture, and that between two mutant factions with
differing perspectives on their roles: the responsibility they have considering their powers, and
their perspectives of power and control. To turn the narrative back to Ellul, we face similar
tensions. Normative human culture is encapsulated in Technique. Ellul calls for the mutant –
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the antihero to stand outside of and above this system – to know it, to use it, and to employ it
with an awareness of its existence as a system of domination. The mutant also exists within
another tension – one with “like-minded” mutants who seek to destroy the system for the
purpose of gaining control back and making the world as they would have it.
In the early 19th Century, a group of textile workers and weavers began to recognize the
technological invasion into their livelihood. The invention of automated textile equipment
threatened to replace these skilled workers with cheaper and less skilled alternatives. This threat
to their jobs prompted protests which, outside of any formal union or organization, resulted in
members of the group destroying the machinery threatening their employment and income. The
Luddite protest concerned the circumventing of fair and standard labor practices but in
destroying the machines, they were painted as individuals hostile to technology and progress.
Interestingly enough, this group recognized what the introduction of new technologies meant for
their future earning potential and their ability to provide for their families, and they decided to
take action against a system which sought to dominate, subordinate, and oppress them. Similar
protests happen all the time – unions which bully independent contractors who can “low ball”
construction bids and, most recently, taxi drivers and hotels who are losing business to
technological giants Uber and Airbnb. Yet the narrative around Luddites as hostile to
technology, though most likely a false narrative, points to someone who cannot live above the
system. Ellul points out:
“I know that it has in fact happened that when historical societies organized, small groups
of sometimes individual people absolutely refused, saying ‘We want to keep living like
monkeys in the forest.’ Of course they could do so, rejecting the development of society.
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But this was no solution. Those who continued living in the forest became extinct.”
(Ellul, 2004, p. 83)
We cannot go back to a pre-technological society and I do not believe we would want to even if
we could. We must, however, concern ourselves with the possibilities and challenges of living
within the current technological culture. In Technopoly, Postman echoes a similar perspective in
offering the idea of a “loving resistance fighter.” One which:
“understands that technology must never be accepted as part of the natural order of
things, that ever technology – from an IQ test to an automobile to a television set to a
computer – is a product of a particular economic and political context and carries with it a
program, an agenda, and a philosophy that may or may not be life-enhancing and that
therefore require scrutiny, criticism, and control. In short, a technological resistance
fighter maintains an epistemological and psychic distance from any technology, so that it
always appears somewhat strange, never inevitable, never natural.” (Postman, 1993, pp.
184–185)
The mutant role is inherently dialectic – offering an opposition to the all-encompassing system of
Technique - while at the same time dialogic – entering into a conversation with culture to
determine the way forward. As a mutant, one employs the superpowers of recognizing
Technique in all its facets and learning to live thoughtfully within the system and, at the same
time, avoiding the constant pressure to conform to it.
So how does one live as a mutant in the technological society? First, I think to live as a
mutant we must adopt a critical perspective of Technique. When I say critical, I do not mean
antithetical. A critical perspective does not mean that we should unilaterally discount all new
technologies, become technophobes, or employ the strategies of the Luddites. Living as a
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mutant means living with Technique, yet not being consumed by it. Admittedly, in a
technological society, this might be impossible but the potential impossibility of our situation
should not preclude us from attempts at mutant living, as difficult as they may seem. In this
case, the cliché applies – good things never come easy. A critical approach toward Technique
attempts to “understand the relations among power, language, social/cultural practices, and the
treatment and/or suppression of important conflicts as they relate to the production of individual
identities, social knowledge, and social and organizational decision making” (Deetz, 2004, p.
85). We must understand Technique as an underlying system within our society that directs the
current of human history. We must ask questions of Technique that determine to unmask power
structures and socio-cultural practices which contribute to social division, inequality, and
partisanship. Technology functions to both give and to take away, and as Postman and Innis
(Harold A. Innis, 2008; See Postman, 1993, pp. 10–11 and) both recognized, new technological
developments have consequences. With each new technology, there are winners and losers.
And as has always been the case, the winners utilize any and all means to convince the losers
that they are actually winning. We must investigate to whom the technology will give greater
power and freedom and at the same time, whose power and freedom will be reduced by it? We
must not accept without reflection and attention the rhetoric of technology which claims untold
benefits without significant consequence. We must approach Technique with a wary eye,
because Technique always shows its value but rarely reveals its dark side. We must question
numbers and statistics given as proof without understanding the questions which prompted those
numbers. We must not fail to recognize the difference between information and understanding.
We must question jargon which can be used to distract us from real consequences. We must
recognize the values of technology but not be lulled into thinking that technological
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developments represent the highest possible form of human achievement (Postman, 1993, p.
184). We must realize and accept that some of the biggest difficulties we face as human beings
in the world, the challenges of the human condition, will never be solved through technology.
We must not accept Technique uncritically.
Second, we must be intentional in our engagement with technology. This intentionality
requires thoughtful practice which understands the benefits as well as the consequences. The
drive for the implementation of new technologies without careful consideration of the
consequences is ubiquitous in our culture. The recent example of the mishandling and leaking of
user data by Facebook serves as a wakeup call to mutants (Kharpal, 2018). As with any
corporation, Technique guides and functions as the underlying value to the detriment of
everything else. To believe that corporations hold to ethical standards when it comes to users vs.
profits is to sink into a dangerous naiveté and believe in the inherent goodness of people against
the overwhelming power of Technique. A recent internal memo by one of Facebook’s longest
serving executives illustrates the point:
“We connect people. That can be good if they make it positive. Maybe someone finds
love. Maybe it even saves the life of someone on the brink of suicide. So we connect
more people. That can be bad if they make it negative. Maybe it costs a life by exposing
someone to bullies. Maybe someone dies in a terrorist attack coordinated on our tools
[…] We connect people. Period. That’s why all the work we do in growth is justified. All
the questionable contact importing practices. All the subtle language that helps people
stay searchable by friends. All of the work we do to bring more communication in. The
work we will likely have to do in China some day. All of it.” (Lovejoy, 2018)

159

We can no longer assume the integrity and ethics of technology companies and must realize that
these technologies use us as the primary mode of their existence. And that realization must
propel us to proactively employ technologies to our own ends instead of allowing ourselves to
become subject to the ends of the technology. We must strive to find ways to enter a dialogic
relationship with Technique as mutants who live within the technological system and use the
technologies inherent within it, yet refuse to be used and dominated by it.
The Student
The final metaphor that gives us insight into a dialogic response to Technique is the idea
of student. Education has always served dialectically to move culture forward. Knowledge is
powerful. As Voltaire once said in a letter, “To hold a pen is to be at war” (Voltaire, 1748) The
intimation is that knowledge is dangerous. History is rife with examples – Darwinian Theory,
the Protestant Revolution, the Enlightenment, Galileo, and the Scientific Revolution. In each
case, education resulted in a revolution that transformed the world. A revolutions, however, that
was not without its costs. In Galileo’s case, his invention of the telescope and observation that
the earth was round and not flat called into question, not only the current epistemology, but
leveled charges which upset the current hierarchical power structure. He was put in jail by the
Catholic Church for heresy. Education upsets the monopolies of knowledge which derive their
power from traditional understandings. Addressing a response to Technique, Ellul notes the
importance of education:
“This implies a development of the intellect and a development of consciousness which can
come about only for individual, but it is the only development possible. This leads,
obviously to the problem of educating children.” (Ellul, 2004, p. 83)
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When we consider a curriculum for education in the Technological Society, it must be a
dialectic/dialogic endeavor. On one hand, we must recognize the fact that our children and
grandchildren will be living in this system of Technique and we cannot allow ourselves to
believe that we could, even if we would so desire, keep them from having contact with it. We
cannot go back to the 19th Century. Today’s digital natives will never experience a world outside
of Technopoly. It is the constant and will remain so. Yet at the same time, we cannot hope for
them to be pure “technical experts, making them so well fit for the technological society that
they are totally devoid of what has until now been considered human” (Ellul, 2004, p. 83) We
must educate dialectically/dialogically.
What do I mean by this? To educate from dialectic means that we understand the tension
of living within Technique but at the same time living against Technique. We teach our children
whatever is necessary to live in this system and, at the same time, to develop the critical thinking
skills necessary to recognize the system they must live within. To re-invoke the metaphor, we
must teach our children to study the water in their own fishbowl. Additionally, Postman (See
1993, pp. 187–189) suggests coherence in the educational process. One of the psychologically
destructive aspects of education in this world is the lack of awareness and the sense of being lost
and overwhelmed in a vast ocean of information. In such a state, nothing makes sense. In the
late 20th Century, the effort was made in the educational system to connect all classrooms to the
internet so that students could have access to more information. And the internet has provided
just that all the information in the world at our fingertips. But who can grasp it all? The human
brain is incapable of it so we turn to the technological savior to make sense of it for us. Google
gives us the answers we are looking for based on computer algorithms which make the decisions
about what information we get when we inquire. This “technological solution” only masks the
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problem. Postman’s suggestion is an educational process that includes things such as virtue, a
sense of purpose, meaning, and connectedness. Even potential metanarratives such as learning
for the glory of God or the love of country can serve as unifying educational principles. Possibly
even themes such as emotional health or a quest for the “real self” (Postman, 1993, pp. 186–
187). Not that any one of these is necessarily correct or even realistic, and it is not my intention
here to outline a curriculum, but mainly to illustrate the point that education should reflect some
overall sense of purpose, coherence, and structure which addresses the problems of the
technological culture and provides the intellectual training that can give students the critical
thinking skills necessary for living dialectically.
One other potential avenue is a dialogic philosophy of education. Ellul’s metaphor of the
word and his emphasis on the liberation of language as dialectical opposition to the culture of
image calls us to reconsider a dialogic hermeneutic entrance to education. In Pedagogy of the
Oppressed (Freire, 2000), Paulo Freire establishes dialogue as a central to his idea of an
interpersonal pedagogy. He connects the idea of dialogue to “reflection” and “action” with a
recognition that through praxis, dialogue can transform the world (Freire, 2000, p. 75). Dialogue
in education liberates the individual from the oppression of society. In his historical moment,
Freire showed how dialogue could liberate people by fighting for the literacy of the oppressed
people through an interpersonal pedagogy. He showed how to uphold the dignity of the human
being in the face of oppression by engaging in a dialogic learning process. Dialogue necessitates
a love for the other person, a humility to learn from them, and a belief that the co-constituted
dialogue can shape the world .(Arnett & Arneson, 1999, p. 185). Additionally Freire’s position
resonates with Ellul’s dialectic link of hope:
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“[D]ialogue [cannot] exist without hope. Hope is rooted in men’s [or women’s]
incompleteness, from which they move out in constant search – a search which can be
carried out only in communion with other men [or women]. Hopelessness is a form of
silence, of denying the world and fleeing from it. The dehumanization resulting from
unjust order is not a cause for despair but for hope, leading to the incessant pursuit of the
humanity denied by injustice.” (Freire as quoted in Arnett & Arneson, 1999, p. 185)
A dialogic education can provide coherence, meaning, and a solid ground upon which students
can stand in an avalanche of meaninglessness.
Additionally, education must not succumb to the values of Technique and should attend
to history and the humanities to provide guidance and wisdom for students. As has been stated
many times, “those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it” (Santayana,
1980). For some, it is a revelation to say that every subject has a history – a past, present, and
future in the development of knowledge within that subject. This history applies to biology,
physics, mathematics, literature, and art as much as it does to social studies. To teach a subject
without reference to the history of that subject – what we once knew about it, what we thought
we knew about it, what we know about it today, and the fact that we will know more about it in
the future, that our knowledge of that subject though vast, is and will always be, incomplete – is
to reduce that subject to a commodity (Postman, 1993, p. 189) and works to create an elitist
perspective in the mind of the student – the idea that their “current” knowledge is the best. To
teach every subject as history creates a different epistemology – one that recognizes the
evolution and development of knowledge rather than its finality. One that recognizes
interpretation – that there is not one history, but histories, human interpretations that give
multiple perspectives and multiple answers depending upon the questions asked. Second, we
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must also not fail to teach the humanities. Obviously in a technological society, the STEM
programs will be most valued. This suggestion does not mean that education should neglect
STEM in favor of the humanities but that we should recognize the differences and values of
each, and give each their due. An education which fails to address the humanities fails to
account for the corpus of human knowledge especially concerning our interpersonal relations.
Interestingly enough, some major tech gurus have recently recognized the importance of the
humanities in education (“Google finds STEM skills aren’t the most important skills,” 2018;
Jackson, n.d.) in thinking about the technological future of employment and the training which
will be most beneficial for employees. We should remember the work of Cicero (1942),
Quintilian (2002), Augustine (2009), and many others – to understand that we stand on the
shoulders of those who have gone before us and that the world, though guided by scientific
principles, is also constructed of human interpretation to which the humanities can give insight.
Finally, education systems should endeavor to make technology itself - as a philosophical system
– a focus of inquiry. In order to live as a student in the technological society, we must engage in
a dialogue with Technique itself. We must endeavor to understand it – its underlying
philosophical dictums, its effects upon human cognition and psychology, and the methods and
modes of its operation and incorporation into human culture and society. Any education which
fails to investigate Technique condemns humanity to the consequences of the machine.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we harken back to where we started. How does Ellul’s work enable us to
respond to the technological society? First, he directs us to a dialogic relationship with ethics.
The problem of our culture concerns a misguided perspective on ends and means due to the
societal infestation of Technique. Ellul highlights the value of human freedom which has been

164

subjugated in the technological society. He helps us to reconsider whether our media ecology is
making us better or worse. Second, Ellul presents us with a dialectic/dialogic hermeneutic into
this problem. We see through his eyes the inevitability of the oppositions that exist and how we
engage in the unity of these contraries. He enables us to enter into a dialogue with these
contraries, to seek understanding rather than mandate, and to understand that life means
wrestling and living within the tension. Finally, he gives us three dialogic metaphors for action
that can help us to live authentically within this technical culture. The craftsperson shows us
how to differentiate the process from the destination and to concern ourselves with good work
instead of seeing everything as labor to be reduced through mediation. The mutant gives us a
perspective on how to use technology but not be used by technology – to see Technique critically
and to employ it intentionally. The student enables us to recognize the value in education – to
understand the importance of the historicity of subjects, to see the relevance of the humanities,
and to reframe the philosophy of technology as a focus of inquiry. Though we engage the
technological world and perceive the ever-present, all-encompassing, dominating nature of
Technique, Ellul gives us hope. Hope that we can live transcendently within this system and still
find the freedom we ultimately seek.
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